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Insider trading and portfolio structure in experimental asset markets with a long lived asset
(1997)
We report results of a series of nine market experiments with asymmetric information and a fundamental value process that is more "realistic" than those in previous experiments. Both a call market institution and a continuous double auction mechanism are employed. We find considerable pricing inefficiencies that are only partially exploited by insiders. The magnitude of insider gains is analyzed separately for each experiment. We find support for the hypothesis that the continuous double auction leads to more efficient outcomes. Finally, we present evidence of an endowment effect: the initial portfolio structure influences the final asset holdings of experimental subjects.
Seit zwanzig Jahren befaßt sich die Finanzmarktforschung einerseits mit Fragen der Bewertung und des Managements von Finanztiteln auf effizienten Kapitalmärkten und mit Fragen der Managementkontrolle auf unvollkommenen Märkten. Der folgende selektive Überblick konzentriert sich auf zentrale Aspekte der Theorie und Empirie der Managementkontrolle bei asymmetrischer Information. Ziel ist die Auseinandersetzung mit der unlängst vorgetragenen These zu den Mythen der Unternehmenskontrolle (Martin Hellwig 1997). Der aktuelle Überblick wird entwickelt vor dem Hintergrund der Gutenberg’schen Position eines eigenständigen Unternehmensinteresses, losgelöst von den Interessen der shareholder oder anderer stakeholder. Diese Position von Gutenberg verbindet sich im dritten Band der „Grundlagen der BWL: Die Finanzen“ von 1969 mit der Forderung nach Einhaltung eines sog. finanziellen Gleichgewichts. Erst in jüngster Zeit werden auch kapitalmarkttheoretisch fundierte Modelle entwickelt, die auch Raum bieten für eine Autonomie des Managements gegenüber dessen stakeholders.
Der vorliegende Beitrag führt eine detaillierte empirische Untersuchung über die Rolle der amtlichen Kursmakler an der Frankfurter Wertpapierbörse durch. Der verwendete Datensatz erlaubt eine Analyse des Einflusses der Maklertätigkeit auf Liquidität und Volatilität sowie eine Beurteilung der Profitabilität der Eigengeschäfte.
Die Beteiligung der Makler am Präsenzhandel ist erheblich. Ihre Eigengeschäfte machen über 20% des Handelsvolumens zu gerechneten Kursen und über 40% des Handelsvolumens im variablen Handel aus. Für letzteren wird zudem dokumentiert, daß die Tätigkeit der Makler zu einer deutlichen Reduktion der Geld-Brief-Spannen beiträgt. Die letztendlich gezahlte effektive Spanne beträgt im Durchschnitt weniger als ein Drittel der Spanne, die sich aus dem Orderbuch ergibt.
Für den Handel zu gerechneten Kursen wird gezeigt, daß die Preisfeststellung durch die Makler zu einer Verringerung der Volatilität führt. Eine Beurteilung des Einflusses der Makler auf die Volatilität im fortlaufenden Handel scheitert daran, daß das hierfür teilweise verwendete Maß, die Stabilisierungsrate, nach unserer Einschätzung keine aussagekräftigen Resultate liefert.
Die Makler erzielten während unseres Untersuchungszeitraums im Durchschnitt keinen Gewinn aus ihren Eigengeschäften. Eine Zerlegung der Gewinne in zwei Komponenten zeigt, daß positive Spannengewinne im Aggregat nicht für entstehende Positionierungsverluste kompensieren können.
Insgesamt zeigt unsere Untersuchung, daß die Kursmakler an den deutschen Wertpapierbörsen einen Beitrag zur Sicherung der Marktqualität leisten. Die Konsequenzen dieser Resultate für die Organisation des Aktienhandels in Deutschland werden diskutiert.
This paper provides a detailed empirical analysis of the call auction procedure on the German stock exchanges. The auction is conducted by the Makler whose position resembles that of a NYSE specialist. We use a dataset which contains information about all individual orders for a sample of stocks traded on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange (FSE). This sample allows us to calculate the cost of transacting in a call market and compare them to the costs of transacting in a continuous market. We find that transaction costs for small transactions in the call market are lower than the quoted spread in the order book of the continuous market whereas transaction costs for large transactions are higher than the spread in the continuous market.
We further address the question whether active participation of the Makler is advantageous. On the one hand he may accomodate order imbalances, increase the liquidity of the market and stabilize prices. On the other hand, the discretion in price setting gives him an incentive to manipulate prices. This may increase return volatility. Our dataset identifies the trades the Maklers make for their own accounts. We eliminate these trades and determine the price that would have obtained without their participation. Comparing this hypothetical price series to the actual transaction prices, we find that Makler participation tends to reduce return volatility. A further analysis shows that the actual prices are much closer to the surrounding prices of the continuous trading session than the hypothetical prices that would have obtained without Makler participation. These results indicate that the Maklers provide a valuable service to the market. We further calculate the profits associated with the positions taken by the Maklers and find that, on average, they do not earn profits on the positions they take. Their compensation is thus restricted to the commissions they receive.
