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The experience in the period during and after the Asian crisis of 1997-98 has provoked an extensive debate about the credit rating agencies' evaluation of sovereign risk in emerging markets lending. This study analyzes the role of credit rating agencies in international finan-cial markets, particularly whether sovereign credit ratings have an impact on the financial stability in emerging market economies. The event study and panel regression results indicate that credit rating agencies have substantial influence on the size and volatility of emerging markets lending. The empirical results are significantly stronger in the case of government's downgrades and negative imminent sovereign credit rating actions such as credit watches and rating outlooks than positive adjustments by the credit rating agencies while by the market participants' anticipated sovereign credit rating changes have a smaller impact on financial markets in emerging economies.
This paper deals with the proposed use of sovereign credit ratings in the "Basel Accord on Capital Adequacy" (Basel II) and considers its potential effect on emerging markets financing. It investigates in a first attempt the consequences of the planned revisions on the two central aspects of international bank credit flows: the impact on capital costs and the volatility of credit supply across the risk spectrum of borrowers. The empirical findings cast doubt on the usefulness of credit ratings in determining commercial banks' capital adequacy ratios since the standardized approach to credit risk would lead to more divergence rather than convergence between investment-grade and speculative-grade borrowers. This conclusion is based on the lateness and cyclical determination of credit rating agencies' sovereign risk assessments and the continuing incentives for short-term rather than long-term interbank lending ingrained in the proposed Basel II framework.
In this paper we estimate a small model of the euro area to be used as a laboratory for evaluating the performance of alternative monetary policy strategies. We start with the relationship between output and inflation and investigate the fit of the nominal wage contracting model due to Taylor (1980)and three different versions of the relative real wage contracting model proposed by Buiter and Jewitt (1981)and estimated by Fuhrer and Moore (1995a) for the United States. While Fuhrer and Moore reject the nominal contracting model in favor of the relative contracting model which induces more inflation persistence, we find that both models fit euro area data reasonably well. When considering France, Germany and Italy separately, however, we find that the nominal contracting model fits German data better, while the relative contracting model does quite well in countries which transitioned out of a high inflation regime such as France and Italy. We close the model by estimating an aggregate demand relationship and investigate the consequences of the different wage contracting specifications for the inflation-output variability tradeoff, when interest rates are set according to Taylor 's rule.
Accounting for financial instruments in the banking industry: conclusions from a simulation model
(2003)
The paper analyses the effects of three sets of accounting rules for financial instruments - Old IAS before IAS 39 became effective, Current IAS or US GAAP, and the Full Fair Value (FFV) model proposed by the Joint Working Group (JWG) - on the financial statements of banks. We develop a simulation model that captures the essential characteristics of a modern universal bank with investment banking and commercial banking activities. We run simulations for different strategies (fully hedged, partially hedged) using historical data from periods with rising and falling interest rates. We show that under Old IAS a fully hedged bank can portray its zero economic earnings in its financial statements. As Old IAS offer much discretion, this bank may also present income that is either positive or negative. We further show that because of the restrictive hedge accounting rules, banks cannot adequately portray their best practice risk management activities under Current IAS or US GAAP. We demonstrate that - contrary to assertions from the banking industry - mandatory FFV accounting adequately reflects the economics of banking activities. Our detailed analysis identifies, in addition, several critical issues of the accounting models that have not been covered in previous literature.
The paper suggests an innovative contribution to the investigation of banking liabilities pricing contracted by sovereign agents. To address fundamental issues of banking, the study focuses on the determinants of the up-front fees (the up-front fee is a charge paid out at the signature of the loan arrangement). The investigation is based on a uniquely extensive sample of bank loans contracted or guaranteed by 58 less-developed countries sovereigns in the period from 1983 to 1997. The well detailed reports allow for the calculation of the equivalent yearly margin on the utilization period for all individual loan. The main findings suggest a significant impact of the renegotiation and agency costs on front-end borrowing payments. Unlike the sole interest spread, the all-in interest margin better takes account of these costs. The model estimates however suggest the non-linear pricing is hardly associated with an exogenous split-up intended by the borrower and his banker to cover up information. Instead the up-front payment is a liquidity transfer as described by Gorton and Kahn (2000) to compensate for renegotiation and monitoring costs. The second interesting result is that banks demand payment for all types of sovereign risk in an identical manner public debt holders do. The difference is that, unlike bond holders, bankers have the possibility to charge an up-front fee to compensate for renegotiation costs. Hence, beyond the information related issues, the higher complexity of the pricing design makes bank loan optimal for lenders on sovereign capital markets, especially relative to public debt, thus motivating for their presence. The paper contributes to the expanding literature on loan syndication and banking related issues. The study also has relevance for the investigation of the developing countries debt pricing.
