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Both banks and open end real estate funds effectuate liquidity transformation in large amounts and high scales. Because of this similarity the latter should be analyzed using the same methodologies as usually applied for banks. We show that the work in the tradition of Diamond and Dybvig (1983), especially Allen and Gale (1998) and Diamond and Rajan (2001), provides an applicable theoretical framework. We used this as the basis for our model for open end real estate funds. We then examined the usefulness of the modeling structure in analyzing open end real estate funds. First, we could show that withdrawing of capital resulting in a run is not always inefficient. Instead, withdrawing can as well be referred to the situation where the low return of an open end fund unit in comparison to other opportunities makes, (partial) withdrawal viewed from the risk-sharing perspective optimal. Even with costly liquidation, this result will hold, though we will have deadweight losses in such a situation. Second, introducing a secondary market in our model does, not in general, resolve the problem of deadweight losses associated with foreclosure. If assets are sold during a run, we do not only have a transfer of value but it can also create an economic cost. Because funds are forced to liquidate the illiquid asset in order to fulfill their obligations, the price of the real estate asset is forced down making the crisis worse. Rather than providing insurance, such that investors receive a transfer in negative outcomes, the secondary market does the opposite. It provides a negative insurance instead. Third, our model proves that the open end structure provides a monitoring function which serves as an efficient instrument to discipline the funds management. Therefore, we argue that an open end structure can represent a more adequate solution to securitize real estate or other illiquid assets. Instead of transforming open end in closed end structures, fund runs should be accepted as a normal phenomenon to clear the market from funds with mismanagement.
One of the dangers of harmonisation and unification processes taking place within the framework of the EU is that they may result in the codification of the lowest common denominator. This is precisely what is threatening to happen in respect of assignment. Referring the transfer of receivables by way of assignment to the law of the assignor’s residence, as article 13 of the Proposal does, would be opting for the most conservative solution and would for many Member States be a step backward rather than forward. A conflict rule referring assignment to the law of the assignor's residence is too rigid to do justice to the dynamic nature of assignments in cross-border transactions and it is unjustly one-sided. It offers no real advantages when compared to other conflict rules; it even has serious disadvantages which make the conflict rule unsuitable for efficient assignment-based cross-border transactions. It is not unconceivable that this conflict rule would even be contrary to the fundamental freedoms of the ECTreaty. The Community legislators in particular should be careful not to needlessly adopt rules which create insurmountable obstacles for cross-border business where choice-of-law by the parties would perfectly do. Community legislation has a special responsibility to create a smooth legal environment for single market transactions.
Using data of US domestic mergers and acquisitions transactions, this paper shows that acquirers have a preference for geographically proximate target companies. We measure the ‘home bias’ against benchmark portfolios of hypothetical deals where the potential targets consist of firms of similar size in the same four-digit SIC code that have been targets in other transactions at about the same time or firms that have been listed at a stock exchange at that time. There is a strong and consistent home bias for M&A transactions in the US, which is significantly declining during the observation period, i.e. between 1990 and 2004. At the same time, the average distances between target and acquirer increase articulately. The home bias is stronger for small and relatively opaque target companies suggesting that local information is the decisive factor in explaining the results. Acquirers that diversify into new business lines also display a stronger preference for more proximate targets. With an event study we show that investors react relatively better to proximate acquisitions than to distant ones. That reaction is more important and becomes significant in times when the average distance between target and acquirer becomes larger, but never becomes economically significant. We interpret this as evidence for the familiarity hypothesis brought forward by Huberman (2001): Acquirers know about the existence of proximate targets and are more likely to merge with them without necessarily being better informed. However, when comparing the best and the worst deals, we are able to show a dramatic difference in distances and home bias: The most successful deals display on average a much stronger home bias and distinctively smaller distance between acquirer and target than the least successful deals. Proximity in M&A transactions therefore is a necessary but not sufficient condition for success. The paper contributes to the growing literature on the role of distance in financial decisions.
The paper examines challenges in effectively implementing the lender-of-last-resort function in the EU single financial market. Briefly highlighted are features of the EU financial landscape that could increase EU systemic financial risk. Briefly described are the complexities of the EU’s financial-stability architecture for preventing and resolving financial problems, including lender-of-last-resort operations. The paper examines how the lender-of-last-resort function might materialize during a systemic financial disturbance affecting more than one EU Member State. The paper identifies challenges and possible ways of enhancing the effectiveness of the existing architecture.
