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Conceptual design of an ALICE Tier-2 centre integrated into a multi-purpose computing facility
(2012)
This thesis discusses the issues and challenges associated with the design and operation of a data analysis facility for a high-energy physics experiment at a multi-purpose computing centre. At the spotlight is a Tier-2 centre of the distributed computing model of the ALICE experiment at the Large Hadron Collider at CERN in Geneva, Switzerland. The design steps, examined in the thesis, include analysis and optimization of the I/O access patterns of the user workload, integration of the storage resources, and development of the techniques for effective system administration and operation of the facility in a shared computing environment. A number of I/O access performance issues on multiple levels of the I/O subsystem, introduced by utilization of hard disks for data storage, have been addressed by the means of exhaustive benchmarking and thorough analysis of the I/O of the user applications in the ALICE software framework. Defining the set of requirements to the storage system, describing the potential performance bottlenecks and single points of failure and examining possible ways to avoid them allows one to develop guidelines for selecting the way how to integrate the storage resources. The solution, how to preserve a specific software stack for the experiment in a shared environment, is presented along with its effects on the user workload performance. The proposal for a flexible model to deploy and operate the ALICE Tier-2 infrastructure and applications in a virtual environment through adoption of the cloud computing technology and the 'Infrastructure as Code' concept completes the thesis. Scientific software applications can be efficiently computed in a virtual environment, and there is an urgent need to adapt the infrastructure for effective usage of cloud resources.
In this thesis I use effective models to investigate the properties of QCD-like theories at nonzero temperature and baryon chemical potential. First I construct a PNJL model using a lattice spin model with nearestneighbor interactions for the gauge sector and four-fermion interactions for the quarks in (pseudo)real representations of the gauge group. Calculating the phase diagram in the plane of temperature and quark chemical potential in QCD with adjoint quarks, it is qualitatively confirmed that the critical temperature of the chiral phase transition is much higher than the deconfinement transition temperature. At a chemical potential equal to half of the diquark mass in the vacuum, a diquark Bose–Einstein condensation (BEC) phase transition occurs. In the two-color case, a Ginzburg–Landau expansion is used to study the tetracritical behavior around the intersection point of the deconfinement and BEC transition lines which are both of second order. A compact expression for the expectation value of the Polyakov loop in an arbitrary representation of the gauge group is obtained for any number of colors, which allows us to study Casimir scaling at both nonzero temperature and chemical potential. Subsequently I study the thermodynamics of two-color QCD (QC2D) at high temperature and/or density using ZQCD, a dimensionally reduced superrenormalizable effective theory, formulated in terms of a coarse grained Wilson line. In the absence of quarks, the theory is required to respect the Z2 center symmetry, while the effects of quarks of arbitrary masses and chemical potentials are introduced via soft Z2 breaking operators. Perturbative matching of the effective theory parameters to the full theory is carried out explicitly, and it is argued how the new theory can be used to explore the phase diagram of two-color QCD.
The importance of RNA in molecular and cell biology has long been underestimated. Besides transmitting genetic information, studies of recent years have revealed crucial tasks of RNA especially in gene regulation. Riboswitches are natural RNA-based genetic switches and known only for ten years. They directly sense small-molecule metabolites and regulate in response the expression of the corresponding metabolic genes. Within recent years, artificial riboswitches have been developed that operate according to user-defined demands. Hence, they represent powerful tools for synthetic biology.
This study focused on the development of engineered catalytic riboswitches for conditional gene expression in eukaryotes. A self-cleaving hammerhead ribozyme was linked to a tetracycline binding aptamer in order to regulate ribozyme cleavage allosterically with tetracycline. By integrating such a hybrid molecule into a gene of interest, mRNA cleavage and thereby gene expression is controllable in a ligand dependent manner. The linking domain between ribozyme and aptamer was randomised. Tetracycline inducible ribozymes were isolated after eleven cycles of in vitro selection (SELEX). 80% of the analysed ribozymes show cleavage that strongly depends on tetracycline. In the presence of 1 μM tetracycline, their cleavage rates are comparable to that of the parental hammerhead ribozyme. In the absence of tetracycline, cleavage rates are inhibited up to 333-fold. The allosteric ribozymes bind tetracycline with similar affinity and specificity as the parental aptamer. Ribozyme cleavage is fully induced within minutes after addition of tetracycline. Interestingly, the isolated linker domains exhibit structural consensus motives rather than consensus sequences.
When transferred to yeast, three switches reduced reporter gene expression by 30 - 60% in the presence of tetracycline; none of them controlled gene expression in mammalian cells. In vitro selected molecules do not necessarily retain their characteristics when applied in a cellular context. Therefore, high throughput screening and selection systems have been developed in mammalian cells. The screening system is based on two fluorescent reporter proteins (GFP and mCherry). 1152 individual constructs of the selected ribozyme pool were tested, but none of them reduced reporter gene expression significantly in the presence of tetracycline. The selection system employs a fusion peptide encoding two selection markers (Hygromycin B phosphotransferase and HSV thymidine kinase) facilitating both negative and positive selection. 6.5 x 104 individual constructs of the selected ribozyme pool are currently under investigation.
Interacting ultracold gases in optical lattices: non-equilibrium dynamics and effects of disorder
(2012)
This dissertation aims at giving a theoretical description of various applications of ultracold gases. A particular focus is cast upon the dynamical evolution of bosonic condensates in non-equilibrium by means of the time-dependent Gutzwiller method. Ground state properties of strongly interacting fermionic atoms in box and speckle disordered lattices are investigated via real-space dynamical mean-field theory. ...
