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Multilevel governance of energy transitions depends on the coordination between national, supra- and international administrative actors. Coordination takes place in systems of multilevel administration, which constitute highly dynamic arenas dominated by legally non-binding instruments and reciprocal interactions and relationships. This article seeks to gain insights into the underlying coordination processes by asking which conditions account for the change over time of coordination between administrative actors in multilevel administration systems. First, research on multilevel administration is summarized. Second and starting from historic and discursive institutionalist theory, a conceptual framework is outlined to assess the conditions and modes that account for the dynamics of coordination in general, and the change of coordination instruments in particular. A trend towards persuasive coordination in a process of institutional layering driven by endogenous conditions is expected. Empirically, an in-depth comparative analysis is conducted based on exploratory interviews with 90 experts mainly from the European Commission, the International Energy Agency, and national administrators from Canada and Europe. The results unveil that administrative coordination evolves according to at least three types of layering that go beyond the initial hypothesis: first, through layering of coordination instruments; second, as an increase in formal and non-formal interactions through a growing number of channels and complexity of interactions over time; third, as layering of inter-administrative relationships through a growing importance of personal networks and the creation of new contacts. By analysing the dynamics of multilevel administrative coordination, the article contributes to an important but underdeveloped aspect of the governance of supra- and international energy transitions.
This dissertation consists of four self-contained chapters in the overlapping fields of industrial organization and organizational economics on the topics pricing, careers and supervision. Each chapter is the result of an independent research project. The dissertation analyzes empirical research topics by exploring novel observational data sets. It sheds light on open questions in the economic profession by extending fundamental models on pricing in the first two chapters and by challenging conventional explanations and methods on careers and supervision in the last two chapters.
- Chapter 1:
The first chapter is based on joint work with Steffen Eibelshäuser. It models price competition among brick-and-mortar retailers with business hours. Specifically, we propose a dynamic model of intraday price competition featuring spatial differentiation and firm size heterogeneity. The model makes detailed predictions concerning equilibrium-pricing patterns. When spatial differentiation is high and consumers cannot easily switch between retailers, equilibrium prices are stable at oligopoly levels. When differentiation is low, equilibrium prices fluctuate in cycles. The shapes of the cycles depend on the level of differentiation and on retailers’ reaction times. When reaction times decrease, the number of price cycles increases. In a second step, we apply the model to the German retail gasoline market. Gasoline retailers have been using digital price tags for decades and fast-paced price competition with more than ten price changes per day is no exception. Our model has successfully predicted the emergence of an additional intraday subcycle in April 2017. Moreover, we were able to confirm several detailed predictions concerning the shape of equilibrium price paths and individual firm behavior. Finally, we calibrate the model using a generalized method of moments. The model fits the data remarkably well, with coefficients of determination ranging from 60% to 80%. We use the fitted model to evaluate a number of policy counterfactuals. Restricting price increases results in higher prices and decreased welfare, leading us to conclude that regulation of dynamic markets is highly complex and can easily backfire.
- Chapter 2:
The second chapter analyzes the price-matching policies of two gasoline retailers. Customers of these retailers that are able to provide evidence of competitors posting lower prices have the ability to claim price matches. As shown in the first chapter, the Edgeworth Cycle model rationalizes price fluctuations in the German gasoline retail market. To determine policy interactions in cycling markets, this chapter extends the classical Edgeworth Cycle model by price-matching. The model predicts that price-matching retailers post higher prices and initiate price increases. The price-consulted firm anticipates this strategy, posts lower prices, and provokes the implementing firm to restore the price more frequently. Consulted stations also anticipate earlier price restoration reactions from implementing stations and, thus, provoke restorations earlier. This effect dominates in welfare calculations, such that price matching has positive welfare implications.
The second part of the chapter tests the hypotheses with price data on the German gasoline retail market. The estimation exploits a discontinuity in the policy-affected retailers. Therefore, the analysis disentangles the competitive effects of implementing and price-consulted market participants in comparison to retailers that are not affected. As predicted, the posted average and minimum prices of one implementing retailer and its consulted competitors increase. For the other price-matching retailer, I find reduced prices that contradict the model. The last part of the chapter relates the empirics to static models and shows that the dynamic component provides previously undiscovered insights.
- Chapter 3:
The third chapter is based on joint work with Emmanuelle Auriol and Guido Friebel. It represents the subtopic of careers in this dissertation. Specifically, the chapter provides the first comprehensive data collection analysis of women’s careers in all European research institutions in the field of economics. Using a web-scraping algorithm that constantly accesses position information on institutions’ websites, we collect a novel data set on researchers in Europe. These details entail information on researchers’ gender obtained by the first name and a face recognition. Similar to survey data on U.S. institutions, we identify a leaky pipeline, as women are less likely to become professors than men are. The situation is very heterogeneous across Europe. The gap is substantially larger in Western and Southern Europe than in Central and Eastern Europe. Furthermore, we identify institutions with a higher research output and a better research-ranking having a systematically lower share of females in full professor positions as well as entry-level positions for Ph.D. graduates. Austria, Belgium, Italy, Portugal, and Spain are the drivers for this correlation. All these results are in line with the “leaky pipeline” hypothesis, in which, over the different stages of a career, the attrition of women is higher than the one of men. We show that the cohort hypothesis arguing that the lag effect between the time of Ph.D. completion and the time of promotion to a full professorship is unable to explain the current low number of females.
