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To monitor one's speech means to check the speech plan for errors, both before and after talking. There are several theories as to how this process works. We give a short overview on the most influential theories only to focus on the most widely received one, the Perceptual Loop Theory of monitoring by Levelt (1983). One of the underlying assumptions of this theory is the existence of an Inner Loop, a monitoring device that checks for errors before speech is articulated. This paper collects evidence for the existence of such an internal monitoring device and questions how it might work. Levelt's theory argues that internal monitoring works by means of perception, but there are other empirical findings that allow for the assumption that an Inner Loop could also use our speech production devices. Based on data from both experimental and aphasiological papers we develop a model based on Levelt (1983) which shows that internal monitoring might in fact make use of both perception and production means.
Based on Foucault’s analysis of German Neoliberalism and his thesis of ambiguity, the following paper draws a two-level distinction between individual and regulatory ethics. The individual ethics level – which has received surprisingly little attention – contains the Christian foundation of values and the liberal-Kantian heritage of so called Ordoliberalism – as one variety of neoliberalism. The regulatory or formal-institutional ethics level on the contrary refers to the ordoliberal framework of a socio-economic order. By differentiating these two levels of ethics incorporated in German Neoliberalism, it is feasible to distinguish dissimilar varieties of neoliberalism and to link Ordoliberalism to modern economic ethics. Furthermore, it allows a revision of the dominant reception of Ordoliberalism which focuses solely on the formal-institutional level while mainly neglecting the individual ethics level.
The unintended consequences of the debt ... will increased government expenditure hurt the economy?
(2011)
In 2008, governments in many countries embarked on large fiscal expenditure programmes, with the intention to support the economy and prevent a more serious recession. In this study, the overall impact of a substantial increase in fiscal expenditure is considered by providing a novel analysis of the most relevant recent experience in similar circumstances, namely that of Japan in the 1990s. Then a weak economy with risk-averse banks seemed to require some of the largest peacetime fiscal stimulation programmes on record, albeit with disappointing results. The explanations provided by the literature and their unsatisfactory empirical record are reviewed. An alternative explanation, derived from early Keynesian models on the ineffectiveness of fiscal policy is presented in the form of a modified Fisher-equation, which incorporates the recent findings in the credit view literature. The model postulates complete quantity crowding out. It is subjected to empirical tests, which were supportive. Thus evidence is found that fiscal policy, if not supported by suitable monetary policy, is likely to crowd out private sector demand, even in an environment of falling or near-zero interest rates. As a policy conclusion it is pointed out that by changing the funding strategy, complete crowding out can be avoided and a positive net effect produced. The proposed framework creates common ground between proponents of Keynesian views (as held, among others, by Blinder and Solow), monetarist views (as held in particular by Milton Friedman) and those of leading contemporary macroeconomists (such as Mankiw).
Central banks have recently introduced new policy initiatives, including a policy called ‘Quantitative Easing’ (QE). Since it has been argued by the Bank of England that “Standard economic models are of limited use in these unusual circumstances, and the empirical evidence is extremely limited” (Bank of England, 2009b), we have taken an entirely empirical approach and have focused on the QE-experience, on which substantial data is available, namely that of Japan (2001-2006). Recent literature on the effectiveness of QE has neglected any reference to final policy goals. In this paper, we adopt the view that ultimately effectiveness will be measured by whether it will be able to “boost spending” (Bank of England, 2009b) and “will ultimately be judged by their impact on the wider macroeconomy” (Bank of England, 2010). In line with a widely held view among leading macroeconomists from various persuasions, while attempting to stay agnostic and open-minded on the distribution of demand changes between real output and inflation, we have thus identified nominal GDP growth as the key final policy goal of monetary policy. The empirical research finds that the policy conducted by the Bank of Japan between 2001 and 2006 makes little empirical difference while an alternative policy targeting credit creation (the original definition of QE) would likely have been more successful.
It has often been asked whether today´s Japan will be able to move into new and promising industries, or whether it is locked into an innovation system with an inherent inability to give birth to new industries. One argument reasons that the thick institutional complementarities among labour, innovation, and finance among its enterprises and the public sector favour industrial development in sectors of intermediate uncertainty, while it is difficult to move into areas of major uncertainty. In this paper, we present the case of the silver industry or, somewhat more prosaically, the 60+ or even 50+ industry, for which most would agree that Japan has indeed become a lead market and lead producer on the global market. For an institutional economist, the case of the silver industry is particularly interesting, because Japan´s success is based on the cooperation of existing actors, the enterprise and public sector in particular, which helped overcome the information uncertainties and asymmetries involved in the new market by relying on several established mechanisms developed well before. In that sense, Japan´s silver industry presents a case of of what we propose to call successful institutional path activation with the effect of an innovative market creation, instead of the problematic lockin effects that are usually associated with the term path dependence.
It has become commonplace to say that, in the past, international governance has been legitimated mainly, if not exclusively, by its welfare-enhancing ‘output’. There has been very little research, however, on the history of legitimating international governance by its output to validate this point. In this essay I begin to address this gap by inquiring into the origins of output-oriented strategies for legitimating international organizations. Scrutinizing the programmatic literature on international organizations from the early 20th century, I illustrate how a new and distinctive account of technocratic legitimation emerged and in the 1920s separated from other types of liberal internationalism. My inquiry, centring on the works of James Arthur Salter, David Mitrany, Paul S. Reinsch and Pitman B. Potter, explores their respective conceptions of ‘good functional governance’, executed by a non-political international technocracy. Their account is explicitly pitched against a notion of ‘international politics’, perceived as violent, polarizing, and irrational. The emergence of such a technocratic legitimation of international governance, I submit, needs to be seen in the context of societal modernization and bureaucratization that unfolded in the first half of the 20th century. I also highlight how in this account the material output of governance is intimately linked to the virtues of the organizational form that brings it about.
The European Monetary Union euro has done very well since its initiation. Price stability has been secured and the external value of the new currency is more than satisfactory. The confidence in it is also shown by its increasing use as a global reserve currency. It has been a stabilizing factor in the current crisis. The recent budgetary problems of some member states are principally not a problem of the Monetary Union. It is therefore in no way justified to speak of a "Euro-crisis". It is true, however, that the Monetary Union restricts the number of possibilities for member states to solve their financial problems but it does not eliminate them entirely that outside help would have become indispensible. The purchase of debt instruments of member states in financial distress by the ECB is questionable from an economic, and more important, from a legal point of view. The longer the duration, the less legally justifiable is it. Financial support for member states in severe financial distress might be acceptable as a temporary crisis resolution mechanism. A permanent support mechanism needs a basis in the primary law of the EU. The treatment of the risk of "sovereign" debt in the legal framework for financial institutions urgently needs improvement. Especially the capital requirements for credit institutions have to be adjusted.