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Die ersten »Banknoten« waren Schuldscheine oder Quittungen für hinterlegte Edelmetalle. Erst mit der Abkopplung von Papier und Einlage eröffneten sich neue Möglichkeiten der Finanzierung für Banken und Staatslenker – mit den entsprechenden Risiken. Der historische Blick auf die unterschiedlichen geldpolitischen Interessen von Regierungen, Privat- und Zentralbanken wirft auch ein neues Licht auf die Hintergründe der gegenwärtigen Krise.
Vielfältige Einschnitte im Rentensystem haben die Bedeutung der privaten Altersvorsorge in den vergangenen Jahren massiv erhöht. Neben Immobilienbesitz, Lebensversicherungen und staatlich geförderten Programmen zur privaten Vorsorge hat sich inzwischen auch die eigenverantwortliche Altersvorsorge mit Wertpapierdepots etabliert, so dass die Anzahl privater Depots in den letzten 25 Jahren von 8,0 auf 27,9 Millionen gestiegen ist. Vor diesem Hintergrund ist die Frage von zentraler Bedeutung, wie gut Anleger ihr Geld investieren.
Wirtschaftliche Umbrüche, wie sie mit der deutschen Wiedervereinigung verbunden waren, sind in industrialisierten Ländern selten. Sie bieten deshalb aus wissenschaftlicher Sicht eine wertvolle Gelegenheit, um Erkenntnisse über das ökonomische Verhalten von Menschen zu gewinnen. Das Sparverhalten der Ostdeutschen nach der deutschen Wiedervereinigung bestätigt, dass Menschen ihre Ersparnis rational planen.
Spätestens seit die Europäische Zentralbank (EZB) ihr Ankaufprogramm für Wertpapiere bekannt gegeben hat, ist die Diskussion über die Wirksamkeit dieser Maßnahmen auch in Europa angekommen. Wegen der besonderen institutionellen Umstände des Euroraums – Kauf von Anleihen der einzelnen Nationalstaaten und des Verbots der monetären Finanzierung – reichen die möglichen Nebenwirkungen hierzulande über den rein geldpolitischen Horizont hinaus.
Life insurers use accounting and actuarial techniques to smooth reporting of firm assets and liabilities, seeking to transfer surpluses in good years to cover benefit payouts in bad years. Yet these techniques have been criticized as they make it difficult to assess insurers’ true financial status. We develop stylized and realistically-calibrated models of a participating life annuity, an insurance product that pays retirees guaranteed lifelong benefits along with variable non-guaranteed surplus. Our goal is to illustrate how accounting and actuarial techniques for this type of financial contract shape policyholder wellbeing, along with insurer profitability and stability. Smoothing adds value to both the annuitant and the insurer, so curtailing smoothing could undermine the market for long-term retirement payout products.
The purpose of the data presented in this article is to use it in ex post estimations of interest rate decisions by the European Central Bank (ECB), as it is done by Bletzinger and Wieland (2017) [1]. The data is of quarterly frequency from 1999 Q1 until 2013 Q2 and consists of the ECB's policy rate, inflation rate, real output growth and potential output growth in the euro area. To account for forward-looking decision making in the interest rate rule, the data consists of expectations about future inflation and output dynamics. While potential output is constructed based on data from the European Commission's annual macro-economic database, inflation and real output growth are taken from two different sources both provided by the ECB: the Survey of Professional Forecasters and projections made by ECB staff. Careful attention was given to the publication date of the collected data to ensure a real-time dataset only consisting of information which was available to the decision makers at the time of the decision.
Risk culture during the last 2000 years - from an aleatory society to the illusion of risk control
(2017)
The culture of risk is 2000 years old, although the term “risk” developed much later. The culture of merchants making decisions under uncertainty and taking the individual responsibility for the uncertain future started with the Roman “Aleatory Society”, continued with medieval sea merchants, who made business “ad risicum et fortunam”, and sustained to the culture of entrepreneurs in times of industrialisation and dynamic economic changes in the 18th and 19th century. For all long-term commercial relationships, the culture of honourable merchants with personal decision-making and individual responsibility worked well. The successful development of sciences, statistics and engineering within the last 100 years led to the conjecture that men can “construct” an economical system with a pre-defined “clockwork” behaviour. Since probability distributions could be calculated ex-post, an illusion to control risk ex-ante became a pattern in business and banking. Based on the recent experiences with the financial crisis, a “risk culture” should understand that human “Strength of Knowledge” is limited and the “unknown unknown” can materialise. As all decisions and all commercial agreements are made under uncertainty, the culture of honourable merchants is key to achieve trust in long-term economic relations with individual responsibility, flexibility to adapt and resilience against the unknown.
The current discussion about a “risk culture” in financial services was triggered by the recent series of financial crises. The last decade saw a long list of hubris, misconduct and criminal activities by human beings on a single or even a collective basis in banks, in the industry or in the whole economy. As a counter-reaction, financial authorities called for a guidance by a “new” risk culture in financial institutions based on a set of abstract, formal, and normative governance processes. While traditional risk research in economics and in banking was focused on the statistical aspects of risk as the probability of loss multiplied by the amount of loss, culture is a paraphrase for the behavior in collectives and dynamics of organization found in human societies. Therefore, a “risk culture” should link the normative concepts of risk with the positive “real-world” decision-making in financial services. This paper will describe a novel view on “risk culture” from the perspective of human beings interacting in dynamical and intertemporal commercial relations. In this context “risk” is perceived by economic agents ex−ante as the consequence of the time lag between the present and the uncertain future development (compared to a probability distribution calculated by observers ex−post). For all those individual decisions—to be made under uncertainty—future “risk” includes the so-called “normal accidents”, i.e., failures that will happen at some uncertain point in time but are inevitable, and the only questions are when failure will happen and how to maintain function in the first line of defense. Finally, the shift from an abstract definition of “risk” as a probability distribution to a role model of “honorable merchants” as a benchmark for significant individual decision-making with individual responsibilities for the uncertain future outcome provides a new framework to discuss the responsibilities in the financial industry.