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This article provides an overview and critical assessment of WIPO ALERT. It locates this initiative in the broader context of transnational IP enforcement schemes on the Internet. These initiatives are classified into two categories according to their point of attachment and geographical effect. Whereas source-related measures (e.g. website takedowns) tend to have a transnational and possibly even a global effect, recipient-related measures (e.g. website and ad blockings) typically mirror the territorially fragmented IPR landscape. This fragmentation is where WIPO ALERT comes into play. It can be understood as a matching service which interconnects holders of information about copyright infringing websites (“Authorized Contributors”) and actors of the online ad industry who want to avoid these outlets (“Authorized Users”). The critical assessment of WIPO ALERT calls for more transparency and the establishment of uniform substantive and procedural standards that have to be met if a new “site of concern” is added to the global ad blacklist.
We show strong overall and heterogeneous economic incidence effects, as well as distortionary effects, of only shifting statutory incidence (i.e., the agent on which taxes are levied), without any tax rate change. For identification, we exploit a tax change and administrative data from the credit market: (i) a policy change in 2018 in Spain shifting an existing mortgage tax from being levied on borrowers to being levied on banks; (ii) some areas, for historical reasons, were exempt from paying this tax (or have different tax rates); and (iii) an exhaustive matched credit register. We find the following robust results: First, after the policy change, the average mortgage rate increases consistently with a strong – but not complete – tax pass-through. Second, there is a large heterogeneity in such pass-through: larger for borrowers with lower income, a smaller number of lending relationships, not working for the lender, or facing less banks in their zip-code, thereby suggesting a bargaining power mechanism at work. Third, despite no variation in the tax rate, and consistent with the non-full tax pass-through, the tax shift increases banks’ risk-taking. More affected banks reduce costly mortgage insurance in case of loan default (especially so if banks have weaker ex-ante balance sheets) and expand into non-affected but (much) ex-ante riskier consumer lending, experiencing even higher ex-post defaults within consumer loans.
This paper makes a case for the future development of European corporate law through regulatory competition rather than EC legislation. It is for the first time becoming legally possible for firms within the EU to select the national company law that they wish to govern their activities. A significant number of firms can be expected to exercise this freedom, and national legislatures can be expected to respond by seeking to make their company laws more attractive to firms. Whilst the UK is likely to be the single most successful jurisdiction in attracting firms, the presence of different models of corporate governance within Europe make it quite possible that competition will result in specialisation rather than convergence, and that no Member State will come to dominate as Delaware has done in the US. Procedural safeguards in the legal framework will direct the selection of laws which increase social welfare, as opposed simply to the welfare of those making the choice. Given that European legislators cannot be sure of the ‘optimal’ model for company law, the future of European company law-making would better be left with Member States than take the form of harmonized legislation.
We present novel evidence on the value of cross-border political access. We analyze data on meetings of US multinational enterprises (MNEs) with European Commission (EC) policymakers. Meetings with Commissioners are associated with positive abnormal equity returns. We study channels of value creation through political access in the areas of regulation and taxation. US enterprises with EC meetings are more likely to receive favorable outcomes in their European merger decisions and have lower effective tax rates on foreign income than their peers without meetings. Our results suggest that access to foreign policymakers is of substantial value for MNEs.
I analyze the most powerful shareholders in Germany to illustrate the concentration of control over listed corporations. Compared to other developed economies, the German stock market is dominated by large shareholders. I show that 77% of the median firm’s voting rights arecontrolled by large blockholders. This corresponds to 47% of the market value of all firms listed in Germany’s official markets. About two thirds of this amount is controlled by banks, industrial firms, holdings, and insurance companies. I show that due to current legislation it is clear for neither group who ultimate exerts control over the shareholding firm itself. For the remaining blockholders, only blocks controlled by voting pools and individuals can be traced back to the highest level of ownership. In the aggregate, both groups control only 5.6% of all reported blocks. The German government controls 8%, and it is not clear who ultimately is responsible for the consequences of decisions.
In its admissibility decision in the Al-Saadoon case the ECtHR held that the United Kingdom had jurisdiction over the applicants, who had been arrested by British forces and kept in a British-run military prison in Iraq. Just before the respective mandate of the Security Council expired on 31 December 2008, the applicants were transferred to Iraqi custody at Iraqi request and thereby exposed to the risk of an unfair trial followed by capital punishment. In this respect, the case resembles the Soering case, although the applicants were, unlike Soering, not on British territory but on occupied Iraqi soil before they were handed over. This aspect raises the question of Iraqi sovereignty as a norm competing with the UK's human rights obligations. The authors trace back the ECtHR's case law concerning the extraterritorial application of the Convention and analyse the UK judgments and the ECtHR's admissibility decision in the Al-Saadoon affair from this angle. Furthermore they consider the doctrinal consequences of the ECHR's extraterritorial effect in cases like Soering and Al-Saadoon, where contracting parties violate guarantees of the Convention by exposing a person within their jurisdiction to a risk of a treatment contrary to these guarantees by a third state. Finally, they test the argument brought forward by the UK that not transferring the applicants would have violated Iraqi sovereignty and establish patterns how the ECtHR and the UK Courts did cope in the past with international law norms potentially competing with the Convention.