- Chapter 4:
The fourth and last chapter "What does Mystery Shopping do?" is based on joint work with Sidney Block, Guido Friebel, Matthias Heinz, and Nick Zubanov. It addresses an auditing practice with a yearly U.S.-turnover of 19.5 billion USD in 2016 (European Society for Opinion and Market Research, 2017: Global Market Research 2017). The term mystery represents the key aspect of the tool. During an anonymous visit, so-called mystery shoppers perform certain predefined tasks such as purchasing a product, asking questions, registering complaints, or behaving in a certain way. Following their visit, the shoppers provide detailed reports about their experiences to the evaluated firms. The chapter investigates whether the practice is suitable to determine employees’ pay. Contrary to the general understanding that firms are able to observe service quality and, in turn, can proxy for business success with mystery shopping, we do not observe mystery-shopping evaluations to correlate positively with firm performance. A decomposition of the evaluation reports indicates that mystery-shopping scores are biased and the shopper’s identity explains up to 20% of the score’s variance. Thus, the shopper’s identity has the largest impact out of all observable characteristics. With the results that mystery-shopping scores are noisy and biased, we conclude that they are not suitable for performance pay in the context of our study. In addition, we show that if the number of observations is sufficiently large, aggregated scores relate to business success. The required number of shops per evaluation period must be, however, larger by a factor between 3 and 30 per evaluated subject. Hence, cost advantages of mystery shopping diminish such that the cost benefits to customer assessments could vanish completely. The current methodology, however, may still be useful for other employee-related purposes like monitoring, which is in line with the policies of the considered firms.
Over the past few decades, changes in market conditions such as globalisation and deregulation of financial markets as well as product innovation and technical advancements have induced financial institutions to expand their business activities beyond their traditional boundaries and to engage in cross-sectoral operations. As combining different sectoral businesses offers opportunities for operational synergies and diversification benefits, financial groups comprising banks, insurance undertakings and/or investment firms, usually referred to as financial conglomerates, have rapidly emerged, providing a wide range of services and products in distinct financial sectors and oftentimes in different geographic locations. In the European Union (EU), financial conglomerates have become part of the biggest and most active financial market participants in recent years. Financial conglomerates generally pose new problems for financial authorities as they can raise new risks and exacerbate existing ones. In particular, their cross-sectoral business activities can involve prudentially substantial risks such as the risk of regulatory arbitrage and contagion risk arising from intra-group transactions. Moreover, the generally large size of financial conglomerates as well as the high complexity and interconnectedness of their corporate structures and risk exposures can entail substantial systemic risk and can therefore threaten the stability of the financial system as a whole. Until a few years ago, there was no supervisory framework in place which addressed a financial conglomerate in its entirety as a group. Instead, each group entity within a financial conglomerate was subject to the supervisory rules of its pertinent sector only. Such silo supervisory approach had the drawback of not taking account of risks which arise or aggravate at the group level. It also failed to consider how the risks from different business lines within the group interrelate with each other and affect the group as a whole. In order to address this lack of group-wide prudential supervision of financial conglomerates, the European legislator adopted the Financial Conglomerates Directive 2002/87/EC8 (‘FCD’) on 16 December 2002. The FCD was transposed into national law in the member states of the EU (‘Member States’) by 11 August 2004 for application to financial years beginning on 1 January 2005 and after. The FCD primarily aims at supplementing the existing sectoral directives to address the additional risks of concentration, contagion and complexity presented by financial conglomerates. It therefore provides for a supervisory framework which is applicable in addition to the sectoral supervision. Most importantly, the FCD has introduced additional capital requirements at the conglomerate level so as to prevent the multiple use of the same capital by different group entities. This paper seeks to examine to what extent the FCD provides for an adequate capital regulation of financial conglomerates in the EU while taking into account the underlying sectoral capital requirements and the inherent risks associated with financial conglomerates. In Part 1, the definition and the basic corporate models of financial conglomerates will be presented (I), followed by an illustration of the core motives behind the phenomenon of financial conglomeration (II) and an overview of the development of the supervision over financial conglomerates in the EU (III). Part 2 begins with a brief elaboration on the role of regulatory capital (I) and gives a general overview of the EU capital requirements applicable to banks and insurance undertakings respectively. A delineation of the commonalities and differences of the banking and the insurance capital requirements will be provided (II). It continues to further examine the need for a group-wide capital regulation of financial conglomerates and analyses the adequacy of the FCD capital requirements. In this context, the technical advice rendered by the Joint Committee on Financial Conglomerates (JCFC) as well as the currently ongoing legislative reforms at the EU level will be discussed (III). The paper finally closes with a conclusion and an outlook on remaining open issues (IV).