One of the most acute problems in the world today is provision of a respectable living for the elderly. Today the process of aging population (as a result of a declined birth rate and increased life expectancy) has touched all countries of the world - developed countries as well as countries like Russia. Consequently, reforming traditional pension systems to deal with the changing situation has become an important issue around the world. These reforms typically center on the implementation of some form of funding of future pension benefits. This also holds for Russia, where in 1995 pension reform legislation introduced the so-called “accumulation pension”. In this context, this article will deal with the issues concerning the establishment of mutual funds, legal aspects of their operating and their investing opportunities. There will be carried out a comparative analysis of mutual funds with the other forms of public investments, namely: Common Funds of Bank Management, Voucher Investment Funds and Joint-stock Investment Funds.
This paper investigates whether the stock market reacts to unsolicited ratings for a sample of S&P rated firms from January 1996 to December 2005. We first analyze the stock market reaction associated with the assignment of an initial unsolicited rating. We find evidence that this reaction is negative and particularly accentuated for Japanese firms. A comparison between S&P’s initial unsolicited ratings with previously published ratings of two Japanese rating agencies for a Japanese subsample shows that ratings assigned by S&P are systematically worse. Further, we find that the stock market does not react to the transition from an unsolicited to a solicited rating. Comparison of the upgrades in the sample with a matched-sample of upgrades of solicited ratings reveals that the price reactions are no different. In addition, abnormal returns are worse for firms whose rating remained unchanged after the solicitation compared to those for upgraded firms. Finally, we find that Japanese firms are less likely to receive an upgrade. Our findings suggest that unsolicited ratings are biased downwards, that the capital market therefore expects upgrades of formerly unsolicited ratings and punishes firms whose ratings remain unchanged. All these effects seem to be more pronounced for Japanese firms.
Inflation and relative price variability in the Euro area : evidence from a panel threshold model
(2006)
In recent macroeconomic theory, relative price variability (RPV) generates the central distortions of inflation. This paper provides first evidence on the empirical relation between inflation and RPV in the euro area focusing on threshold effects of inflation. We ¯nd that expected inflation significantly increases RPV if inflation is either very low (below -1.38% p.a.) or very high (above 5.94% p.a.). In the intermediate regime, however, expected in°ation has no distorting effects which supports price stability as an outcome of optimal monetary policy. JEL classification: E31, C23
We focus on a quantitative assessment of rigid labor markets in an environment of stable monetary policy. We ask how wages and labor market shocks feed into the inflation process and derive monetary policy implications. Towards that aim, we structurally model matching frictions and rigid wages in line with an optimizing rationale in a New Keynesian closed economy DSGE model. We estimate the model using Bayesian techniques for German data from the late 1970s to present. Given the pre-euro heterogeneity in wage bargaining we take this as the first-best approximation at hand for modelling monetary policy in the presence of labor market frictions in the current European regime. In our framework, we find that labor market structure is of prime importance for the evolution of the business cycle, and for monetary policy in particular. Yet shocks originating in the labor market itself may contain only limited information for the conduct of stabilization policy. JEL - Klassifikation: J64 , E32 , C11 , E52
Although stable money demand functions are crucial for the monetary model of the exchange rate, empirical research on exchange rates and money demand is more or less disconnected. This paper tries to fill the gap for the Euro/Dollar exchange rate. We investigate whether monetary disequilibria provided by the empirical literature on U.S. and European money demand functions contain useful information about exchange rate movements. Our results suggest that the empirical performance of the monetary exchange rate model improves when insights from the money demand literature are explicitly taken into account. JEL - Klassifikation: F31 , E41
We analyze the effect of committee formation on how corporate boards perform two main functions: setting CEO pay and overseeing the financial reporting process. The use of performance-based pay schemes induces the CEO to manipulate earnings, which leads to an increased need for board oversight. If the whole board is responsible for both functions, it is inclined to provide the CEO with a compensation scheme that is relatively insensitive to performance in order to reduce the burden of subsequent monitoring. When the functions are separated through the formation of committees, the compensation committee is willing to choose a higher pay-performance sensitivity as the increased cost of oversight is borne by the audit committee. Our model generates predictions relating the board committee structure to the pay-performance sensitivity of CEO compensation, the quality of board oversight, and the level of earnings management.