This thesis will first introduce in more detail the Bayesian theory and its use in integrating multiple information sources. I will briefly talk about models and their relation to the dynamics of an environment, and how to combine multiple alternative models. Following that I will discuss the experimental findings on multisensory integration in humans and animals. I start with psychophysical results on various forms of tasks and setups, that show that the brain uses and combines information from multiple cues. Specifically, the discussion will focus on the finding that humans integrate this information in a way that is close to the theoretical optimal performance. Special emphasis will be put on results about the developmental aspects of cue integration, highlighting experiments that could show that children do not perform similar to the Bayesian predictions. This section also includes a short summary of experiments on how subjects handle multiple alternative environmental dynamics. I will also talk about neurobiological findings of cells receiving input from multiple receptors both in dedicated brain areas but also primary sensory areas. I will proceed with an overview of existing theories and computational models of multisensory integration. This will be followed by a discussion on reinforcement learning (RL). First I will talk about the original theory including the two different main approaches model-free and model-based reinforcement learning. The important variables will be introduced as well as different algorithmic implementations. Secondly, a short review on the mapping of those theories onto brain and behaviour will be given. I mention the most in uential papers that showed correlations between the activity in certain brain regions with RL variables, most prominently between dopaminergic neurons and temporal difference errors. I will try to motivate, why I think that this theory can help to explain the development of near-optimal cue integration in humans. The next main chapter will introduce our model that learns to solve the task of audio-visual orienting. Many of the results in this section have been published in [Weisswange et al. 2009b,Weisswange et al. 2011]. The model agent starts without any knowledge of the environment and acts based on predictions of rewards, which will be adapted according to the reward signaling the quality of the performed action. I will show that after training this model performs similarly to the prediction of a Bayesian observer. The model can also deal with more complex environments in which it has to deal with multiple possible underlying generating models (perform causal inference). In these experiments I use di#erent formulations of Bayesian observers for comparison with our model, and find that it is most similar to the fully optimal observer doing model averaging. Additional experiments using various alterations to the environment show the ability of the model to react to changes in the input statistics without explicitly representing probability distributions. I will close the chapter with a discussion on the benefits and shortcomings of the model. The thesis continues whith a report on an application of the learning algorithm introduced before to two real world cue integration tasks on a robotic head. For these tasks our system outperforms a commonly used approximation to Bayesian inference, reliability weighted averaging. The approximation is handy because of its computational simplicity, because it relies on certain assumptions that are usually controlled for in a laboratory setting, but these are often not true for real world data. This chapter is based on the paper [Karaoguz et al. 2011]. Our second modeling approach tries to address the neuronal substrates of the learning process for cue integration. I again use a reward based training scheme, but this time implemented as a modulation of synaptic plasticity mechanisms in a recurrent network of binary threshold neurons. I start the chapter with an additional introduction section to discuss recurrent networks and especially the various forms of neuronal plasticity that I will use in the model. The performance on a task similar to that of chapter 3 will be presented together with an analysis of the in uence of different plasticity mechanisms on it. Again benefits and shortcomings and the general potential of the method will be discussed. I will close the thesis with a general conclusion and some ideas about possible future work.
From the dawn of civilization, a multitude of religious has developed each very complex. These great differences among religions make it difficult to find a least common denominator or to talk at length of religion in general. On the other hand, focusing on just one specific religion often causes us to ignore or underestimate some of the very broad traits that religions seem to share. The fact remains that we will make no headway into the question of what makes a specific religion a religion if we do not seek some characteristics common to all religions.
Religion is usually associated with the supernatural or the divine.505 However, the notion of a supernatural realm does not occur in the non-theistic schools of Buddhism and functions in very different ways, say, in Taoism, Hinduism, and Islam. These shortcomings suggest that religion is notoriously difficult to define. To me, religion is any action taken through every aspect of our being to release us from our weakness or imperfection, and bring us closer to the divine reality. In other words, it is a human inner desire or activity to unite with an absolute being.
The examination of the intellectual dimension of religion that is, its key beliefs is most beneficial when it is guided and informed. Since epistemology is the theory of knowledge, one would therefore expect epistemological discussions of religion to concentrate on the question whether one could have knowledge of religious beliefs. Religious epistemology is simple to say that it is the epistemology of distinctively religious beliefs, but that will not be helpful in the absence of a definition of religious beliefs.
Philosophers of religion might consider the epistemology of religious belief, pondering questions about the sources and justifications of religious knowledge. Fundamental questions regarding the nature of knowledge are likely to arise in any culture. After all, everyone has some stake in distinguishing truth from error, wisdom from ignorance, and the path to knowledge from the path to ignorance. Epistemologists have discussed, in addition to the defining conditions and the sources of knowledge, the extent of human knowledge. They have asked how far human knowledge can extend. Many philosophers find it obvious that we know at least some things, if only things about personal experiences or household physical objects. Others have claimed, however, that we really have no knowledge. Such philosophers admit that people typically feel confident that they have some knowledge, but these philosophers insist that our apparent cases of knowledge are mere illusions. Many epistemologists aim not to set knowledge beyond our reach or to escape the quest for knowledge but rather to make many of our ordinary claims to knowledge more secure by explaining knowledge. They seek to explain what knowledge consists in and how we get it.506
Therefore, a good deal of the task of general epistemology is to understand the nature of the various truth-relevant merits which beliefs can possess, the necessary and sufficient conditions for beliefs to possess those merits, and the virtues of mind and practice requisite and apt for their presence merits such as being reliably formed, being warranted, being entitled, being scientific, being rational, being justified and indeed being true.
