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We analyze global data about electricity generation and document that the risk exposure of a firm’s owners and its workers depends on competitors’ ability or willingness to change their output in response to productivity shocks. Competitor inflexibility appears to be a risk factor: the sales of firms with more inflexible competitors respond more strongly to aggregate sales shocks. As a consequence, competitor inflexibility also affects the stability of firms’ total wage- and dividend-payments. Firms with relatively flexible competitors appear to smoothen both wages and dividends, but an increase in competitor inflexibility is associated with less dividend-smoothing and more wage-smoothing. Our evidence supports the idea that labor productivity risk associated with competitor inflexibility should be borne by firms’ shareholders, rather than by their workers.
Low risk anomalies?
(2016)
This paper shows theoretically and empirically that beta- and volatility-based low risk anomalies are driven by return skewness. The empirical patterns concisely match the predictions of our model which generates skewness of stock returns via default risk. With increasing downside risk, the standard capital asset pricing model increasingly overestimates required equity returns relative to firms' true (skew-adjusted) market risk. Empirically, the profitability of betting against beta/volatility increases with firms' downside risk. Our results suggest that the returns to betting against beta/volatility do not necessarily pose asset pricing puzzles but rather that such strategies collect premia that compensate for skew risk.
Using merger announcements and applying methods from computational linguistics we find strong evidence that stock prices under-react to information in financial media. A one standard deviation increase in the media-implied probability of merger completion increases the subsequent 12-day return of a long-short merger strategy by 1.2 percentage points. Filtering out the 28% of announced deals with the lowest media-implied completion probability increases the annualized alpha from merger arbitrage by 9.3 percentage points. Our results are particularly pronounced when high-yield spreads are large and on days when only few merger deals are announced. We also document that financial media information is orthogonal to announcement day returns.
The ECB’s Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) program, launched in summer 2012, indirectly recapitalized periphery country banks through its positive impact on the value of sovereign bonds. However, the regained stability of the European banking sector has not fully transferred into economic growth. We show that zombie lending behavior of banks that still remained undercapitalized after the OMT announcement is an important reason for this development. As a result, there was no positive impact on real economic activity like employment or investment. Instead, firms mainly used the newly acquired funds to build up cash reserves. Finally, we document that creditworthy firms in industries with a high prevalence of zombie firms suffered significantly from the credit misallocation, which slowed down the economic recovery.
SAFE Newsletter : 2016, Q3
(2016)
SAFE Newsletter : 2016, Q4
(2016)
Amid increasing regulation, structural changes of the market and Quantitative Easing as well as extremely low yields, concerns about the market liquidity of the Eurozone sovereign debt markets have been raised. We aim to quantify illiquidity risks, especially such related to liquidity dry-ups, and illiquidity spillover across maturities by examining the reaction to illiquidity shocks at high frequencies in two ways:
a) the regular response to shocks using a variance decomposition and,
b) the response to shocks in the extremes by detecting illiquidity shocks and modeling those as ultivariate Hawkes processes.
We find that:
a) market liquidity is more fragile and less predictable when an asset is very illiquid and,
b) the response to shocks in the extremes is structurally different from the regular response.
In 2015 long-term bonds are less liquid and the medium-term bonds are liquid, although we observe that in the extremes the medium-term bonds are increasingly driven by illiquidity spillover from the long-term titles.
How do insiders trade?
(2016)
We characterize how informed investors trade in the options market ahead of corporate news when they receive private, but noisy, information about (i) the timing of the announcement and (ii) its impact on stock prices. Our theoretical framework generates a rich set of predictions about the insiders’ behavior and their maximum expected returns. Three different analyses offer empirical support for our approach. First, predicted trades resemble illegal insider trades documented in SEC litigation cases with insiders being more likely to trade in options that offer higher expected returns. Second, pre-announcement patterns in unusual activity in the options market ahead of significant corporate news are consistent with the predictions of our framework. We employ our approach to characterize informed trading ahead of twelve different types of news including the announcement of earnings, corporate guidance, M&As, product innovations, management changes, and analyst recommendations. Third, to address concerns that pre-announcement patterns are driven by speculation, we show that measures capturing trading activity in call (put) options with high expected returns predict significant positive (negative) corporate news in the aggregate cross-section.
Data show that sovereign risk reduces liquidity, increases funding cost and risk of banks highly exposed to it. I build a model that rationalizes this fact. Banks act as delegated monitors and invest in risky projects and in risky sovereign bonds. As investors hear rumors of increased sovereign risk, they run the bank (via global games). Banks could rollover liquidity in repo market using government bonds as collateral, but as sovereign risk raises collateral values shrink. Overall banks’ liquidity falls (its cost increases) and so does banks’ credit. In this context noisy news (announcements with signal extraction) of consolidation policies are recessionary in the short run, as they contribute to investors and banks pessimism, and mildly expansionary in the medium run. The banks liquidity channel plays a major role in the fiscal transmission.
n traditional portfolio theory, risk management is limited to the choice of the relative weights of the riskless asset and a diversified basket of risky securities, respectively. Yet in industry, risk management represents a central aspect of asset management, with distinct responsibilities and organizational structures. We identify frictions that lead to increased importance of risk management and describe three major challenges to be met by the risk manager. First, we derive a framework to determine a portfolio position's marginal risk contribution and to decide on optimal portfolio weights of active managers. Second, we survey methods to control downside risk and unwanted risks since investors frequently have non-standard preferences which make them seek protection against excessive losses. Third, we point out that quantitative portfolio management usually requires the selection and parametrization of stylized models of financial markets. We therefore discuss risk management approaches to deal with parameter uncertainty, such as shrinkage procedures or re- sampling procedures, and techniques of dealing with model uncertainty via methods of Bayesian model averaging.