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Acquiring foreign firms far away might be hazardous to your share price: evidence from Germany
(2007)
This paper examines shareholder wealth effects of cross-border acquisitions. In a sample of 155 large acquisitions by German corporations from 1985–2006 international transactions in total do not lead to significant announcement returns. Geography, however, makes a difference: Shareholders of acquiring firms gain 6.5% in cross-border transactions into countries that have a common border with Germany but lose 4.4% in other international transactions. We find proximity to be one of the most important success factors in cross-border mergers and acquisitions, even when we control for firm, deal and country characteristics.
This paper sets out to analyze the influence of different types of venture capitalists on the performance of their portfolio firms around and after IPO. We investigate the hypothesis that different governance structures, objectives, and track records of different types of VCs have a significant impact on their respective IPOs. We explore this hypothesis using a data set embracing all IPOs that have occurred on Germany's Neuer Markt. Our main finding is that significant differences among the different VCs exist. Firms backed by independent VCs perform significantly better two years after IPO as compared to all other IPOs, and their share prices fluctuate less than those of their counterparts in this period of time. On the contrary, firms backed by public VCs show relative underperformance. The fact that this could occur implies that market participants did not correctly assess the role played by different types of VCs.
The German corporate governance system has long been cited as the standard example of an insider-controlled and stakeholder-oriented system. We argue that despite important reforms and substantial changes of individual elements of the German corporate governance system the main characteristics of the traditional German system as a whole are still in place. However, in our opinion the changing role of the big universal banks in the governance undermines the stability of the corporate governance system in Germany. Therefore a breakdown of the traditional system leading to a control vacuum or a fundamental change to a capital market-based system could be in the offing.
Traditional tests of the CAPM following the Fama / MacBeth (1973) procedure are tests of the joint hypotheses that there is a relationship between beta and realized return and that the market risk premium is positive. The conditional test procedure developed by Pettengill / Sundaram / Mathur (1995) allows to independently test the hypothesis of a relation between beta and realized returns. Monte Carlo simulations show that the conditional test reliably identifies this relation. In an empirical examination for the German stock market we find a significant relation between beta and return. Previous studies failed to identify this relationship probably because the average market risk premium in the sample period was close to zero. Our results provide a justification for the use of betas estimated from historical return data by portfolio managers.
Central wage bargaining and local wage flexibility : evidence from the entire wage distribution
(1998)
We argue that in labor markets with central wage bargaining wage flexibility varies systematically across the wage distribution: local wage flexibility is more relevant for the upper part of the wage distribution, and flexibility of wages negotiated under central wage bargaining affects the lower part of the wage distribution. Using a random sample of German social-security accounts, we estimate wage flexibility across the wage distribution by means of quantile regressions. The results support our hypothesis, as employees with low wages have significantly lower local wage flexibility than high wage employees. This effect is particularly relevant for the lower educational groups. On the other hand, employees with low wages tend to have a higher wage flexibility with respect to national unemployment.
All-over in Europe, unemployment became a growing problem from the mid 1980s to the mid 1990s. Nevertheless, the effects on the economical situation of the unemployed and the whole population are quite different in European countries. In this paper we first give a brief overview over the development of unemployment rates in eight member states of the European Union and over the different reactions to provide the social protection of the unemployed. Therefore we look at the social security expenditures, the level of income replacement for the unemployed and recent social policy reforms concerning them. In the second section of the paper, we examine the development of income distribution and poverty taking different poverty lines into consideration. There is no general pattern neither for the relationship of inequality among the unemployed to the whole economically active population nor for the development from the 80s to the 90s. But one can say that in countries with increasing income inequality also poverty is rising (especially in the UK) and that where inequality among the unemployed is less pronounced the proportions of the poor went down from the mid 80s to the mid 90s (France and Ireland). In nearly all countries the risk of being poor is ernormously high for the unemployed, Denmark is the only exception.
