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A call on art investments
(2010)
The art market has seen boom and bust during the last years and, despite the downturn, has received more attention from investors given the low interest environment following the financial crisis. However, participation has been reserved for a few investors and the hedging of exposures remains dificult. This paper proposes to overcome these problems by introducing a call option on an art index, derived from one of the most comprehensive data sets of art market transactions. The option allows investors to optimize their exposure to art. For pricing purposes, non-tradability of the art index is acknowledged and option prices are derived in an equilibrium setting as well as by replication arguments. In the former, option prices depend on the attractiveness of gaining exposure to a previously non-traded risk. This setting further overcomes the problem of art market exposures being dificult to hedge. Results in the replication case are primarily driven by the ability to reduce residual hedging risk. Even if this is not entirely possible, the replication approach serves as pricing benchmark for investors who are significantly exposed to art and try to hedge their art exposure by selling a derivative. JEL Classification: G11, G13, Z11
This paper proposes the Shannon entropy as an appropriate one-dimensional measure of behavioural trading patterns in financial markets. The concept is applied to the illustrative example of algorithmic vs. non-algorithmic trading and empirical data from Deutsche Börse's electronic cash equity trading system, Xetra. The results reveal pronounced differences between algorithmic and non-algorithmic traders. In particular, trading patterns of algorithmic traders exhibit a medium degree of regularity while non-algorithmic trading tends towards either very regular or very irregular trading patterns. JEL Classification: C40, D0, G14, G15, G20
The objective of this study is to determine whether specific industries across countries or within countries are more likely to reach a stage of profitability and make a successful exit. In particular, we assess whether firms in certain industries are more prone to exit via IPO, be acquired, or exit through a leveraged buy-out. We are also interested in analyzing whether substantial differences across industries and countries arise when looking separately at the success’ rate of firms which have received venture funding at the early seed and start-up stages, vis-à-vis firms that received funding at later stages. Our results suggest that, inasmuch as some of the differences in performance can be explained by country-specific factors, there are also important idiosyncratic differences across industries: In particular, firms in the biotech and the medical / health / life science sectors tend to be significantly more likely to have a successful exit via IPO, while firms in the computer industry and communications and media are more prone to exit via merger or acquisition. Key differences across industries also emerge when considering infant versus mature firms, and their preferred exit. JEL Classification: G24, G3 Keywords:
This paper analyzes the impact of blockownership dispersion on firm value. Blockholdings by multiple blockholders is a widespread phenomenon in the U.S. market. It is not clear, however, whether dispersion among blockholder is preferable to having a more concentrated ownership structure. To test for the direction of the effect, we use a large dataset of U.S. firms that combines blockholder information, shareholder rights information, debt ratings, accounting information, and financial markets information. We find that a large fraction of aggregated block ownership negatively affects Tobin’s Q. The negative impact is larger if blockowners are more dispersed, suggesting that a concentrated ownership structure is to be preferred on average. Results are robust to controlling for blockholder type as well as proxies for shareholder rights. Our empirical findings are also confirmed if we study the impact of ownership dispersion on firm debt ratings rather than Tobin’s Q. JEL Classification: G3, G32
Capturing the zero: a new class of zero-augmented distributions and multiplicative error processes
(2010)
We propose a novel approach to model serially dependent positive-valued variables which realize a non-trivial proportion of zero outcomes. This is a typical phenomenon in financial time series observed on high frequencies, such as cumulated trading volumes or the time between potentially simultaneously occurring market events. We introduce a flexible pointmass mixture distribution and develop a semiparametric specification test explicitly tailored for such distributions. Moreover, we propose a new type of multiplicative error model (MEM) based on a zero-augmented distribution, which incorporates an autoregressive binary choice component and thus captures the (potentially different) dynamics of both zero occurrences and of strictly positive realizations. Applying the proposed model to high-frequency cumulated trading volumes of liquid NYSE stocks, we show that the model captures both the dynamic and distribution properties of the data very well and is able to correctly predict future distributions. Keywords: High-frequency Data , Point-mass Mixture , Multiplicative Error Model , Excess Zeros , Semiparametric Specification Test , Market Microstructure JEL Classification: C22, C25, C14, C16, C51
We test whether asymmetric preferences for losses versus gains as in Ang, Chen, and Xing (2006) also affect the pricing of cash flow versus discount rate news as in Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2004). We construct a new four-fold beta decomposition, distinguishing cash flow and discount rate betas in up and down markets. Using CRSP data over 1963–2008, we find that the downside cash flow beta and downside discount rate beta carry the largest premia. We subject our result to an extensive number of robustness checks. Overall, downside cash flow risk is priced most consistently across different samples, periods, and return decomposition methods, and is the only component of beta that has significant out-of-sample predictive ability. The downside cash flow risk premium is mainly attributable to small stocks. The risk premium for large stocks appears much more driven by a compensation for symmetric, cash flow related risk. Finally, we multiply our premia estimates by average betas to compute the contribution of the different risk components to realized average returns. We find that up and down discount rate components dominate the contribution to average returns of downside cash flow risk. Keywords: Asset Pricing, Beta, Downside Risk, Upside Risk, Cash Flow Risk, Discount Rate Risk JEL Classification: G11, G12, G14
The European Commission's Green Paper "Audit Policy: Lessons from the Crisis" raises 38 questions regarding how the audit function could be enhanced in order to contribute to increased financial stability. The authors comment on these 38 questions, arguing that the general level of audit quality can be enhanced by extending the duties of care and by tightening the regulations on liability.
