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WiWi news 3/2015
(2015)
This paper investigates whether exchanging the Social Security delayed retirement credit, currently paid as an increase in lifetime annuity benefits, for a lump sum would induce later claiming and additional work. We show that people would voluntarily claim about half a year later if the lump sum were paid for claiming any time after the Early Retirement Age, and about two-thirds of a year later if the lump sum were paid only for those claiming after their Full Retirement Age. Overall, people will work one-third to one-half of the additional months, compared to the status quo. Those who would currently claim at the youngest ages are likely to be most responsive to the offer of a lump sum benefit.
We consider the continuous-time portfolio optimization problem of an investor with constant relative risk aversion who maximizes expected utility of terminal wealth. The risky asset follows a jump-diffusion model with a diffusion state variable. We propose an approximation method that replaces the jumps by a diffusion and solve the resulting problem analytically. Furthermore, we provide explicit bounds on the true optimal strategy and the relative wealth equivalent loss that do not rely on quantities known only in the true model. We apply our method to a calibrated affine model. Our findings are threefold: Jumps matter more, i.e. our approximation is less accurate, if (i) the expected jump size or (ii) the jump intensity is large. Fixing the average impact of jumps, we find that (iii) rare, but severe jumps matter more than frequent, but small jumps.
Von Februar bis Juni 2015 hat die Europäische Zentralbank (EZB) die Notfall-Liquiditätshilfen (emergency liquidity assistance, ELA) für griechische Banken von 50 auf etwa 90 Milliarden Euro ausgeweitet. Dies hat zu einer Diskussion unter Wissenschaftlern, Politikern und Praktikern geführt, ob diese Liquiditätshilfen rechtmäßig sind. Es wurde der Vorwurf erhoben, die EZB trage bewusst zu einer Konkursverschleppung der bereits insolventen griechischen Banken bei.
Wir nehmen diesen Vorwurf zum Anlass, die Grundsätze des ELA-Programms genauer zu betrachten und die Frage zu diskutieren, ob das Programm in der aktuellen Situation rechtmäßig war. Zunächst beschreiben wir hierfür aus finanzwirtschaftlicher Perspektive die komplexe Beziehung zwischen der Europäischen Union, der EZB und den griechischen Banken. Dabei gehen wir insbesondere auf die wirtschaftspolitischen Grundsätze einer Währungsunion mit einer unvollständigen Fiskalunion (oder Haushaltskonsolidierung) ein. Vor diesem Hintergrund analysieren wir dann die Entscheidung der EZB, weiterhin Liquiditätshilfen an griechische Banken bereitzustellen. Wir kommen zu dem Ergebnis, dass das Vorgehen der EZB nicht als Konkursverschleppung zu bezeichnen ist.
Since the 1970s, the overarching view in the literature has been that a Phillips curve relationship did not exist in Ireland prior to the 1979 exchange rate break with Sterling. It was argued that, as a small open economy, prices were determined externally. To test this relationship, we study the determination of inflation between 1926 and 2012, a longer sample period than any previously used. We find that the difference between unemployment and the NAIRU is a significant determinant of inflation both in the full sample and in the subsamples spanning the periods before and after the Sterling parity link.
Some observers have conjectured that oil supply shocks in the United States and in other countries are behind the plunge in the price of oil since June 2014. Others have suggested that a major shock to oil price expectations occurred when in late November 2014 OPEC announced that it would maintain current production levels despite the steady increase in non-OPEC oil production. Both conjectures are perfectly reasonable ex ante, yet we provide quantitative evidence that neither explanation appears supported by the data. We show that more than half of the decline in the price of oil was predictable in real time as of June 2014 and therefore must have reflected the cumulative effects of earlier oil demand and supply shocks. Among the shocks that occurred after June 2014, the most influential shock resembles a negative shock to the demand for oil associated with a weakening economy in December 2014. In contrast, there is no evidence of any large positive oil supply shocks between June and December. We conclude that the difference in the evolution of the price of oil, which declined by 44% over this period, compared with other commodity prices, which on average only declined by about 5%-15%, reflects oil-market specific developments that took place prior to June 2014.