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The importance of agile methods has increased in recent years, not only to manage software development processes but also to establish flexible and adaptive organisational structures, which are essential to deal with disruptive changes and build successful digital business strategies. This paper takes an industry-specific perspective by analysing the dissemination, objectives and relative popularity of agile frameworks in the German banking sector. The data provides insights into expectations and experiences associated with agile methods and indicates possible implementation hurdles and success factors. Our research provides the first comprehensive analysis of agile methods in the German banking sector. The comparison with a selected number of fintechs has revealed some differences between banks and fintechs. We found that almost all banks and fintechs apply agile methods in IT-related projects. However, fintechs have relatively more experience with agile methods than banks and use them more intensively. Scrum is the most relevant framework used in practice. Scaled agile frameworks are so far negligible in the German banking sector. Acceleration of projects is apparently the most important objective of deploying agile methods. In addition, agile methods can contribute to cost savings and lead to improved quality and innovation performance, though for banks it is evidently more challenging to reach their respective targets than for fintechs. Overall our findings suggest that German banks are still in a maturing process of becoming more agile and that there is room for an accelerated adoption of agile methods in general and scaled agile frameworks in particular.
We find that on average consumers chose the contract that ex post minimized their net costs. A substantial fraction of consumers (about 40%) still chose the ex post sub-optimal contract, with some incurring hundreds of dollars of avoidable interest costs. Nonetheless, the probability of choosing the sub-optimal contract declines with the dollar magnitude of the potential error, and consumers with larger errors were more likely to subsequently switch to the optimal contract. Thus most of the errors appear not to have been very costly, with the exception that a small minority of consumers persists in holding substantially sub-optimal contracts without switching. Klassifikation: G11, G21, E21, E51
Some have argued that recent increases in credit risk transfer are desirable because they improve the diversification of risk. Others have suggested that they may be undesirable if they increase the risk of financial crises. Using a model with banking and insurance sectors, we show that credit risk transfer can be beneficial when banks face uniform demand for liquidity. However, when they face idiosyncratic liquidity risk and hedge this risk in an interbank market, credit risk transfer can be detrimental to welfare. It can lead to contagion between the two sectors and increase the risk of crises. Klassifikation: G21, G22
Market discipline for financial institutions can be imposed not only from the liability side, as has often been stressed in the literature on the use of subordinated debt, but also from the asset side. This will be particularly true if good lending opportunities are in short supply, so that banks have to compete for projects. In such a setting, borrowers may demand that banks commit to monitoring by requiring that they use some of their own capital in lending, thus creating an asset market-based incentive for banks to hold capital. Borrowers can also provide banks with incentives to monitor by allowing them to reap some of the benefits from the loans, which accrue only if the loans are in fact paid o.. Since borrowers do not fully internalize the cost of raising capital to the banks, the level of capital demanded by market participants may be above the one chosen by a regulator, even when capital is a relatively costly source of funds. This implies that capital requirements may not be binding, as recent evidence seems to indicate. JEL Classification: G21, G38