We use a novel disaggregate sectoral euro area dataset with a regional breakdown that allows explicit estimation of the sectoral component of price changes (rather than interpreting the idiosyncratic component as sectoral as done in other papers). Employing a new method to extract factors from over-lapping data blocks, we find for our euro area data set that the sectoral component explains much less of the variation in sectoral regional inflation rates and exhibits much less volatility than previous findings for the US indicate. Country- and region-specific factors play an important role in addition to the sector-specific factors. We conclude that sectoral price changes have a “geographical” dimension, as yet unexplored in the literature, that might lead to new insights regarding the properties of sectoral price changes.
The global financial crisis has lead to a renewed interest in discretionary fiscal stimulus. Advocates of discretionary measures emphasize that government spending can stimulate additional private spending — the so-called Keynesian multiplier effect. Thus, we investigate whether the discretionary spending announced by Euro area governments for 2009 and 2010 is likely to boost euro area GDP by more than one for one. Because of modeling uncertainty, it is essential that such policy evaluations be robust to alternative modeling assumptions and different parameterizations. Therefore, we use five different empirical macroeconomic models with Keynesian features such as price and wage rigidities to evaluate the impact of fiscal stimulus. Four of them suggest that the planned increase in government spending will reduce private spending for consumption and investment purposes significantly. If announced government expenditures are implemented with delay the initial effect on euro area GDP, when stimulus is most needed, may even be negative. Traditional Keynesian multiplier effects only arise in a model that ignores the forward-looking behavioral response of consumers and firms. Using a multi-country model, we find that spillovers between euro area countries are negligible or even negative, because direct demand effects are offset by the indirect effect of euro appreciation.
The impact of European integration on the German system of pharmaceutical product authorization
(2008)
The European Union has evolved since 1965 into an influential political player in the regulation of pharmaceutical safety standards. The objective of establishing a single European market for pharmaceuticals makes it necessary for member-states to adopt uniform safety standards and marketing authorization procedures. This article investigates the impact of the European integration process on the German marketing authorization system for pharmaceuticals. The analysis shows that the main focal points and objectives of European regulation of pharmaceutical safety have shifted since 1965. The initial phase saw the introduction of uniform European safety standards as a result of which Germany was obliged to undertake “catch-up” modernization. From the mid-1970s, these standards were extended and specified in greater detail. Since the mid-1990s, a process of reorientation has been under way. The formation of the European Agency for the Evaluation of Medicinal Products (EMEA) and the growing importance of the European authorization procedure, combined with intensified global competition on pharmaceutical markets, are exerting indirect pressure for EU member-states to adjust their medicines policies. Consequently, over the past few years Germany has been engaged in a competition-oriented reorganization of its pharmaceutical product authorization system the outcome of which will be to give higher priority to economic interests.
The single most important policy-induced innovation in the international financial system since the collapse of the Bretton-Woods regime is the institution of the European Monetary Union. This paper provides an account of how the process of financial integration has promoted financial development in the euro area. It starts by defining financial integration and how to measure it, analyzes the barriers that can prevent it and the effects of their removal on financial markets, and assesses whether the euro area has actually become more integrated. It then explores to which extent these changes in financial markets have influenced the performance of the euro-area economy, that is, its growth and investment, as well as its ability to adjust to shocks and to allow risk-sharing. The paper concludes analyzing further steps that are required to consolidate financial integration and enhance the future stability of financial markets.
This paper proposes a possible way of assessing the effect of interest rate dynamics on changes in the decision-making approach, communication strategy and operational framework of a Central bank. Through a GARCH specification we show that the USA and Euro area displayed a limited but significant spillover of volatility from money market to longer-term rates. We then checked the stability of this phenomenon in the most recent period of improved policymaking and found empirical evidence that the transmission of overnight volatility along the yield curve vanished soon after specific policy changes of the FED and ECB.
The European Central Bank has assigned a special role to money in its two pillar strategy and has received much criticism for this decision. In this paper, we explore possible justifications. The case against including money in the central bank’s interest rate rule is based on a standard model of the monetary transmission process that underlies many contributions to research on monetary policy in the last two decades. Of course, if one allows for a direct effect of money on output or inflation as in the empirical “two-pillar” Phillips curves estimated in some recent contributions, it would be optimal to include a measure of (long-run) money growth in the rule. In this paper, we develop a justification for including money in the interest rate rule by allowing for imperfect knowledge regarding unobservables such as potential output and equilibrium interest rates. We formulate a novel characterization of ECB-style monetary cross-checking and show that it can generate substantial stabilization benefits in the event of persistent policy misperceptions regarding potential output. Such misperceptions cause a bias in policy setting. We find that cross-checking and changing interest rates in response to sustained deviations of long-run money growth helps the central bank to overcome this bias. Our argument in favor of ECB-style cross-checking does not require direct effects of money on output or inflation. JEL Classification: E32, E41, E43, E52, E58