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The right to ask questions and voice their opinions at annual general meetings (AGMs) represents one of the few avenues for shareholders to communicate directly and publicly with the firm’s management. Examining AGM transcripts of U.S. companies between 2007 and 2021, we find that shareholders actively express their concerns about environmental, social and governance (ESG) issues in accordance with their specific relationship with the company. Further, they are also demonstrably more vocal about ESG issues at AGMs of firms with poor sustainability performance. What is more, we show that this soft engagement translates into a more negative tone which, in turn, results in lower approval rates for management proposals. Shareholders' soft engagement at AGMs is hence an effective way to "walk the talk".
In order to reach climate neutrality by 2050, the European Union is taking action in the form of extensive sustainability regulations with the aim to push the private sector towards sustainable economic activities. In this context, a new instrument to finance a company’s sustainability transition has been developed: the sustainability-linked bond (SLB). This paper analyzes the SLB market’s efficiency in attracting those companies that are most crucial for a successful sustainability transition, namely carbon-intensive companies and companies that are lagging behind in their sustainability transition, defined as ESG laggards. By developing a conceptual framework for the SLB market and running a probit and logit regression estimation, this paper shows that the SLB market efficiently attracts carbon-intensive companies, but fails to attract ESG laggards. Moreover, the paper identifies four success factors for the SLB market to improve its future accessibility and credibility.
We examine whether the uncertainty related to environmental, social, and governance (ESG) regulation developments is reflected in asset prices. We proxy the sensitivity of firms to ESG regulation uncertainty by the disparity across the components of their ESG ratings. Firms with high ESG disparity have a higher option-implied cost of protection against downside tail risk. The impact of the misalignment across the different dimensions of the ESG score is distinct from that of ESG score level itself. Aggregate downside risk bears a negative price for firms with low ESG disparity.