Epistemology in Western philosophical tradition has until recently offered a prominent definition of knowledge that analyzes knowledge into three essential components: justification, truth, and belief. According to this analysis, propositional knowledge is, by definition, justified true belief. Epistemologists typically focus on propositional knowledge. Knowledge that something is the case, as opposed to knowledge of how to do something. The content of propositional knowledge can be expressed in a proposition, that is, what is meant by a declarative sentence. Knowledge how to do something is by contrast, a skill or competence in performing a certain task. Within the last few decades, philosophers have discovers that these three conditions are not really sufficient for knowledge; something else is required. Genuine knowledge requires not only truth and belief, but also the satisfaction of the belief condition be appropriately related to the satisfaction of the truth condition. That is, on the traditional approach, genuine knowledge requires that a knower have an “adequate indication” that a believed proposition is true. The required “adequate indication”507 of truth, according to Plato, Kant, and many other philosophers, is evidence indicating that a proposition is true. These philosophers thus hold that knowledge must be based on evidence, or justifying reason.
The kind of justification crucial to knowledge is called epistemic justification. Even if knowledge requires justification, a justified belief can be false. In allowing for justified false beliefs, contemporary epistemologists endorse fallibilism about justification. Reformed epistemologists contend that belief in the existence of God can, in some circumstances, have an epistemic status high enough to render it worthy of acceptance even if it has no support from the arguments of natural theology or from any other beliefs. The views of Alston and Mavrodes are sometimes said to display an affinity with Reformed epistemology, and Nicholas Wolterstorff has made significant contributions to its development. But Plantinga has clearly been the leading contemporary advocate of this school of thought in religious epistemology. During the earlier phase of their development, Plantinga concentrated on defending the view that theistic belief can be in certain conditions, is justified or rationally held even in the absence of any propositional evidence or supporting argument.508
For the conviction that theistic belief is properly basic, foundationalists carry out a reconstructive project that would put our revised doxastic structures on foundations so firm that they could withstand rather than ignore skeptical challenges. That is, for the classical foundationlist theistic belief requires support from propositional evidence or argument if it is to be rationally or justifiably held. However, it is fairly clear that belief in God’s existence does not satisfy this criterion; it is neither self-evident nor incorrigible nor evident to the sense for humans at any time in this life.
The question of justification attracts philosophers especially in contemporary epistemology. And controversy of this question focuses on the meaning of ‘justification’ as well as on the substantive conditions of a belief’s being justified in a way appropriate to knowledge. William Alston, for instance, has introduced a non-deontological normative concept of justification that relies mainly on the notion of what is epistemically good from the view-point of maximizing truth and minimizing falsity. Alston link epistemic goodness to a belief’s being based on adequate grounds in the absence of overriding reason to the contrary. But for some epistemologists “Epistemic justification” means simply “evidential support” of certain sort.509 To say that s is epistemically justifiable to some extent for you is, on this view, just to say that s is supportable to some extent by your overall evidential reason. According to epistemologist, knowledge entails beliefs, so that I cannot know that such and such is the case unless I believe that such and such is the case.
Robert Audi mentioned that knowledge arises in experience. It is constituted by conclusively justified true belief, meaning that: the believer may be justified by psychological certain of the true proposition in question and this proposition is so well-grounded as to be itself propositionally certain. And knowledge constitute by such belief may be called epistemic certainty. When we come to religious knowledge, Audi says that religious propositions are simply beyond the scope of human knowledge. But the point is why would it be thought that no religious propositions are known? The most common ground for holding this view is namely, that religious propositions, such as that God exists, cannot be known either a priori or on the basis of experience. The concept of justification or evidence would occur with the concept of belief in a more complex analysis of the concept of knowledge.510
In recent decades, questions of knowledge seem to have been marginalized by question of justification. As a matter of fact, however, epistemological discussion of religious belief, at least since the Enlightenment has tended to focus, not on the question whether religious belief has warrant, but whether it is justified. More precisely, it has tended to focus on the question whether those properties are enjoyed by theistic belief - the belief that there exists a person like the God of traditional Christianity, Judaism, and Islam: an almighty, all knowing, wholly benevolent and loving spiritual person who has created the world. The main epistemological question about religious belief, therefore, has been the question whether or not religious belief in general and theistic belief in particular is rational or rationally acceptable, or whether it is justified?
In its primary sense, rationality is a normative concept that philosophers have generally tried to characterize in such a way that, for any action, belief, or desire, if it is rational we ought to choose it. Rationality is the use of reason to reach a certain level of reasonableness or unreasonableness. Many positive characterizations of rational beliefs have been proposed by beliefs that are either self-evident or derived from self-evident beliefs by a reliable procedure and beliefs that are consistent with the overwhelming majority of one’s beliefs.511 Analytic epistemology in the twentieth century was conducted as if there were a part from truth itself - just one truth-relevant merit in beliefs, that one typically called either “justification or rationality;”512 and since there was a great deal of disagreement on the answer to that question, there was a great flowering of theories of justification, or theories of rationality.
According to Nicholas Wolterstorff, there are a large number of distinct truth-relevant merits in beliefs, and that neither “Justification” nor “rationality”513 picks out single such merit, both are highly ambiguous terms, each picking out a number of distinct merits. Religious beliefs are formed or evoked by experience of some sort, or by believing what is said in some discourse, or by reflection on the implications of some complex of beliefs that one has previously acquired. Here, we notice that there are no rational activities to understand or justify the experience.
Richard Swinburne considered the nature of actual belief. He saw how in a sense all beliefs given rise to action and must be based on evidence. But he knows that not all beliefs are rational beliefs. For him a beliefs will fail to be rational if it is based on evidence in the wrong way or if it is based on the wrong sort of evidence. According to Swinburne beliefs are rational in so far as they are based on investigation which was, in the believer’s view, adequate, and if the believer believes it to be rational. Swinburne understand by religious beliefs as about transcendent reality, including his belief about whether or not there is a God, and his beliefs about what properties God has (what God is like) and what actions he has performed.514
According to John Hick, the issue is not whether it can be established as an item of indubitable public knowledge that God (or the divine or the Transcendent) exists, or most probably exists, but whether it is rational for those who experience some of life’s moments theistically to believe that God exists, and to proceed to conduct their lives on that basis. Hick looks at a rational belief in general way. For him “belief” can mean a proposition believed or it can be defined as an act or state of believing. The idea of evidence normally presupposes a gap between an observed fact, or body of facts, and an inferred conclusion. Therefore, our ordinary moment - to moment perceptual beliefs contradict the principle that all rational believing must be based upon adequate evidence. It is not that they are based upon inadequate evidence, but rather that the model of evidence-inference-belief does not apply here. Ordinary perceptual beliefs arise directly out of our experience, and it is entirely appropriate, proper, and rational to form these beliefs in this way. The relationship between experience and belief has been much debated in recent work in the philosophy of religion. This discussion has focused upon specifically theistic belief and Hick discusses also in these terms and his argument is that it is rational to believe in the reality of God.
