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SME funding without banks?
(2017)
The Capital Markets Union-project of the European Commission aims for an increase of marketbased debt financing of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), complementing bank lending. In this essay we argue that rather than focussing on pure non-bank lending, a reasonable mix of bankand market-based financing should be considered. Banks are said to have a comparative advantage in critical lending functions such as credit screening, debtor monitoring and debt renegotiation. All forms of lending require a persistent skin-in-the-game of critical players in order to be effective. The regulator should insist on full disclosure of skin-in-the-game, thereby improving capital allocation and reducing systemic risks.
This essay reviews a cornerstone of the European Banking Union project, the resolution of systemically important banks. The focus is on the inherent conflict between a possible intervention by resolution authorities, conditional on a crisis situation, and effective prevention prior to a crisis. Moreover, the paper discusses the rules for bail-in debt and conversion rules for different layers of debt. Finally, some organizational requirements to achieve effective resolution results will be analyzed.
Mis-selling by banks has occurred repeatedly in many nations over the last decade. While clients may benefit from competition – enabling them to choose financial services at lowest costs – economic frictions between banks and clients may give rise to mis-selling. Examples of mis-selling are mis-representation of information, overly complex product design and non-customized advice. European regulators address the problem of mis-selling in the "Markets in Financial Instruments Directive" (MiFID) I and II and the "Markets in Financial Instruments Regulation" (MiFIR), by setting behavioral requirements for banks, regulating the compensation of employees, and imposing re-quirements on offered financial products and disclosure rules.
This paper argues that MiFID II protects clients but is not as effective as it could be. (1) It does not differentiate between client groups with different levels of financial literacy. Effective advice requires different advice for different client groups. (2) MiFID II uses too many rules and too many instruments to achieve identical goals and thereby generates excessive compliance costs. High compliance costs and low revenues would drive banks out of some segments of retail business.