The recent financial crisis has highlighted the limits of the “originate to distribute” model of banking, but its nexus with the macroeconomy and monetary policy remains unexplored. I build a DSGE model with banks (along the lines of Holmström and Tirole [28] and Parlour and Plantin [39] and examine its properties with and without active secondary markets for credit risk transfer. The possibility of transferring credit reduces the impact of liquidity shocks on bank balance sheets, but also reduces the bank incentive to monitor. As a result, secondary markets allow to release bank capital and exacerbate the effect of productivity and other macroeconomic shocks on output and inflation. By offering a possibility of capital recycling and by reducing bank monitoring, secondary credit markets in general equilibrium allow banks to take on more risk. Keywords: Credit Risk Transfer , Dual Moral Hazard , Monetary Policy , Liquidity , Welfare JEL Classification: E3, E5, G3 First Draft: December 2009, This Draft: September 2010
SUMMARY RECOMMENDATIONS 1. One of the major lessons from the current financial crisis refers to the systemic dimension of financial risk which had been almost completely neglected by bankers and supervisors in the pre-2007 years. 2. Accordingly, the most needed change in financial regulation, in order to avoid a repetition of such a crisis in the future, consists of influencing individual bank behaviour such that systemic risk is decreased. This objective is new and distinct from what Basle II was intended to achieve. 3. It is important, therefore, to evaluate proposed new regulatory instruments on the ground of whether or not they contribute to a reduction, or containment of systemic risk. We see two new regulatory measures of paramount importance: the introduction of a Systemic Risk Charge (SRC), and the implementation of a transparent bank resolution regime. Both measures complement each other, thus both have to be realized to be effective. 4. We propose a Systemic Risk Charge (SRC), a levy capturing the contribution of any individual bank to the overall systemic risk which is distinct from the institution’s own default risk. The SRC is set up such that the more systemic risk a bank contributes, the higher is the cost it has to bear. Therefore, the SRC serves to internalize the cost of systemic risk which, up to now, was borne by the taxpayer. 5. Major details of our SRC refer to the use of debt that may be converted into equity when systemic risk threatens the stability of the banking system. Also, the SRC raises some revenues for government. 6. The SRC has to be compared to several bank levies currently debated. The Financial Transaction Tax (FTT) does not directly address systemic risk and is therefore inferior to a SRC. Nevertheless, a FTT may offer the opportunity to subsidize on-exchange trading at the expense of off-exchange (over-the-counter, OTC) transactions, thereby enhancing financial market stability. The Financial Activity Tax (FAT) is similar to a VAT on financial services. It is the least adequate instrument among all instruments discussed above to limit systemic risk. 7. Bank resolution regime: No instrument to contain systemic risk can be effective unless the restructuring of bank debt, and the ensuing loss given default to creditors, is a real possibility. As the crisis has taught, bank restructuring is very difficult in light of contagion risk between major banks. We therefore need a regulatory procedure that allows winding down banks, even large banks, on short notice. Among other things, the procedure will require to distinguish systemically relevant exposures from those that are irrelevant. Only the former will be saved with government money, and it will then be the task of the supervisor to ensure a sufficient amount of nonsystemically relevant debt on the balance sheet of all banks. 8. Further issues discussed in this policy paper and its appendices refer to the necessity of a global level playing field, or the lack thereof, for these new regulatory measures; the convergence of our SRC proposal with what is expected to be long-term outcome of Basle III discussions; as well as the role of global imbalances.
This paper presents a model to analyze the consequences of competition in order-flow between a profit maximizing stock exchange and an alternative trading platform on the decisions concerning trading fees and listing requirements. Listing requirements, set by the exchange, provide public information on listed firms and contribute to a better liquidity on all trading venues. It is sometimes asserted that competition induces the exchange to lower its level of listing standards compared to a situation in which it is a monopolist, because the trading platform can free-ride on this regulatory activity and compete more aggressively on trading fees. The present analysis shows that this is not always true and depends on the existence and size of gains related to multi market trading. These gains relax competition on trading fees. The higher these gains are, the more the exchange can increase its revenue from listing and trading when it raises its listing standards. For large enough gains from multi-market trading, the exchange is not induced to lower the level of listing standards when a competing trading platform appears. As a second result, this analysis also reveals a cross - subsidization effect between the listing and the trading activity when listing is not competitive. This model yields implications about the fee structures on stock markets, the regulation of listings and the social optimality of competition for volume. JEL Classification: G10, G18, G12