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La distinzione fra apollineo e dionisiaco è ritornata di moda grazie a Friedrich Nietzsche, che se ne è servito nella sua famosa opera La nascita della tragedia dallo spirito della musica. Questo scritto, tuttavia, non persegue affatto l’intento di contribuire a comprendere questi concetti, ma si serve di questa distinzione per spiegare due aspetti di colonialismo d’insediamento in forma di stato, con particolare riferimento all’esempio dell’Africa Sud Occidentale e della sua capitale Windhoek. Come è noto, Apollo veniva considerato il Dio del sole e della ragione, mentre Dionisio era visto come il Dio dell’ebbrezza e dell’estasi. Nel presente contesto, l’apollineo rappresenta il sogno utopico di potere di stato coloniale, comportante il diritto assoluto all’uso della forza, a giudicare, a proteggere ed a praticare una politica attentamente pianificata, mentre il dionisiaco rappresenta, grosso modo, la mentalità pionieristica dei coloni e le loro tendenze anomiche, derivanti alla fin fine dall’illegittimità incontrastata dell’intero progetto coloniale. Nello stesso tempo questo scritto si avvale di un altro contrasto: giorno e notte. È usato in senso metaforico – ma non esclusivamente. E mentre il primo rispecchia “il regno della luce”, basato sul potere dello stato e su una vita pubblica che evidenzia le caratteristiche di società civile, la seconda rappresenta la fase del giorno in cui la notte scende ed il controllo da parte dello stato viene a cessare del tutto, mentre la «vita coloniale sotterranea» si risveglia.
In cases in which there is the possibility of massive human losses, the threshold likelihood of their occurrence, and the non-excessive costs of their prevention, we ought to act now. This is all the more definitely the case because it may well be that this is the time-of-last-opportunity to head off one or more potential disasters, all of which may still be preventable by sufficiently rapid reductions in carbon emissions from the combustion of fossil fuel. It is unfair that the present generation should incur as heavy a burden as it does of seizing the last opportunity for prevention of disasters like large sea-level rises, but the unfairness is not sufficient to make the burden unreasonable to bear, especially since it is not in fact as heavy as often believed.
In the nineties, Habermas redirected his political writings to the post-national constellation (global and European) and the possibilities of a society politically integrated through transnational democracy (or post-national democracy). This thematic reorientation took place on two fronts. The first one is the global transnational democracy, which includes the impacts of the economic globalization on national democracies, as well the proposal for a political Constitution for a pluralistic world society, based on a constitutionalization of international law. The second one is the European transnational democracy, which includes the redefinition of the political profile of European welfare state for an economic liberal profile, as well the paradox of democratic technocracy operated by European institutions and the proposal to overcome the decoupled technocratic policy model. This paper will address only this last topic, describing the reasons of the democratic deficit and the consequent delay of European political Union. Despite numerous reforms, the technocratic policies have not eliminated the discrepancy between centralization and democratization, and mistakenly indicate another direction further reinforcing the problem of European undemocratic institutions. In contrast, Habermas argues that the democratic deficit could only be overcome replacing the technocratic approach by a deeper democratization of European institutions.
European energy policy dates back to the founding days of integration, yet the emergence of supranational governance is a recent development. The article examines the extent to which European policymakers have succeeded in building up governance capacity, and what the facilitating and impeding factors were that have shaped the governance mix. The conceptual framework differentiates between orders of governance in the multilevel context, and between policy modes involving hierarchical and non-hierarchical settings and varying actor constellations. The article finds that governance capacity has emerged where second order governance (institutional and procedural rules) is concerned, while first order governance (the concrete policy process) remains the remit of national and private actors. This becomes even more obvious once the interaction between policy modes is taken into account: governance networks enhance governance capacity in the area of competition policy and agency governance; self-regulation by industry constitutes a fall-back option in case of insufficient governance capacity on cross-border issues; soft governance helps to bridge multiple policy areas and levels of governance. The article concludes that second order governance may prove effective where it combines with hierarchy but that it may fail to overcome both trade-offs between contradicting goals and resistance at lower levels.