Collateral, default risk, and relationship lending : an empirical study on financial contracting
(1999)
This paper provides further insights into the nature of relationship lending by analyzing the link between relationship lending, borrower quality and collateral as a key variable in loan contract design. We used a unique data set based on the examination of credit files of five leading German banks, thus relying on information actually used in the process of bank credit decision-making and contract design. In particular, bank internal borrower ratings serve to evaluate borrower quality, and the bank's own assessment of its housebank status serves to identify information-intensive relationships. Additionally, we used data on workout activities for borrowers facing financial distress. We found no significant correlation between ex ante borrower quality and the incidence or degree of collateralization. Our results indicate that the use of collateral in loan contract design is mainly driven by aspects of relationship lending and renegotiations. We found that relationship lenders or housebanks do require more collateral from their debtors, thereby increasing the borrower's lock-in and strengthening the banks' bargaining power in future renegotiation situations. This result is strongly supported by our analysis of the correlation between ex post risk, collateral and relationship lending since housebanks do more frequently engage in workout activities for distressed borrowers, and collateralization increases workout probability.
Collateral, default risk, and relationship lending : an empirical study on financial contracting
(2000)
This paper provides further insights into the nature of relationship lending by analyzing the link between relationship lending, borrower quality and collateral as a key variable in loan contract design. We used a unique data set based on the examination of credit files of five leading German banks, thus relying on information actually used in the process of bank credit decision-making and contract design. In particular, bank internal borrower ratings serve to evaluate borrower quality, and the bank's own assessment of its housebank status serves to identify information-intensive relationships. Additionally, we used data on workout activities for borrowers facing financial distress. We found no significant correlation between ex ante borrower quality and the incidence or degree of collateralization. Our results indicate that the use of collateral in loan contract design is mainly driven by aspects of relationship lending and renegotiations. We found that relationship lenders or housebanks do require more collateral from their debtors, thereby increasing the borrower's lock-in and strengthening the banks' bargaining power in future renegotiation situations. This result is strongly supported by our analysis of the correlation between ex post risk, collateral and relationship lending since housebanks do more frequently engage in workout activities for distressed borrowers, and collateralization increases workout probability. First version: March 12, 1999
We analyse the coordination problem in multi-creditor relationships empirically, relying on a unique panel data set that contains detailed credit-file information on distressed lending relationships in Germany, including information on creditor pools, a legal institution aiming at coordinating lender interests in borrower distress. We report three major findings. First, the existence of creditor pools increases the probability of workout success. Second, the results are consistent with coordination costs being positively related to pool size. Third, major determinants of pool formation are found to be the number of banks, the distribution of lending shares, and the severity of the distress shock.
This paper analyses the role of collateral in loan contracting when companies are financed by multiple bank lenders and relationship lending can be present. We conjecture and empirically validate that relationship lenders, who enjoy an informational advantage over arm’s-length banks, are more senior to strengthen their bargaining power in future renegotiation if borrower’s face financial distress. This deters costly conflicts between lenders and fosters workout decisions by the best informed party. Consistent with our conjecture, we find that relationship lender in general have a higher probability to be collateralized, and a higher degree of collateralization (i.e. seniority). Furthermore, we show that seniority and the status of relationship lending increases the likelihood that a bank invests in a risky workout of distressed borrowers. Both findings support the view that collateral is a strategic instrument intended to influence the bargaining position of banks. Our result further suggest that seniority and relationship lending are complementary to each other. JEL Classification: G21
Multiple lenders and corporate distress: evidence on debt restructuring : [Version Juli 2002]
(2002)
In the recent theoretical literature on lending risk, the common pool problem in multi-bank relationships has been analyzed extensively. In this paper we address this topic empirically, relying on a unique panel data set that includes detailed credit-fie information on distressed lending relationships in Germany. In particular, it includes information on bank pools, a legal institution aimed at coordinating lender interests in borrower distress. We find that the existence of small bank pools increases the probability of workout success and that coordination costs are positively related to pool size. We identify major determinants of pool formation, in particular the distribution of lending shares among banks, the number of banks, and the severity of the distress shock to the borrower.
This paper makes an attempt to present the economics of credit securitisation in a non-technical way, starting from the description and the analysis of a typical securitisation transaction. The paper sketches a theoretical explanation for why tranching, or nonproportional risk sharing, which is at the heart of securitisation transactions, may allow commercial banks to maximize their shareholder value. However, the analysis makes also clear that the conditions under which credit securitisation enhances welfare, are fairly restrictive, and require not only an active role of the banking supervisory authorities, but also a price tag on the implicit insurance currently provided by the lender of last resort.