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Coming of voting age. Evidence from a natural experiment on the effects of electoral eligibility
(2024)
In recent years, several jurisdictions have lowered the voting age, with many more discussing it. Sceptics question whether young people are ready to vote, while supporters argue that allowing them to vote would increase their specific engagement with politics. To test the latter argument, we use a series of register-based surveys of over 10,000 German adolescents. Knowing the exact birthdates of our respondents, we estimate the causal effect of eligibility on their information-seeking behaviour in a regression discontinuity design. While eligible and non-eligible respondents do not differ in their fundamental political dispositions, those allowed to vote are more likely to discuss politics with their family and friends and to use a voting advice application. This effect appears to be stronger for voting age 16 than for 18. The right to vote changes behaviour. Therefore, we cannot conclude from the behaviour of ineligible citizens that they are unfit to vote.
We study platform design in online markets in which buying involves a (non-monetary) cost for consumers caused by privacy and security concerns. Firms decide whether to require registration at their website before consumers learn relevant product information. We derive conditions under which a monopoly seller benefits from ex ante registration requirements and demonstrate that the profitability of registration requirements is increased when taking into account the prospect of future purchases or an informational value of consumer registration to the
rm. Moreover, we consider the effectiveness of discounts (store credit) as a means to influence the consumers-registration decision. Finally, we con
rm the profitability of ex ante registration requirements in the presence of price competition.
We present a simple model of personal finance in which an incumbent lender has an information advantage vis-a-vis both potential competitors and households. In order to extract more consumer surplus, a lender with sufficient market power may engage in "irresponsible"lending, approving credit even if this is knowingly against a household’s best interest. Unless rival lenders are equally well informed, competition may reduce welfare. This holds, in particular, if less informed rivals can free ride on the incumbent’s superior screening ability.