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Speculative news on corporate takeovers may hurt productivity because uncertainty and threat of job loss cause anxiety, distraction, and reduced collaboration and morale among employees and managers. Using a panel of OECD-headquartered firms, we show that firm productivity temporarily declines upon announcements of speculative takeover rumors that do not materialize. This productivity dip is more pronounced for targets and for firms in countries with weaker employee rights and less long-term orientation. Abnormal stock returns mirror these results. The evidence fosters our understanding of potential real effects of speculative financial news and the costs of takeover threats.
This paper studies the impact of the concentration of control, the type of controlling shareholder and the dividend tax preference of the controlling shareholder on dividend policy for a panel of 220 German firms over 1984-2005. While the concentration of control does not have an effect on the dividend payout, there is strong evidence that the type of controlling shareholder matters as family controlled firms have high dividend payouts whereas bank controlled firms have low dividend payouts. However, there is no evidence that the dividend preference of the large shareholder has an impact on the dividend decision. JEL Classification: G32, G35 Keywords: Dividend Policy, Payout Policy, Lintner Dividend Model, Tax Clientele Effects, Corporate Governance