Alvin Plantinga argues on these manifestation-experiences that they are properly basic.515 That is to say, it is as rational for religious persons to hold these basic religious beliefs as it is for all of us to hold our basic perceptual beliefs. But, more basically, it is the biblical assumption translated into philosophical terms. According to Plantinga this experience is what justifies me in holding (the belief) that is the ground of my justification, and by extension, the ground of the belief itself. He then applies this principle to religious beliefs.
In philosophy, experience is generally what we perceive by the senses what we learn from others, or whatever comes from external sources or from inner reflection. In the sense, experience is associated with observation and experiment. Empiricism stresses that our knowledge must be based on experience, but rationalism claims that experience is a potential source of error and prefers rational certainty to mere empirical generalization. In ordinary usage, for every experience there must be something experienced that is independent of the subject of experience. But in philosophy, the relation between experience as a state of consciousness and independent objects of experience becomes a focus of debate. There are many different kinds of experiences, but it is religious experiences that interest me here.
From the point of view of epistemology the modifications of consciousness consisting our apparently perceptual experience are of importantly different kinds. In addition to true perceptions there are misperceptions, illusions, and hallucinations. Therefore, if anyone misled by any of these forms of perceptual error, he or she is then deluded. In each case the delusion consists in a mistaken implicit belief about the cause of the experience: Applying this concept of delusion to the realm of religious experience, we have to ask whether those who assume that their experience of living in God’s presence is caused by their being in God’s presence are believing truly or are, on the contrary, under a delusion.
In modern philosophy of mind a major theme which bears on many theoretical issues, concerns the alleged privacy of an experience as an event knowable only to its possessor and the possibility of public access to that experience. There is much philosophical debate concerning precisely how perception is to be analyzed. In particular, questions are raised concerning the status of the phenomenon. But there is general agreement that in perception, objects present themselves to us in ways that enable us to know them. Similarly, in religious experience God presents himself in ways that enable us to know him and his actions. For Alston there are, it seems, important differences between ordinary perceptual or sense experience and religious experience. Sense perception is a common experience, whereas religious experience is less common, perhaps, even rare, sense perception yields a great deal of information about the world, whereas religious experience yields apparently little information about God, all humans have the capacity for sense perception, but many seem not to have the capacity for religious experience. These differences, however, do not show that religious experience has a structure unlike perception. For one thing, neither the frequency of an experience nor the amount of information it yields tells us anything about its structure.
On the other hand, the limitation of the rationalist way is that the only truths capable of being strictly proved are analytic and ultimately tautological. But we cannot by logic alone demonstrate any matter of fact and existence; these must be known through experience. For sure if nothing were given through experience in its various modes, we should never have anything to reason about. This is as true in religion as in other fields. If God exists, God is not an idea but a reality outside us, in order to be known to men and women, God must therefore become manifest in some way within their experience. This conclusion is in line with the contemporary revolt against the rationalist assumptions which have dominated much of western philosophy since the time of Descartes.516 Descartes held that we can properly be said to know only truths that are self-evident or that can be reached by logical inferences from self-evident premises.
Therefore, those who stress faith and attack reason often place a great deal of emphasis on religious experience. However, religious experience is by no means a purely emotional “happening”; rather, it involves concepts and beliefs about the being that is experienced. If we tried to separate religious experiences from such concepts and beliefs - from the religious belief-system, as we shall call it - then there would be no way saying who or what is that is experienced, or of explaining what sort of difference the experience ought to make to the person who has it. However, such a religious belief system needs to be understood; at least to some degree - it is hard to see how understanding it is not going to involve the use of reason.
For Rationalisms, in order for a religious belief-system to be properly and rationally accepted, it must be possible to prove that the belief-system is true. Rationalism in this sense implies a reliance on reason, or intelligence, in deciding our beliefs and actions. The central idea of strong rationalism was stated forcefully by W. K. Clifford. According to his opinion, no religious belief-system is capable of meeting the high standard of proof that should govern all of our believing, and so a reasonable (and moral) person must do without religious beliefs. Among the objections to Christian belief, as well as to Judaic and Muslim, Characteristic of the modern intelligentsia is the objection that it is no longer rational, if ever it was, to believe that God exists. Therefore, the rational person will have to make his way in the world without supposing that there exists any God in whom he could trust.517
However, according to Nicholas Wolterstorff, to believe in God is our fundamental human obligation. Central to Christianity, Judaism, and Islam alike is the conviction that we as human beings are called to believe in God to trust in him, to rely on him, to place our confidence in him. Central also is the conviction that only by believing in God can the deepest stirrings of the human heart be satisfied. Duty and fulfillment here coalesce. The rationality of trusting someone presupposes the rationality of believing that person exists.
John Locke was among the first to formulate articulately the evidentialist challenge to theistic belief. Reason is reasoning for Locke, and clearly he thinks of it as one among others of our belief-forming processes. Faith is another belief-forming process. It, by contrast, consists in accepting something “as coming from God.”518 However, for Locke it still belongs to reason to judge of the truth of its being a revelation, and of the signification of the words wherein it is delivered.