In this article I advance an account of human rights as individual claims that can be justified within the conceptual framework of social contract theories. The contractarian approach at issue here aims, initially, at a justification of morality at large, and then at the specific domain of morality which contains human rights concepts. The contractarian approach to human rights has to deal with the problem of universality, i.e. how can human rights be ‘universal’? I deal with this problem by examining the relationship between moral dispositions and what I call ‘diffuse legal structure’.
What happened to the tremendous legacy of juridical knowledge left behind in Italy in the 6th century? Into what labyrinth did it plunge only to re-emerge after the silent age of the early Middle Ages into the light of day, and effectively come to shape the renewal of the jurisprudence at the beginning of the 12th century? One-and-a-half centuries after the fanciful writings of Hermann Fitting, legal historians are still looking for the answers to these questions. Considering the new information we have (especially coming from the paleographical research), this paper re-examines the existence as well as the activities of the school of Rome both during the Justinian Age and in the two centuries thereafter. The aim of this essay is to verify whether Rome, during the very early Middle Ages, continued to represent a centre of juridical culture. According to the hypothesis developed in this contribution, Rome – at that time – not only played a very important role with regard to the material conservation of the Justinian’s libri legales, but also in the initial establishment of the new (i. e., Justinian) imperial law in the West and creation of its image as a significant juridical centre. The absence of such a centre as well as its wide-spread image would truly make the Bolognese renovatio appear "miraculous" and very difficult to explain.
After Justinian, the 7th and 8th centuries can truly be characterised as "silent" in the history of Roman law in the West. However, by studying the medieval manuscript tradition, in particular, that of the Institutiones and the Novellae, we can gather together a series of elements helping us to clarify the situation. Also quite useful is an examination of the manuscript tradition of the Collatio legum Mosaicarum et Romanarum. Through the spread and use of these Late Antique works, we can see how – in conjunction with the actions of the papacy – Rome, toward the end of the 8th century, returned to being a centre of world politics and – given that law follows politics – of the legal culture.
In response to recent developments in the financial markets and the stunning growth of the hedge fund industry in the United States, policy makers, most notably the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”), are turning their attention to the regulation, or lack thereof, of hedge funds. U.S. regulators have scrutinized the hedge fund industry on several occasions in the recent past without imposing substantial regulatory constraints. Will this time be any different? The focus of the regulators’ interest has shifted. Traditionally, they approached the hedge fund industry by focusing on systemic risk to and integrity of the financial markets. The current inquiry is almost exclusively driven by investor protection concerns. What has changed? First, since 2000, new kinds of investors have poured capital into hedge funds in the United States, facilitated by the “retailization” of hedge funds through the development of funds of hedge funds and the dismal performance of the stock market. Second, in a post-Enron era, regulators and policy makers are increasingly sensitive to investor protection concerns. On May 14 and 15, 2003, the SEC held for the first time a public roundtable discussion on the single topic of hedge funds. Among the investor protection concerns highlighted were: an increase in incidents of fraud, inadequate suitability determinations by brokers who market hedge fund interests to individual investors, conflicts of interest of managers who manage mutual funds and hedge funds side-by-side, a lack of transparency that hinders investors from making informed investment decisions, layering of fees, and unbounded discretion by managers in pricing private hedge fund securities. Although there has been discussion about imposing wide-ranging restrictions onhedge funds, such as reining in short selling, requiring disclosure of long/short positions and limiting leverage, such a response would be heavy-handed and probably unnecessary. The existing regulatory regime is largely adequate to address the most flagrant abuses. Moreover, as the hedge fund market further matures, it is likely that institutional investors will continue to weed out weak performers and mediocre or dishonest hedge fund managers. What is likely to emerge from the newest regulatory focus on investor protection is a measured response that would enhance the SEC’s enforcement and inspection authority, while leaving hedge funds’ inherent investment flexibility largely unfettered. A likely scenario, for example, might be a requirement that some, or possibly all, hedge fund sponsors register with the SEC as investment advisers. Today, most are exempt from registration, although more and more are registering to provide advice to public hedge funds and attract institutions. Registration would make it easier for the SEC to ferret out potential fraudsters in advance by reviewing the professional history of hedge fund operators, allow the SEC to bring administrative proceedings against hedge fund advisers for statutory violations and give the agency access to books and records that it does not have today. Other possible initiatives, including additional disclosure requirements for publicly offered hedge funds, are discussed below. This article addresses the question whether U.S. regulation of hedge funds is really taking a new direction. It (i) provides a brief overview of the current U.S. regulatory scheme, from which hedge funds are generally exempt, (ii) describes recent events in the United States that have contributed to regulators’ anxiety, (iii) examines the investor protection rationale for hedge fund regulation and considers whether these concerns do, in fact, merit increased regulation of hedge funds at this time, and (iv) considers the likelihood and possible scope of a potential regulatory response, principally by the SEC.