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Common systemic risk measures focus on the instantaneous occurrence of triggering and systemic events. However, systemic events may also occur with a time-lag to the triggering event. To study this contagion period and the resulting persistence of institutions' systemic risk we develop and employ the Conditional Shortfall Probability (CoSP), which is the likelihood that a systemic market event occurs with a specific time-lag to the triggering event. Based on CoSP we propose two aggregate systemic risk measures, namely the Aggregate Excess CoSP and the CoSP-weighted time-lag, that reflect the systemic risk aggregated over time and average time-lag of an institution's triggering event, respectively. Our empirical results show that 15% of the financial companies in our sample are significantly systemically important with respect to the financial sector, while 27% of the financial companies are significantly systemically important with respect to the American non-financial sector. Still, the aggregate systemic risk of systemically important institutions is larger with respect to the financial market than with respect to non-financial markets. Moreover, the aggregate systemic risk of insurance companies is similar to the systemic risk of banks, while insurers are also exposed to the largest aggregate systemic risk among the financial sector.
Passt das deutsche Dreisäulensystem in eine zunehmend harmonisierte Bankenstruktur für Europa?
(2018)
Das deutsche Bankensystem ruht seit Jahrzehnten auf drei Säulen: den privaten Kreditbanken, einschließlich der großen Banken in Aktionärsbesitz, den öffentlichen Banken und den Genossenschaftsbanken. Fast nirgendwo anders in Europa hat ein solches Dreisäulensystem überlebt. Passt es also noch in ein Europa, in dem die Bankpolitik, die Regulierung und die Aufsicht inzwischen weitgehend in die Zuständigkeit der EU fallen? Für eine Bewahrung des Systems sprechen vor allem Gesichtspunkte der Stabilität. Angesichts ihrer Gruppenzugehörigkeit sind die deutschen "stakeholder-value-orientierten" Banken der Säulen 2 und 3 finanziell keineswegs weniger erfolgreich, sogar ein wenig erfolgreicher als die "shareholder-value-orientierten" Großbanken der Säule 1. Insbesondere schwanken ihre Geschäftszahlen deutlich weniger als jene der Großbanken, die in der Regel ein riskanteres Geschäftsmodell verfolgen. In vielen Privatbanken ist die Gewinnorientierung und damit auch die Bereitschaft, hohe Risiken einzugehen, aus ordnungspolitischer Sicht zu hoch, was die Systemstabilität tendenziell gefährdet. Zudem erfüllen die Genossenschaftsbanken und Sparkassen eine regionalpolitische Ausgleichsfunktion und haben eine gesamtwirtschaftlich stabilisierende Wirkung.
An economy in which deposit-taking banks of a Diamond/ Dybvig style and an asset market coexist is modelled. Firstly, within this framework we characterize distinct financial systems depending on the fraction of households with direct investment opportunities that are less efficient than those available to banks. With this fraction comparatively low, the evolving financial system can be interpreted as market-oriented. In this system, banks only provide efficient investment opportunities to households with inferior investment alternatives. Banks are not active in the secondary financial market nor do they provide any liquidity insurance to their depositors. Households participate to a large extent in the primary as well as in the secondary financial markets. In the other case of a relatively high fraction of households with inefficient direct investment opportunities, a bank-dominated financial system arises, in which banks provide liquidity transformation, are active in secondary financial markets and are the only player in primary markets, while households only participate in secondary financial markets. Secondly, we analyze the effect a run on a single bank has on the entire financial system. Interestingly, we can show that a bank run on a single bank causes contagion via the financial market neither in market-oriented nor in extremely bank-dominated financial systems. But in only moderately bank-dominated (or hybrid) financial systems fire sales of long-term financial claims by a distressed bank cause a sudden drop in asset prices that precipitates other banks into crisis.