For evidentialist, one’s belief that God exists is rational only if it is formed or sustained by good inference by inferring it from others of one’s beliefs, which in fact provide adequate evidence for it. But, Wolterstorff, see no reason what so ever to suppose that by the criterion offered the evidentialist challenge is tenable. He see no reason to suppose that people who hold as one of their immediate beliefs that God exists always have adequate reason to surrender that belief or ought to believe that they do. However, for him those abstract and highly general theses of evidentialism no longer look very interesting, once we regard them in the light of the criterion offered. Therefore, for him the fact that it is not rational for some person to believe that God exists does not follow that he ought to give up that belief.
But can we accept the Principle of Credulity? One problem is that whereas there is a fundamental uniformity about the way we report both ordinary perceptual experiences and the beliefs about objects of those experiences, there is quite a diversity of reports about religious experiences and the claim based on them. Person give incompatible descriptions of the Reality experienced. Therefore, where perceptions yield conflicting testimony, we must turn to other experiences and rational arguments to determine the truth of the various claims. That is, where there are different accounts, additional considerations must be introduced to help decide which, if any, of the religious experiences are veridical. Although the reports provide a prima facie ground for their acceptance, not all beliefs based on such experiences are true. Just as we at times doubt perceptual claims for good reason, we might do the same for claims based on religious experience.
According to Hick, religion constitutes our varied human response to transcendent reality. Religious experience then is structured by religious beliefs which are implicit within religious experience. But the question is if this complex of experience and beliefs that takes place in different shapes within the different traditions, is to be regarded simply as a human creation or as our response to a transcendent reality, even if a response whose particular forms always involve the creative activity of the human imagination. Of course the problem of terminology is obvious as we see in many parts of philosophy, and without explanatory gloss none of the available descriptive labels for these two possibilities is entirely adequate.
Much of the philosophical discussion of religious diversity continues to centre on the work of John Hick.519 He is not interested in the question of what can justifiably be affirmed in the face of such diversity, rather, he is primarily concerned with the question of which justified response is most reasonable. Moreover, on this question, he leaves no doubt as to his opinion:
519 See John Hick, An Interpretation of Religion: Human response to the Transcendent, (New Haven: Yale University and London: Macmillan press, 1989), 172.
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religious pluralism is by far the most plausible explanation for the pervasive religious diversity we encounter.
Many Westerners will best understand the emergence of inclusivism and pluralism in terms of the history of Christianity. For most of its history, Christianity has been resolutely exclusivist. In late antiquity, it was a new religion, struggling to establish itself in the face of criticism and persecution. It is not surprising to find it making exclusive claims on behalf of its charismatic founder, Jesus of Nazareth. Of course, Christianity is not the only religion to have fostered exclusivist attitudes. In their more militant movements, Muslims have done the same. Some Jews cherish an ethnically exclusive identity as God’s chosen people, and some Hindus revere the Vedas as a source of absolute truth, Buddhists often see in the teachings of Gautama the only dharma that can liberate humans from illusion and suffering.
Hick has set forth a philosophically sophisticated pluralistic hypothesis that may avoid problems of this sort.520 As he sees it, each of the major religious traditions offers a path to salvation or liberation that involves a transformation of human existence from self-centeredness to reality- centeredness.
Religious plurality is simply a fact. There are religious traditions that differ deeply in terms of their doctrines, practices, institutions, scriptures, experiences, and hope. According to pluralism, a single ultimate religious reality is being differently experienced and understood in all the major religious traditions; they all, as far as the philosophers can tell, offer equally effective paths to salvation or liberation.
According to Harold Coward, Judaism is an appropriate tradition in which to begin the stay of religious pluralism and the world religions. The experience of being a minority group in other cultures, which becoming more common place for all the world religions as religious pluralism spreads, has been the norm for Judaism for countless generations. From the biblical period to the present, Judaism has had to formulate its beliefs and practices in the face of challenges from other cultures and religions. The viewpoint of the modern Jew opens the way for relations with Christianity, Islam, and perhaps Hinduism; however, Buddhism - especially Mahayana Buddhism may prove to be in a separate category. The Buddhist consciousness in which no transcendent God is recognized and the Mahayana awareness of the Divine in the
520 Ibid.
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secular may be judged by the Jewish philosopher as a modern idolatry. Therefore, perhaps the most serious challenge for Judaism comes in its response to Buddhism. As long as a religion is founded on the experience of a transcendent God, Judaism seems to be able to enter into spiritual partnership with it. But if that experience does not hold true for the Buddhist - if it is not a transcendent God that is being experienced - can the Jew still embrace the Buddhist as a spiritual partner? This question has yet to be faced by Judaism.521
The relationship between Christianity and the other religions is one of the key issues in Christian self-understanding. Perhaps pluralism is so pressing a challenge because of the exclusivist missionary approaches adopted by Christianity over the past several hundred years.
In the rapidly expanding body of literature resulting from the encounter with other religions, many Christian theologians are concluding that Christian theology cannot continue to be formulated in isolation from the other religions, and that in fact future developments in Christian theology will be the direct result of serious dialogue with the other religions. Although the Churches are altering their ecclesiology so as to open the way for serious dialogue with other religions, the fundamental Christology that underlies traditional ecclesiology has not yet changed.
Through out the centuries the basic Islamic approach to other religions was to search for some fundamental structures that were harmonious with Islam but which lay hidden beneath the other religion’s deviations from true Islam: A major obstacle for understanding other religions was the lack of accurate information. However, Islam has essentially reached the truth toward which all other religions are evolving. Christianity, it seems, has also virtually reached this goal. It is possible that various nations or cultures will reach the truth in their own way. The Qur’an itself teaches that every community in every age has had its prophet. However, modern education will offer Muslims an opportunity to understand each religion in terms of its own culture, history, world view, and claims to truth. This will have an effect on Islamic self-perception.
