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The debate about the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), which are to replace the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) when they expire in 2015, is moving very quickly. Weighing in on this debate, we argue that if the SDGs are to be as effective as they can realistically be, concrete responsibilities must be assigned to specific competent actors, measurement methods involved in development targets must not be allowed to be changed midway, and the tracking of progress must be left to independent experts. New development goals should aim for inequality reduction, a more comprehensive view of poverty, and, most importantly, systemic reforms of global institutions. The world will not make decent progress against poverty until the most powerful agents accept real action commitments, not only in the marginal area of development assistance, but in all their policy and institutional design decisions, at both the domestic and especially the supranational level. We end with eight examples of institutional reform goals – ranging from deterring trade barriers to mitigating the effects of lost corporate tax revenues on poor populations – that should be included in the new list.
Much of the recent philosophical literature about distributive justice and equality in the domestic context has been dominated by a family of theories now often called ‘luck egalitarianism’, according to which it is unfair if some people are worse off than others through no choice or fault of their own. This principle has also found its way into the literature about global justice. This paper explores some difficulties that this principle faces: it is largely insensitive to the causes of global inequality, and it is so demanding that it can only give rise to weak moral claims. I go on to argue that a) understanding justice claims as merely weak claims rests on an implausible and impractical concept of justice, and b) using the global luck egalitarian argument in practical discourse is likely to lead to misunderstanding, and to be counterproductive if the aim is to tackle global inequality. While these considerations do not suffice to make a conclusive case against the luck egalitarian principle, they should be acknowledged by global luck egalitarians – as some similar problems have indeed been by domestic luck egalitarians – and need to be addressed.