Measuring confidence and uncertainty during the financial crisis: evidence from the CFS survey
(2011)
The CFS survey covers individual situations of banks and other companies of the financial sector during the financial crisis. This provides a rare possibility to analyze appraisals, expectations and forecast errors of the core sector of the recent turmoil. Following standard ways of aggregating individual survey data, we first present and introduce the CFS survey by comparing CFS indicators of confidence and predicted confidence to ifo and ZEW indicators. The major contribution is the analysis of several indicators of uncertainty. In addition to well established concepts, we introduce innovative measures based on the skewness of forecast errors and on the share of ‘no response’ replies. Results show that uncertainty indicators fit quite well with pattern of real and financial time series of the time period 2007 to 2010. Business Sentiment , Financial Crisis , Survey Indicator , Uncertainty CFS working paper series, 2010, 18. Revised Version July 2011
Measuring confidence and uncertainty during the financial crisis : evidence from the CFS survey
(2010)
The CFS survey covers individual situations of banks and other companies of the financial sector during the financial crisis. This provides a rare possibility to analyze appraisals, expectations and forecast errors of the core sector of the recent turmoil. Following standard ways of aggregating individual survey data, we first present and introduce the CFS survey by comparing CFS indicators of confidence and predicted confidence to ifo and ZEW indicators. The major contribution is the analysis of several indicators of uncertainty. In addition to well established concepts, we introduce innovative measures based on the skewness of forecast errors and on the share of ‘no response’ replies. Results show that uncertainty indicators fit quite well with pattern of real and financial time series of the time period 2007 to 2010. Business Sentiment , Financial Crisis , Survey Indicator , Uncertainty
Fünf Jahre nach Beginn der Banken- und Staatsschuldenkrise („Finanzkrise“) kämpfen wir weiterhin mit den elementaren Problemen: Bei Märkten und Marktteilnehmern fehlt es an Stabilität und Vertrauen. Viele Banken stehen immer noch nicht auf eigenen Füßen und nehmen die ihnen in Europa traditionell zukommende zentrale Rolle für Wachstum und Entwicklung nicht wahr. Den guten Absichten, auf die sich die großen politischen Mächte während der ersten G-20 Treffen 2008 und 2009 verständigt hatten, ist eine Reihe von sinnvollen Ideen und Konzepten gefolgt. Die Voraussetzungen für einen grundlegenden reformerischen Erfolg sind somit gegeben – doch nun muss die Umsetzung folgen. Dazu bedarf es mutiger Entscheidungen. Im Jahr 2014 muss die europäische Politik gleich mehrere Weichen stellen. Der Bundesregierung kommt dabei die Schlüsselrolle zu. Sie muss den Mut haben zu radikaler Ordnungspolitik!
Das deutsche Bankensystem ruht seit Jahrzehnten auf drei Säulen: den privaten Kreditbanken, den öffentlichen Banken des Sparkassensystems und den genossenschaftlichen Banken. Das Drei-Säulen-System scheint ursächlich für die Stabilität im deutschen Bankensystem zu sein. Gerade die Krise hat gezeigt, dass es für ein Bankensystem vorteilhaft ist, wenn es darin nicht nur einen Typus von Banken gibt. Wir müssen eine Pluralität von Organisationsformen im Bankwesen erhalten und weiterentwickeln.
The recent financial crisis has led to a major debate about fair-value accounting. Many critics have argued that fair-value accounting, often also called mark-to-market accounting, has significantly contributed to the financial crisis or, at least, exacerbated its severity. In this paper, we assess these arguments and examine the role of fair-value accounting in the financial crisis using descriptive data and empirical evidence. Based on our analysis, it is unlikely that fair-value accounting added to the severity of the current financial crisis in a major way. While there may have been downward spirals or asset-fire sales in certain markets, we find little evidence that these effects are the result of fair-value accounting. We also find little support for claims that fair-value accounting leads to excessive write-downs of banks’ assets. If anything, empirical evidence to date points in the opposite direction, that is, towards overvaluation of bank assets.