Therefore, the religious pluralism of the modern world will force Islam, finding itself in much the same position as the other traditions, to come to grips with them rather provincial
521 See Harold Coward, Pluralism: Challenge to World Religions, Harold Coward, 1-12.
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character of some of its past views of other religions.
According to Hinduism, there is one divine reality that manifests itself in many forms. The various religions are simply different revelations of the one divine reality. Hinduism sees itself as being a very open and tolerant religion. But because it asserts that the Vedas are the most perfect revelation of divine truth, Hinduism also sees itself as providing the criteria against which the revelations of all other religions must be tested. Nevertheless, the Hindu view that there is one Divine, which may be reached by many paths, has proven through out the centuries to be a powerful influence upon Hinduism’s interaction with the other religions.522 Therefore, the Hindu contribution to the modern challenge of religious pluralism is to encourage the inquiring spirit and devotion to truth that is larger than any individual tradition.
The Buddhist attitude to other religions has been described as “critical tolerance”523 combined with a missionary goal. Buddhism has demonstrated a remarkable degree of tolerance and flexibility throughout the course of its expansion. Unlike some other religious expansions, the spread of Buddhism has been accomplished more through the dissemination of ideas than by migration of peoples.
Buddhism rejects the worship of God or gods and the performance of religious rituals as a means to release. It also rejects speculations about ultimate beginnings, especially about whether the self and the world were eternal, and a number of speculations about the ultimate state of the self in the future. The tolerant but critical attitude of the Buddha toward the plurality of religious views is shaped into a rigorous philosophic approach by the Madhyamika Buddhists. If, as the Buddha discovered, the goal of religion is compassion, then, say the Madhyamika, the biggest obstacle to realizing that goal is attachment to our own religious beliefs in such a way as to make them absolute. Based on this understanding, the Madhyamika Buddhist’s attitude towards other religions is one of openness and indeed a “missionary desire”524 to enter into dialogue.
The inherent desire to conceptualize and share religious experience is too deeply ingrained in
522 Ibid., 63-80.
523 See K. N. Jayatilleke, The Buddhist Attitude to Other Religions (Kandy, Sri Lanka: Buddhist Publication Society, 1975). And see also Harold Coward Pluralism: Challenge to World Religions, 81.
524 See Harold Coward, Pluralism: Challenge to World Religions, 88.
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human nature to render silence an acceptable answer. In fact the Madhyamika himself has been far from silent. His prescription of silence was only intended to apply to claims of absolute knowledge. As long as the limitation is honored, then discussion, including theological discussion, could take place.
The dialogical approach opens the way for the meeting of Christians with Jews, Muslims, and Hindus. However, the theocentric premise could become an obstacle to meaningful encounters with Buddhists and Advaita Vedantists. Therefore, an unresolved problem for all of these approaches is the Buddhist and even those with considerable exposure to Buddhism and Hinduism seem almost willfully to turn a blind eye to this problem. One possible exception might be found in Tillich’s formulation of the “god above gods” as the “ground of being.”525
Dialogue starts from the assumption that each religion has its absolute claims which cannot be relativized. No amount of reformulation will do away with the difference. But, by letting our theologizing be influenced by others we will be forced to greater honesty and deeper spirituality. The prerequisite for dialogue is not the harmonizing of all beliefs but the recognition that each spiritual person has a committed and absolute conviction, and that these convictions are different.
Therefore, the expected outcome is not the homogenization of particular religions but the mutual deepening of spiritual experience within each particular religion, which may lead to glimpses of a common transcendent reality. This shift in perspective had the effect of drawing attention to the universal nature of religious experience in its many different traditions. In addition to turning attention away from metaphysics, rationalism, or revelation, the focus on the humanity of religion has had the effect of highlighting some of the limitations in human nature that must be taken seriously in all future religion.
The long sought molecular function of membrane raft-associated flotillin proteins is slowly becoming resolved, partially owing to the increasing knowledge about their interaction partners. Being ubiquitously expressed and evolutionarily highly conserved, flotillins carry out important cellular functions, one of which is the regulation of signal transduction pathways. This study shows that the signaling adaptor protein fibroblast growth factor receptor substrate 2 (FRS2) directly interacts both in vivo and in vitro with flotillin-1 (flot-1). FRS2 is an important docking protein of many receptor tyrosine kinases. It regulates downstream signaling by forming molecular complexes with other adaptor proteins and tyrosine phosphatases, and seems to be a critical mediator of sustained extracellular signal regulated kinase (ERK) activity. Flot-1 has also been implicated in the regulation of ERK activity upon EGF and FGF stimuli. Furthermore, flot-1 forms signalosomes with EGFR and the downstream components of the MAP kinase pathway. The newly discovered interaction between FRS2 and flot-1 was shown to be mediated by the phosphotyrosine binding (PTB) domain and, to a lesser extent, the C-terminus (CT) of FRS2 and by the C-terminus of flot-1. Flot-1 coprecipitated together with FRS2 from murine tissues and cell lysates, demonstrating that this interaction also takes place in vivo. Interestingly, flot-2, which shows a high homology to flot-1 and forms stable oligomeric complexes with it, does not appear to directly interact with FRS2. Novel insights into the functional role of the interaction between flot-1 and FRS2 were provided by the results showing that depletion of flot-1 affects