Refine
Year of publication
- 2014 (4) (remove)
Document Type
- Working Paper (4) (remove)
Language
- English (4)
Has Fulltext
- yes (4)
Is part of the Bibliography
- no (4)
Keywords
- financial crisis (2)
- limited attention (2)
- OTC markets (1)
- advertising (1)
- bank capital requirements (1)
- bank regulation (1)
- bank resolution (1)
- disclosure (1)
- euro (1)
- financial literacy (1)
Institute
- Center for Financial Studies (CFS) (4) (remove)
his paper distils three lessons for bank regulation from the experience of the 2009-12 euro-area financial crisis. First, it highlights the key role that sovereign debt exposures of banks have played in the feedback loop between bank and fiscal distress, and inquires how the regulation of banks’ sovereign exposures in the euro area should be changed to mitigate this feedback loop in the future. Second, it explores the relationship between the forbearance of non-performing loans by European banks and the tendency of EU regulators to rescue rather than resolving distressed banks, and asks to what extent the new regulatory framework of the euro-area “banking union” can be expected to mitigate excessive forbearance and facilitate resolution of insolvent banks. Finally, the paper highlights that capital requirements based on the ratio of Tier-1 capital to banks’ risk-weighted assets were massively gamed by large banks, which engaged in various forms of regulatory arbitrage to minimize their capital charges while expanding leverage. This argues in favor of relying on a set of simpler and more robust indicators to determine banks’ capital shortfall, such as book and market leverage ratios.
Has economic research been helpful in dealing with the financial crises of the early 2000s? On the whole, the answer is negative, although there are bright spots. Economists have largely failed to predict both crises, largely because most of them were not analytically equipped to understand them, in spite of their recurrence in the last 25 years. In the pre-crisis period, however, there have been important exceptions – theoretical and empirical strands of research that largely laid out the basis for our current thinking about financial crises. Since 2008, a flurry of new studies offered several different interpretations of the US crisis: to some extent, they point to potentially complementary factors, but disagree on their relative importance, and therefore on policy recommendations. Research on the euro debt crisis has so far been much more limited: even Europe-based researchers – including CEPR ones – have often directed their attention more to the US crisis than to that occurring on their doorstep. In terms of impact on policy and regulatory reform, the record is uneven. On the one hand, the swift and massive liquidity provision by central banks in the wake of both crises is, at least partly, to be credited to previous research on the role of central banks as lenders of last resort in crises and on the real effects of bank lending and monetary policy. On the other hand, economists have had limited impact on the reform of prudential and security market regulation. In part, this is due to their neglect of important regulatory choices, which policy-makers are therefore left to take without the guidance of academic research-based analysis.
Advertising arbitrage
(2014)
Speculators often advertise arbitrage opportunities in order to persuade other investors and thus accelerate the correction of mispricing. We show that in order to minimize the risk and the cost of arbitrage an investor who identifies several mispriced assets optimally advertises only one of them, and overweights it in his portfolio; a risk-neutral arbitrageur invests only in this asset. The choice of the asset to be advertised depends not only on mispricing but also on its "advertisability" and accuracy of future news about it. When several arbitrageurs identify the same arbitrage opportunities, their decisions are strategic complements: they invest in the same asset and advertise it. Then, multiple equilibria may arise, some of which inefficient: arbitrageurs may correct small mispricings while failing to eliminate large ones. Finally, prices react more strongly to the ads of arbitrageurs with a successful track record, and reputation-building induces high-skill arbitrageurs to advertise more than others.
We study a model where some investors ("hedgers") are bad at information processing, while others ("speculators") have superior information-processing ability and trade purely to exploit it. The disclosure of financial information induces a trade externality: if speculators refrain from trading, hedgers do the same, depressing the asset price. Market transparency reinforces this mechanism, by making speculators' trades more visible to hedgers. As a consequence, issuers will oppose both the disclosure of fundamentals and trading transparency. Issuers may either under- or over-provide information compared to the socially efficient level if speculators have more bargaining power than hedgers, while they never under-provide it otherwise. When hedgers have low financial literacy, forbidding their access to the market may be socially efficient.