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The paper discusses the policy implications of the Wirecard scandal. The study finds that all lines of defense against corporate fraud, including internal control systems, external audits, the oversight bodies for financial reporting and auditing and the market supervisor, contributed to the scandal and are in need of reform. To ensure market integrity and investor protection in the future, the authors make eight suggestions for the market and institutional oversight architecture in Germany and in Europe.
The Wirecard scandal is a wake-up call alerting German politics to the importance of securities market integrity. The role of market supervision is to ensure the smooth functioning of capital markets and their integrity, creating trust among and acceptance by investors locally and globally. The existing patchwork of national supervisory practice in Europe is under discussion today, in the wake of Brexit that will end the role of London as a de-facto lead supervisor in stock and bond markets. A fundamental overhaul of a fragmented securities markets supervisory regime in Europe would offer the potential to lead to the establishment of an independent European Single Market Supervisor (ESMS). Endowed with strong enforcement powers, and supported by the existing national agencies, the ESMS would be entrusted with ensuring a uniform market standard as to transparency and other issues of market integrity across Europe. This would not rule out maintaining a variety of market organization structures at the national level. The ESMS would need executive powers in the world of markets (i.e. securities and trading), much like the SSM in the world of banking. To fill this new role, ESMS would have to be established as a new, independent institution, including an enormously scaled up staff if compared, e.g., to ESMA.
Almost ten years after the European Commission action plan on building a capital markets union (CMU) and despite incremental progress, e.g. in the form of the EU Listing Act, the picture looks dire. Stock exchanges, securities markets, and supervisory authorities remain largely national, and, in many cases, European companies have decided to exclusively list overseas. Notwithstanding the economic and financial benefits of market integration, CMU has become a geopolitical necessity. A unified capital market can bolster resilience, strategic autonomy, and economic sovereignty, reduce dependence on external funding, and may foster economic cooperation between member states.
The reason for the persistent stand-still in Europe’s CMU development is not so much the conflict between market- and state-based integration, but rather the hesitancy of national regulatory and supervisory bodies to relinquish powers. If EU member states wanted to get real about CMU (as they say, and as they should), they need to openly accept the loss of sovereignty that follows from a true unified capital market. Building on economic as well as historical evidence, the paper offers viable proposals on how to design competent institutions within the current European framework.
This note outlines the case for speedy capital market integration and for the adoption of a common regulatory framework and single supervisory authority from a political economy perspective. We also show the alternative case for harmonization and centralization via regulatory competition, elaborating how competition between EU jurisdictions by way of full mutual recognition may lead to a (cost-)efficient and standardized legal framework for capital markets. Lastly, the note addresses the political economy conflict that underpins the implementation of both models for integrating capital markets. We point out that, in both cases, national authorities experience a loss of legislative and jurisdictional competence at the national level. We predict that any plan to foster a stronger capital market union, following an institution based or a market-based strategy, will face opposition from powerful national stakeholders.
The German corporate governance code includes a recommendation as to diversity on corporate boards. Two draft bills on gender quotas are currently under way in legislative proceedings. However, the ruling coalition rejects those, advocating a “flexible quota”. The present study provides an overview on legislative proposals currently presented and on academic scholarship on the issue. Legal obstacles to the introduction of a “fix” quota under German law are discussed and the “soft” version of “flexible” quotas is advocated.
Die Erklärung von Intelligenz fasziniert Menschen seit Jahrtausenden, scheint sich doch mit ihr die menschliche Singularität gegenüber Natur und Tier zu manifestieren. Zugleich betonen nicht nur philosophische Strömungen, sondern auch die Mathematik, die Neuro- und die Computerwissenschaften die Abhängigkeit menschlicher Intelligenz von mechanistischen Prozessen. Ob damit eine Verwandtschaft beider Formen der Informationsverarbeitung verbunden ist oder genau umgekehrt fundamentale Unterschiede bestehen, ist seit knapp hundert Jahren Gegenstand wissenschaftlicher Kontroversen. Fest steht allerdings, dass Maschinen jedenfalls in manchen Bereichen die menschliche Leistungsfähigkeit in Schnelligkeit und Präzision übertreffen können. Nähert man sich dieser Vorstellung, drängt sich die Frage auf, ob es sich empfiehlt, bestimmte Entscheidungen besser von Maschinen treffen, jedenfalls aber unterstützen zu lassen. Neben Ärzten, Rechtsanwälten und Börsenhändlern betrifft das auch Leitungsentscheidungen von Unternehmensführern.
Vor diesem Hintergrund wird im Folgenden ein Überblick über Formen künstlicher Intelligenz (KI) gegeben. Im Anschluss fokussiert der Beitrag auf die Rolle von KI im Kontext von Vorstandsentscheidungen. Dazu zählen allgemeine Sorgfaltspflichten, wenn über den Einsatz von KI im Unternehmen zu entscheiden ist. Geht es um die Unterstützung gerade von Vorstandsentscheidungen stellen sich zusätzlich Fragen der Kooperation von Mensch und Maschine, der Delegation des Kernbestands von Leitungsentscheidungen und der Einstandspflicht für KI.