the cellular localization of FRS2. In hepatocytes stably depleted of flot-1, FRS2 appeared to be more soluble. Furthermore, upon pervanadate stimulation of the cells, a small fraction of FRS2 was recruited into detergent resistant membranes, but the recruitment did not take place in the absence of flot-1. Triggered by the same stimulus, a fraction of FRS2 was translocated to the nucleus independently of flot-1. Overexpression of FRS2 has previously been shown to result in increased ERK activation. However, in cells depleted of flot-1, FRS2 was not able to compensate for the compromised ERK activation after EGF or FGF stimulation. This might imply that FRS2 and flot-1 are functionally interconnected and that FRS2 resides upstream of flot-1. Taken together, the results presented here indicate that this complex may be involved in the control of signaling downstream of receptor tyrosine kinases and is important for ensuring a proper signaling response. In the absence of flot-1, increased Tyr phosphorylation of FRS2 was observed. It is known that Tyr and Thr phosphorylation of FRS2 are reciprocally regulated. Since ERK is a known executor of the FRS2 Thr phosphorylation, and ERK activity was shown to be severely diminished upon flot-1 depletion, the increased Tyr phosphorylation of FRS2 was in agreement with this and might be a direct consequence of a decreased ERK activity upon flot-1 depletion. FRS2 owes its name to the major and the first described function of this protein as a substrate for FGFR. PTB domain of FRS2 was published to constitutively bind the juxtamembrane domain of FGFR. In this study, the PTB domain was mapped to be involved in the constitutive interaction with flot-1 and the competition was shown to exist between flot-1 and FGFR1 for binding to FRS2. Another novel interaction partner of FRS2 was discovered in the present study. Cbl-associated protein (CAP) is an adaptor protein with three SH3 domains and it plays a role during insulin signaling by recruiting the signaling complex to lipid rafts. CAP was previously shown to interact with flot-1 via the SoHo domain, and this interaction was found to be crucial for the lipid raft recruitment of other signaling components. Both the PTB domain and CT of FRS2 were found to mediate the interaction with CAP, whereas in CAP, the SoHo domain, together with the third SH3 domain, seems to bind to FRS2. SH3 domains mediate the assembly of specific protein complexes by binding to proline rich sequences, several of which are present in FRS2. Due to overlapping interaction domains, FRS2 and flot-1 competed for the binding to CAP. However, the interaction with neither CAP nor flot-1 was necessary for the observed nuclear translocation of FRS2. Since CAP is expressed as several tissue- and developmental stage-specific isoforms, a further aim of this study was to analyze the expression of its isoforms in mouse embryonic fibroblasts (MEFs). Many new isoforms were discovered here which have not been described in the literature so far. They all contain the SoHo domain and three SH3 domains, but differ among themselves by the presence and length of a proline-rich region that preceeds the SoHo domain and by a novel 20-amino acid (AA) stretch between the second and the third SH3 domain. The length of the proline-rich region turned out to be an important factor determining the strength of the interaction with FRS2. The interaction was found to be weakened by the increasing length of this region. The new isoforms possessing the 20-AA stretch are specifically expressed in murine muscular tissues, with the highest level in the heart. During adipogenesis, we observed a shift in the abundance of the isoforms, in that only the isoforms without the insertion were shown to be upregulated on mRNA level. However, during myogenesis, preferentially expressed isoforms were those with the insertion. The collected data implicate that isoforms with the 20-AA insertion might be more ubiquitous in nondifferentiated/embryonic cells and that the observed "isoform-switch" might be dependent on the cell fate and differentiation state.
A new era in experimental nuclear physics has begun with the start-up of the Large Hadron Collider at CERN and its dedicated heavy-ion detector system ALICE. Measuring the highest energy density ever produced in nucleus-nucleus collisions, the detector has been designed to study the properties of the created hot and dense medium, assumed to be a Quark-Gluon Plasma.
Comprised of 18 high granularity sub-detectors, ALICE delivers data from a few million electronic channels of proton-proton and heavy-ion collisions.
The produced data volume can reach up to 26 GByte/s for central Pb–Pb
collisions at design luminosity of L = 1027 cm−2 s−1 , challenging not only the data storage, but also the physics analysis. A High-Level Trigger (HLT) has been built and commissioned to reduce that amount of data to a storable value prior to archiving with the means of data filtering and compression without the loss of physics information. Implemented as a large high performance compute cluster, the HLT is able to perform a full reconstruction of all events at the time of data-taking, which allows to trigger, based on the information of a complete event. Rare physics probes, with high transverse momentum, can be identified and selected to enhance the overall physics reach of the experiment.
The commissioning of the HLT is at the center of this thesis. Being deeply embedded in the ALICE data path and, therefore, interfacing all other ALICE subsystems, this commissioning imposed not only a major challenge, but also a massive coordination effort, which was completed with the first proton-proton collisions reconstructed by the HLT. Furthermore, this thesis is completed with the study and implementation of on-line high transverse momentum triggers.
The ongoing debate on deforestation in the tropics usually points out agriculture and logging as the main causes. The two activities are often linked and the trails created by logging com-panies with their heavy machines are afterwards used by farmers to penetrate deep into the forest and cultivate. Shifting cultivation is a widespread agricultural practice in the tropics and its sustainability is often a matter of controversy. It is necessary to investigate forest recovery after shifting cultivation, analyze its succession stages for comparison with regeneration after natural disturbance, and evaluate its role for discussing the hazards of deforestation.