Die Pleitewelle in Deutschland steuert nach Angaben des Bundesverbandes Deutscher Inkasso-Unternehmen (BDIU) auf einen neuen Höchststand zu. Für 2003 erwartet der Verband bereits zum vierten Mal in Folge sowohl bei Unternehmens- als auch Verbraucherinsolvenzen Rekordmarken: Die für 2003 geschätzten 40 000 Unternehmenspleiten (zuzüglich weiterer 58 000 Pleiten von Selbstständigen und Privaten) mit einem zu erwartenden volkswirtschaftlichen Gesamtschaden von über 50 Milliarden Euro tragen erheblich zur schlechten Stimmung in Deutschland bei. Diese Zahlen verdeutlichen auch, wie außerordentlich wichtig ein modernes Insolvenzrecht ist, das neben dem Gläubigerschutz auch der möglichen Sanierung eines Unternehmens Rechnung trägt.
We estimate a Bayesian vector autoregression for the U.K. with drifting coefficients and stochastic volatilities. We use it to characterize posterior densities for several objects that are useful for designing and evaluating monetary policy, including local approximations to the mean, persistence, and volatility of inflation. We present diverse sources of uncertainty that impinge on the posterior predictive density for inflation, including model uncertainty, policy drift, structural shifts and other shocks. We use a recently developed minimum entropy method to bring outside information to bear on inflation forecasts. We compare our predictive densities with the Bank of England's fan charts.
The paper explores factors that influence the design of financing contracts between venture capital investors and European venture capital funds. 122 Private Placement Memoranda and 46 Partnership Agreements are investigated in respect to the use of covenant restrictions and compensation schemes. The analysis focuses on the impact of two key factors: the reputation of VC-funds and changes in the overall demand for venture capital services. We find that established funds are more severely restricted by contractual covenants. This contradicts the conventional wisdom which assumes that established market participants care more about their reputation, have less incentive to behave opportunistically and therefore need less covenant restrictions. We also find that managers of established funds are more often obliged to invest own capital alongside with investors money. We interpret this as evidence that established funds have actually less reason to care about their reputation as compared to young funds. One reason for this surprising result could be that managers of established VC funds are older and closer to retirement and therefore put less weight on the effects of their actions on future business opportunities. We also explore the effects of venture capital supply on contract design. Gompers and Lerner (1996) show that VC-funds in the US are able to reduce the number of restrictive covenants in years with high supply of venture capital and interpret this as a result of increased bargaining power by VC-funds. We do not find similar evidence for Europe. Instead, we find that VC-funds receive less base compensation and higher performance related compensation in years with strong capital inflows into the VC industry. This may be interpreted as a signal of overconfidence: Strong investor demand seems to coincide with overoptimistic expectations by fund managers which make them willing to accept higher powered incentive schemes.
A financial system can only perform its function of channelling funds from savers to investors if it offers sufficient assurance to the providers of the funds that they will reap the rewards which have been promised to them. To the extent that this assurance is not provided by contracts alone, potential financiers will want to monitor and influence managerial decisions. This is why corporate governance is an essential part of any financial system. It is almost obvious that providers of equity have a genuine interest in the functioning of corporate governance. However, corporate governance encompasses more than investor protection. Similar considerations also apply to other stakeholders who invest their resources in a firm and whose expectations of later receiving an appropriate return on their investment also depend on decisions at the level of the individual firm which would be extremely difficult to anticipate and prescribe in a set of complete contingent contracts. Lenders, especially long-term lenders, are one such group of stakeholders who may also want to play a role in corporate governance; employees, especially those with high skill levels and firm-specific knowledge, are another. The German corporate governance system is different from that of the Anglo-Saxon countries because it foresees the possibility, and even the necessity, to integrate lenders and employees in the governance of large corporations. The German corporate governance system is generally regarded as the standard example of an insider-controlled and stakeholder-oriented system. Moreover, only a few years ago it was a consistent system in the sense of being composed of complementary elements which fit together well. The first objective of this paper is to show why and in which respect these characterisations were once appropriate. However, the past decade has seen a wave of developments in the German corporate governance system, which make it worthwhile and indeed necessary to investigate whether German corporate governance has recently changed in a fundamental way. More specifically one can ask which elements and features of German corporate governance have in fact changed, why they have changed and whether those changes which did occur constitute a structural change which would have converted the old insider-controlled system into an outsider-controlled and shareholder-oriented system and/or would have deprived it of its former consistency. It is the second purpose of this paper to answer these questions. Revised version forthcoming in "The German Financial System", edited by Jan P. Krahnen and Reinhard H. Schmidt, Oxford University Press.
While focusing on the protection of distressed sovereigns, the current debate intended to reform the International Financial Architecture has hardly addressed the protection of creditors rights that varies among laws. I suspect however that this constitutes an essential determinant of the success of suggested solutions, especially under the contractual approach. Based on a sample of bonds issued by developing countries states in the period, January 1987 to December 1997, I find that, for given contract characteristics (e.g. listing markets and currency), the governing law is selected according to its ability to enforce repayment. However, although the New York law seems looser and incur larger enforcement costs than the England&Wales law, the former permits equivalent yearly credit amounts. I interpret this as a consequence of the existence of a larger set of valuable assets (e.g. trade) in the US that constitute implicit securities. My findings yield important implications for the reforms. In particular, provided that there exists a seemingly equivalent enforcement credibility between England and New York laws, the prompt implementation of the contractual approach solution should constitute a valuable first step toward efficient sovereign debt markets. October 2003.