To sum up our findings we come to the following statements. - During the period from 1973 to 1993 inequality of the personal distribution of equivalent pre-government income increased to some extent, as was to be expected given the enormous rise in unemployment. - Inequality of post-government income also increased slightly, but was much lower than inequality of pre-government income due to the equalizing effect of the German tax and transfer system. - In 1993 inequality of pre-government income was higher, and inequality of post-government income was considerably lower in East Germany than in West Germany; the West German tax and transfer system that was transferred to East Germany after reunification - with some additional but temporary minimum regulations - seems to have had a stronger equalizing effect in the East than in the West. - A decomposition into three age groups, the young and the middle-aged group sub-divided further according to whether household members were affected by unemployment, showed that within-groups inequality explained by far more of overall inequality than between-groups inequality. - The relative positions of the two young groups as well as of the middle-aged group with unemployed members deteriorated with respect to their equivalent pre-government and post-government incomes. - During the first period with rising unemployment (1973 to 1978), the development of within-groups inequality and of between-groups inequality contributed to about the same extent to the increase of overall inequality of pre-government income. But this was fully compensated by the tax and transfer system as there were only a negligible change in inequality of equivalent net income and very slight effects of the (four) components of change which nearly compensated each other. - During the last period from 1988 to 1993 the equalizing effect of the German tax and transfer system seems to have weakened, at least in the western part of Germany. The increase in inequality of equivalent net income is mainly due to developments of within group inequalities.
Collateral, default risk, and relationship lending : an empirical study on financial contracting
(2000)
This paper provides further insights into the nature of relationship lending by analyzing the link between relationship lending, borrower quality and collateral as a key variable in loan contract design. We used a unique data set based on the examination of credit files of five leading German banks, thus relying on information actually used in the process of bank credit decision-making and contract design. In particular, bank internal borrower ratings serve to evaluate borrower quality, and the bank's own assessment of its housebank status serves to identify information-intensive relationships. Additionally, we used data on workout activities for borrowers facing financial distress. We found no significant correlation between ex ante borrower quality and the incidence or degree of collateralization. Our results indicate that the use of collateral in loan contract design is mainly driven by aspects of relationship lending and renegotiations. We found that relationship lenders or housebanks do require more collateral from their debtors, thereby increasing the borrower's lock-in and strengthening the banks' bargaining power in future renegotiation situations. This result is strongly supported by our analysis of the correlation between ex post risk, collateral and relationship lending since housebanks do more frequently engage in workout activities for distressed borrowers, and collateralization increases workout probability. First version: March 12, 1999
A financial system can only perform its function of channelling funds from savers to investors if it offers sufficient assurance to the providers of the funds that they will reap the rewards which have been promised to them. To the extent that this assurance is not provided by contracts alone, potential financiers will want to monitor and influence managerial decisions. This is why corporate governance is an essential part of any financial system. It is almost obvious that providers of equity have a genuine interest in the functioning of corporate governance. However, corporate governance encompasses more than investor protection. Similar considerations also apply to other stakeholders who invest their resources in a firm and whose expectations of later receiving an appropriate return on their investment also depend on decisions at the level of the individual firm which would be extremely difficult to anticipate and prescribe in a set of complete contingent contracts. Lenders, especially long-term lenders, are one such group of stakeholders who may also want to play a role in corporate governance; employees, especially those with high skill levels and firm-specific knowledge, are another. The German corporate governance system is different from that of the Anglo-Saxon countries because it foresees the possibility, and even the necessity, to integrate lenders and employees in the governance of large corporations. The German corporate governance system is generally regarded as the standard example of an insider-controlled and stakeholder-oriented system. Moreover, only a few years ago it was a consistent system in the sense of being composed of complementary elements which fit together well. The first objective of this paper is to show why and in which respect these characterisations were once appropriate. However, the past decade has seen a wave of developments in the German corporate governance system, which make it worthwhile and indeed necessary to investigate whether German corporate governance has recently changed in a fundamental way. More specifically one can ask which elements and features of German corporate governance have in fact changed, why they have changed and whether those changes which did occur constitute a structural change which would have converted the old insider-controlled system into an outsider-controlled and shareholder-oriented system and/or would have deprived it of its former consistency. It is the second purpose of this paper to answer these questions.