Este artículo presenta una lectura crítica de un trabajo central de Axel Honneth desde la teoría de la sujeción de Judith Butler. Intenta mostrar que, por la ausencia en su escrito de una consideración sobre el poder, el pensador alemán no logra cumplir satisfactoriamente su objetivo propuesto de enfrentar las posturas que cuestionan el potencial crítico del reconocimiento. La hipótesis que aquí se maneja es que esa ausencia está ligada a su definición del reconocimiento como lo contrario de las prácticas de dominio o sometimiento. Ahora bien, Honneth afirma que el escepticismo de esas posturas respecto del reconocimiento se basa en la idea de que toda praxis recognoscente reproduce de alguna manera el orden social dominante. El presente trabajo se propone entonces, cuestionar esta aseveración del autor advirtiendo que un análisis sobre el modo en que el poder actúa en las prácticas cotidianas de reconocimiento no necesariamente conlleva una renuncia de la función crítica del concepto para la teoría social. Más bien, como sugiere la noción butleriana (y foucaultiana) de crítica, sólo enmarcando al reconocimiento en el horizonte normativo que lo delimita puede convertirse en la base de la indagación social.
Sublimity, negativity, and architecture. An essay on negative architecture through Kant to Adorno
(2015)
Architecture defines and consumes people. It exposes them to a multitude of varieties of different aesthetic engagements. Architecture becomes a lived experience. However, this lived experience is always caught in the inner workings of the social and more specifically within cultural ideology. In modern capitalism, culture pervades every aspect of our lives. It shows its presence everywhere from our own homes to the public streets. Culture is everywhere, and architecture is a tool used for both the benefit and detriment of the “culture industry”. Kant speaks of the sublime as a profound moment of reason realizing its ability to overcome its own limits. In this experience is it possible to be completely ravaged and descend into hades and melancholy? Is there a beauty in this descent? More specifically, can architecture become banal or pedestrian, uplifting or depressing? According to Theodor Adorno, our subjectivity is defined by the constant dialectical struggle between freedom and unfreedom (among other things). It is realizing our freedom in the face of our unfreedom that makes us truly able to attain some form of resistance. The sublime experience can be transformed into a spirit of revelation and beautifully allow us to in a way resist the one-dimensional tendencies of modern capitalism. Architecture, which is immersed in our societal being and contributes to many of our own subjective unfreedoms, comes to define our lives as inhabited space. When does architecture produce a sublime experience? Can architecture’s authentic “aura” stand out amongst the reproduced city and produce a sublime feeling that can be a form of resistance against the culture industry? Does Grand Central Terminal provide the key to an architecturally sublime experience? Using dialectical experience and examining the sublime feeling (in a critique of the Kantian sublime) as the key to breaking through the culture industry’s banal architectural hold on our subjectivity, this essay will examine the experience of the sublime as a key to unfolding resistance in the face of the banality of modern architecture in the city and opening our minds to the Great Refusal through the exploration of Grand Central Terminal.
Ibegin by providing some background to conceptions of responsibility. I note the extent of disagreement in this area, the diverse and cross-cutting distinctions that are deployed, and the relative neglect of some important problems. These facts make it difficult to attribute responsibility for climate change, but so do some features of climate change itself which I go on to illuminate. Attributions of responsibility are often contested sites because such attributions are fundamentally pragmatic, mobilized in the service of a normative outlook. We should be pluralists about responsibility and shape whatever conceptions can help to explain, guide, and motivate our responses to climate change. I sketch one such notion, ‘intervention-responsibility’, and argue that it should be ascribed to international regimes and organizations, states and other jurisdictions, individuals, and firms. Each has different capacities and thus different intervention-responsibilities responsibilities, but these differences are not always mirrored in public discussion. In particular, the moral responsibility of firms has been greatly neglected.
Esse artigo tem por objetivo analisar as contribuições de Axel Honneth para o atual debate das teorias da justiça, entre as quais a principal é a busca de princípios normativos encrustados na realidade social. Em sua obra O direito da liberdade, o autor indica a liberdade como o grande valor moderno. O medium da justiça seria uma liberdade de tipo social a qual estaria expressa nas instituições vinculadas às relações pessoais, ao mercado e ao universo político. Considerando a lacuna entre os princípios normativos de justiça indicados pelo autor e a realidade social este artigo propõe colocar em discussão as potencialidades e limites da própria reconstrução normativa como instrumento de análise do social, pautando especificamente o mercado de trabalho, a fim de colaborar à discussão das possibilidades de articular a norma compartilhada e a emergência de valores em vias de institucionalização.
The European Union is at the crossroads between intelligent expansion of future horizons and frightened shrinking to a perspective of local areas. Fear of descent of the citizens on one side and a politics of crisis, that goes along with harsh injustice have made upset the national societies against each other, missing courage on the side of politicians, to bring European issues to the fore, endanger the European project. There is only one way to overcome this situation by establishing a democratic union, which conserves not only the social and civilian achievements of the national state, as well as the assets of a greater democratic political unity, that offers an unity of European citizens and European state demos.