Refine
Year of publication
- 2003 (58) (remove)
Document Type
- Working Paper (53)
- Article (2)
- Part of Periodical (2)
- Conference Proceeding (1)
Has Fulltext
- yes (58)
Is part of the Bibliography
- no (58)
Keywords
- Deutschland (14)
- Geldpolitik (11)
- Going Public (7)
- Europäische Union (5)
- Risikokapital (5)
- Schätzung (5)
- Venture Capital (5)
- Börsenzulassung (4)
- Germany (4)
- Inflation (4)
Institute
- Center for Financial Studies (CFS) (58) (remove)
Die Pleitewelle in Deutschland steuert nach Angaben des Bundesverbandes Deutscher Inkasso-Unternehmen (BDIU) auf einen neuen Höchststand zu. Für 2003 erwartet der Verband bereits zum vierten Mal in Folge sowohl bei Unternehmens- als auch Verbraucherinsolvenzen Rekordmarken: Die für 2003 geschätzten 40 000 Unternehmenspleiten (zuzüglich weiterer 58 000 Pleiten von Selbstständigen und Privaten) mit einem zu erwartenden volkswirtschaftlichen Gesamtschaden von über 50 Milliarden Euro tragen erheblich zur schlechten Stimmung in Deutschland bei. Diese Zahlen verdeutlichen auch, wie außerordentlich wichtig ein modernes Insolvenzrecht ist, das neben dem Gläubigerschutz auch der möglichen Sanierung eines Unternehmens Rechnung trägt.
We estimate a model with latent factors that summarize the yield curve (namely, level, slope, and curvature) as well as observable macroeconomic variables (real activity, inflation, and the stance of monetary policy). Our goal is to provide a characterization of the dynamic interactions between the macroeconomy and the yield curve. We find strong evidence of the effects of macro variables on future movements in the yield curve and much weaker evidence for a reverse influence. We also relate our results to a traditional macroeconomic approach based on the expectations hypothesis.
While focusing on the protection of distressed sovereigns, the current debate intended to reform the International Financial Architecture has hardly addressed the protection of creditors rights that varies among laws. I suspect however that this constitutes an essential determinant of the success of suggested solutions, especially under the contractual approach. Based on a sample of bonds issued by developing countries states in the period, January 1987 to December 1997, I find that, for given contract characteristics (e.g. listing markets and currency), the governing law is selected according to its ability to enforce repayment. However, although the New York law seems looser and incur larger enforcement costs than the England&Wales law, the former permits equivalent yearly credit amounts. I interpret this as a consequence of the existence of a larger set of valuable assets (e.g. trade) in the US that constitute implicit securities. My findings yield important implications for the reforms. In particular, provided that there exists a seemingly equivalent enforcement credibility between England and New York laws, the prompt implementation of the contractual approach solution should constitute a valuable first step toward efficient sovereign debt markets. October 2003.
Based on a broad set of regional aggregated and disaggregated consumer price index (CPI) data from major industrialized countries in Asia, North America and Europe we are examining the role that national borders play for goods market integration. In line with the existing literature we find that intra-national markets are better integrated than international market. Additionally, our results show that there is a large "ocean" effect, i.e., inter-continental markets are significantly more segmented than intra-continental markets. To examine the impact of the establishment of the European Monetary Union (EMU) on integration, we split our sample into a pre-EMU and EMU sample. We find that border effects across EMU countries have declined by about 80% to 90% after 1999 whereas border estimates across non-EMU countries have remained basically unchanged. Since global factors have affected all countries in our sample similarly and major integration efforts across EMU countries were made before 1999, we suggest that most of the reduction in EMU border estimates has been "nominal". Panel unit root evidence shows that the observed large differences in integration across intra- and inter-continental markets remain valid in the long-run. This finding implies that real factors are responsible for the documented segmentations across our sample countries.
We show diverse beliefs is an important propagation mechanism of fluctuations, money non neutrality and efficacy of monetary policy. Since expectations affect demand, our theory shows economic fluctuations are mostly driven by varying demand not supply shocks. Using a competitive model with flexible prices in which agents hold Rational Belief (see Kurz (1994)) we show that (i) our economy replicates well the empirical record of fluctuations in the U.S. (ii) Under monetary rules without discretion, monetary policy has a strong stabilization effect and an aggressive anti-inflationary policy can reduce inflation volatility to zero. (iii) The statistical Phillips Curve changes substantially with policy instruments and activist policy rules render it vertical. (iv) Although prices are flexible, money shocks result in less than proportional changes in inflation hence the aggregate price level appears "sticky" with respect to money shocks. (v) Discretion in monetary policy adds a random element to policy and increases volatility. The impact of discretion on the efficacy of policy depends upon the structure of market beliefs about future discretionary decisions. We study two rationalizable beliefs. In one case, market beliefs weaken the effect of policy and in the second, beliefs bolster policy outcomes and discretion could be a desirable attribute of the policy rule. Since the central bank does not know any more than the private sector, real social gain from discretion arise only in extraordinary cases. Hence, the weight of the argument leads us to conclude that bank´s policy should be transparent and abandon discretion except for rare and unusual circumstances. (vi) An implication of our model suggests the current effective policy is only mildly activist and aims mostly to target inflation.
A financial system can only perform its function of channelling funds from savers to investors if it offers sufficient assurance to the providers of the funds that they will reap the rewards which have been promised to them. To the extent that this assurance is not provided by contracts alone, potential financiers will want to monitor and influence managerial decisions. This is why corporate governance is an essential part of any financial system. It is almost obvious that providers of equity have a genuine interest in the functioning of corporate governance. However, corporate governance encompasses more than investor protection. Similar considerations also apply to other stakeholders who invest their resources in a firm and whose expectations of later receiving an appropriate return on their investment also depend on decisions at the level of the individual firm which would be extremely difficult to anticipate and prescribe in a set of complete contingent contracts. Lenders, especially long-term lenders, are one such group of stakeholders who may also want to play a role in corporate governance; employees, especially those with high skill levels and firm-specific knowledge, are another. The German corporate governance system is different from that of the Anglo-Saxon countries because it foresees the possibility, and even the necessity, to integrate lenders and employees in the governance of large corporations. The German corporate governance system is generally regarded as the standard example of an insider-controlled and stakeholder-oriented system. Moreover, only a few years ago it was a consistent system in the sense of being composed of complementary elements which fit together well. The first objective of this paper is to show why and in which respect these characterisations were once appropriate. However, the past decade has seen a wave of developments in the German corporate governance system, which make it worthwhile and indeed necessary to investigate whether German corporate governance has recently changed in a fundamental way. More specifically one can ask which elements and features of German corporate governance have in fact changed, why they have changed and whether those changes which did occur constitute a structural change which would have converted the old insider-controlled system into an outsider-controlled and shareholder-oriented system and/or would have deprived it of its former consistency. It is the second purpose of this paper to answer these questions. Revised version forthcoming in "The German Financial System", edited by Jan P. Krahnen and Reinhard H. Schmidt, Oxford University Press.
We estimate a Bayesian vector autoregression for the U.K. with drifting coefficients and stochastic volatilities. We use it to characterize posterior densities for several objects that are useful for designing and evaluating monetary policy, including local approximations to the mean, persistence, and volatility of inflation. We present diverse sources of uncertainty that impinge on the posterior predictive density for inflation, including model uncertainty, policy drift, structural shifts and other shocks. We use a recently developed minimum entropy method to bring outside information to bear on inflation forecasts. We compare our predictive densities with the Bank of England's fan charts.