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We analyze the desinvestment decision of venture capitalists in the course of an IPO of their portfolio firms. The capital market learns of the project quality only in the period following the IPO. Venture capitalists with high-quality firms face a trade-off between immediately selling their stake in the venture at a price below the true value and having to wait until the true value is revealed. We show that the dilemma may be resolved via a reputation-acquiring mechanism in a repeated game set-up. Thereby, we can explain, e.g., the advent of "hot-issue market behavior" involving early disinvestments and a high degree of price uncertainty. Furthermore, we provide a new rationale for underpricing. Young venture capitalists may use underpricing as a device for credibly committing themselves to acquiring reputation.
This paper investigates the financial contracting behavior of German venture capitalists against the results of recent theoretical work on the design of venture capital contracts, especially with regard to the use of convertible securities. First, we identify a special feature of the German market, namely that public-private partnership agencies require significantly lower returns than private and young venture capitalists. The latter are most likely to follow their North-American counterpart by refinancing themselves with closed-end funds. Second, with regard to financing practices it is shown that the use of convertibles, relative to other instruments, is influenced by the anticipated severity of agency problems. Klassifikation: C24; G24; G32
A number of recent studies have suggested that activist stabilization policy rules responding to inflation and the output gap can attain simultaneously a low and stable rate of inflation as well as a high degree of economic stability. The foremost example of such a strategy is the policy rule proposed by Taylor (1993). In this paper, I demonstrate that the policy settings that would have been suggested by this rule during the 1970s, based on real-time data published by the U.S. Commerce Department, do not greatly differ from actual policy during this period. To the extent macroeconomic outcomes during this period are considered unfavorable, this raises questions regarding the usefulness of this strategy for monetary policy. To the extent the Taylor rule is believed to provide a reasonable guide to monetary policy, this finding raises questions regarding earlier critiques of monetary policy during the 1970s.
Syndicated loans and the number of lending relationships have raised growing attention. All other terms being equal (e.g. seniority), syndicated loans provide larger payments (in basis points) to lenders funding larger amounts. The paper explores empirically the motivation for such a price discrimination on sovereign syndicated loans in the period 1990-1997. First evidence suggests larger premia are associated with renegotiation prospects. This is consistent with the hypothesis that price discrimination is aimed at reducing the number of lenders and thus the expected renegotiation costs. However, larger payment discrimination is also associated with more targeted market segments and with larger loans, thus minimising borrowing costs and/or attempting to widen the circle of lending relationships in order to successfully raise the requested amount. JEL Classification: F34, G21, G33 This version: June, 2002. Later version (october 2003) with the title: "Why Borrowers Pay Premiums to Larger Lenders: Empirical Evidence from Sovereign Syndicated Loans" : http://publikationen.ub.uni-frankfurt.de/volltexte/2005/992/
Ambivalence in the regulatory definition of capital adequacy for credit risk has recently stirred the financial services industry to collateral loan obligations (CLOs) as an important balance sheet management tool. CLOs represent a specialised form of Asset-Backed Securitisation (ABS), with investors acquiring a structured claim on the interest proceeds generated from a portfolio of bank loans in the form of tranches with different seniority. By way of modelling Merton-type risk-neutral asset returns of contingent claims on a multi-asset portfolio of corporate loans in a CLO transaction, we analyse the optimal design of loan securitisation from the perspective of credit risk in potential collateral default. We propose a pricing model that draws on a careful simulation of expected loan loss based on parametric bootstrapping through extreme value theory (EVT). The analysis illustrates the dichotomous effect of loss cascading, as the most junior tranche of CLO transactions exhibits a distinctly different default tolerance compared to the remaining tranches. By solving the puzzling question of properly pricing the risk premium for expected credit loss, we explain the rationale of first loss retention as credit risk cover on the basis of our simulation results for pricing purposes under the impact of asymmetric information. Klassifikation: C15, C22, D82, F34, G13, G18, G20
The following descriptive paper surveys the various types of loan securitisation and provides a working definition of so-called collateralised loan obligations (CLOs). Free of the common rhetoric and slogans, which sometimes substitute for understanding of the complex nature of structured finance, this paper describes the theoretical foundations of this specialised form of loan securitisation. Not only the distinctive properties of CLOs, but also the information economics inherent in the transfer of credit risk will be considered, so that we can equally privilege the critical aspects of security design in the structuring of CLO transactions.
Since the second half of the nineties the euro area has been subject to a considerable accumulation of temporary and idiosyncratic price shocks. Core inflation indicators for the euro area are thus of utmost interest. Based on euro area-wide data core inflation in this paper is analyzed by means of an indicator derived from the generalized dynamic factor model. This indicator reveals that HICP inflation strongly exaggerated both the decline as well as the increase in the price trend in 1999 and 2000/2001. Our results reinforce those achieved by Cristadoro, Forni, Reichlin and Versonese (2001) based on euro area country data which indicates the robustness of the indicator. Klassifikation: C33, E31
In this paper we assess the implications of sunk costs and product differentiation on the pricing decisions of the multinational firms. For this purpose we use a modified version of Salop's spatial competition. The model yields clear-cut predictions regarding the effects of exchange rate shocks on the market structure and on pass-through. The main results are following: shocks within the band of inaction do not affect market structure. The upper bound of this range rises as the industry ratio of sunk- to fixed costs increases. As fixed costs and product heterogeneity jointly increase, the lower bound drops. Outside of the range, depreciations cause one or several of those foreign brands closest to the home brand to leave. This decreases the overall responsiveness of prices to exchange rate shocks. Large appreciations induce entry and increase the elasticity of prices. This asymmetry implies larger positive than negative PPP deviations. When accounting for price changes in foreign markets, strategic pricing behaviour is no longer sufficient to generate real exchange rate variability. Incomplete pass-through obtains if and only if the domestic firms have a smaller market share abroad. With large nominal exchange rate shocks a hysteresis result obtains if and only if sunk costs are non-zero. Klassifikation: C33, E31
In this paper, we present a monetary policy game in which the central bank has a private forecast of supply and demand shocks. The public needs to form its inflationary expectations and can make use of central bank announcements. However, because of the credibility problem that the central bank faces, the public will not believe a precise announcement. By extending the arrangement proposed by Garfinkel and Oh (1995) to a model that includes private information about both demand and supply shocks, we investigate the feasibility of making imprecise credible announcements concerning the rate of inflation. Klassifikation:E52;E58
Deutsche Börse AG plans to introduce a system (Xetra Best) allowing brokers and broker-dealers to internalize the orders of retail customers. Further, Xetra Best supports payment for order flow arrangements. Both internalization and payment for order flow may be detrimental to market quality. This paper discusses advantages and disadvantages of these arrangements. It draws on experiences made in the US. We derive policy implications that aim at a more stringent interpretation of "best execution", and at higher transparency. Klassifikation: G10, G14