Many hominin species are best physically represented and understood by the sum of their dental morphologies. Generally, taxonomic affinities and evolutionary trends in development (ontogeny) and morphology (phylogeny) can be deduced from dental analyses. More specifically, the study of dental remains can yield a wealth of information on many facets of hominin evolution, life history, physiology and ecological adaptation; in short, the organisms paleobiomics. Functionally, teeth present information about dietary preferences, that is, the dietary niche in ecological context and, in turn, masticatory function. As the amount and types of information that can be gleaned from 2-dimensional tooth measurement exhaust themselves, 3-dimensional microscopic modeling and analysis presents a largely fertile ground for reexamination and reinterpretation of dental characteristics (Bromage et al., 2005). As such, a novel, non-destructive approach has been developed which combines the work of two established technologies (confocal microscopy and 3D modeling) adapted specifically for the purpose of mineralized tissue imaging. Through this method, 3D functional masticatory and therefore occlusal molar microwear is able to be visualized, quantified and comparatively analyzed to assess dietary preference in Javanese Homo erectus. This method differs from other microwear investigative techniques (defining 'pits'- vs- 'scratches', microtexture analysis etc.) in that it defines a molars masticatory microwear functional interactions in 3-dimensions as its baseline dataset for further interpretations and analyses. Due to poor specimen collection techniques employed during the first half of the 20th century, the very complex geologic nature of the Sangiran Dome and disagreements over its chronostratigraphy, only very few scientific works have addressed the Sangiran 7 (S7) Homo erectus molar collection (n=25) (e.g. Grine and Franzen, 1994; Kaifu, 2006). Grine and Franzen's (1994) work was a predominantly qualitative initial assessment of the specimens and identified five specimens that might better be ascribed to a fossil pongid rather than H. erectus. They also noted several molars to which tooth position (M1 or M2) was unable to be ascribed (Grine and Franzen, 1994). Kaifu (2006) comparatively examined crown sizes in several S7 molars.
The Sangiran 7 collection originates from two distinct geologic horizons: ten from the older Sangiran Formation (S7a, ~1.7 to 1.0mya) and fifteen from the younger, overlying Bapang Formation (S7b, ~1.0 to .7mya). During this million year period, Java was connected to the mainland during various glacio-eustatic low-stands in sea level. These mainland connections varied in size, extent, climatic condition and therefore in faunal and floral composition. As the S7 sample may be representative of the earliest Homo erectus migrants into Java and spans long durations of occupation, its investigation yields potential to understand the various influences climatic and ecogeographic fluctuations had on these populations. Since the sample consists only of teeth, an ecodietary approach has been deemed the most logical and appropriate investigative approach. Questions regarding the intra- and inter- S7 sample
relationships will also be addressed.
By comparing various aspects of the H. erectus dentition against that of hunter/ gatherer's (H/G) whose diet is known, functional dietary similarity can be directly correlated. Thus a comparative molar sample consisting of the below historic hunter/ gather's (n=63) has been included in order to assess H. erectus's diet in ecological context: Inuit (n=9), Pacific Northwest Tribes (n=11), Fuegians (n=11), Australian Aborigines (n=12) and Bushman (n=20). Methodologically, this approach produces a 3D facet microwear vector (fmv) signature for each molar which can then be compared for statistical similarity.
Microwear (and, as such, the fmv signatures) was defined by the regular, parallel striations found on specific cusp facets known to arise from patterned, directional masticatory movements. This differs significantly from post-mortem or taphonomic microwear which produces striations at irregular angles on multiple, non-masticatory surfaces (Peuch et al.1985, Teaford, 1988). A 'match value' is produced to determine the similarity of two molars fmv's. The 'match values' are ranked (high to low) and these rankings are used to statistically analyze and infer dietary preference: between Sangiran 7 (as an entire sample) compared against that of the historic hunter/ gatherer H. sapiens whose diet and ecogeography is known; within S7a and S7b and then among the S7 sample (eg. S7a-vs-S7b); whether the purported Pongo molars actually affiliate well with H. erectus, the hunter-gatherer's or if they demonstrate distinctly different fmv signatures altogether; whether fmv signatures are useful in distinguishing molars whose tooth position is in doubt (eg. M1 or M2).
When compared against individual H/G molars, the results show that Sangiran 7 H. erectus most closely correlates with Bushmen across all areas of fmv signature analysis. However, within broader dietary categories (yearly reliant on proteinaceous foods; seasonally reliant on proteinaceous foods; not reliant on proteinaceous foods), it was found that H. erectus most closely allied with the two hunter/ gatherer subpopulations associated with the 'Seasonally reliant on proteinaceous foods' (Australian Aboriginals and Pacific Northwest Tribes). There was also evidence for dietary change or specialization over time. As the environment changed during occupation by the earlier Sangiran to the later Bapang individuals, the dietary preference shifted from a focus on vegetative foods to a diet much more inclusive of proteinaceous resources.
These results are considered logical within the larger ecogeographic and chronostratigraphic context of the Sangiran Dome during the Pleistocene. However, a larger sample would be needed to confirm this. Although general dietary preferences can be drawn from this method, it is not possible at present to define specific foods consumed on a daily basis (eg. tubers or tortoise meat).
Out of the five specimens possibly allied with Pongo, S7-14 matched at the 'high' designation with a hunter/ gatherer, S7-62 matched 'moderately', S7-20 matched 'low' while the remaining two were not able to be matched with any other teeth for various reasons. Although designation to Pongo cannot be ruled on at this time using this method, it does demonstrate that at least two of the teeth correlate well with various hunter/ gatherer's who do not share dietary similarity with Pongo. This suggests their designation as Pongo should be more closely reevaluated. As for the four specimens whose tooth position was unsure, S7-14 matched 'highly' with 1st molars, S7-62 and S7-78 matched 'moderately' with 2nd and 1st molars respectively while S7-20 only matched at the 'low' designation. Although this approach is still exploratory, it adds another analytical tool for use in defining tooth position.
In sum, this method has demonstrated its usefulness in defining and functionally analyzing a novel 3D molar microwear dataset to interpret dietary preference. Future work would include a pan- H. erectus molar sample in order to illuminate broader populational, taxonomic and dietary correlations within and amoung all H. erectus specimens. A larger, more heterogenous historic H/G sample would also be included in order to provide a wider dietary comparative population. This method can be further extended to include and compare any and all hominins as well as any organism which produces micro wear upon it molars. Also, the data obtained and resultant fmv signature diagrams have the potential to be incorporated into 3D VR reconstructions of mandibular movement thus recreating mastication in extinct organisms and leading to more robust anatomical and physiological investigations especially when viewed in the context of larger environmental conditions or changes.