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We analyze the effect of committee formation on how corporate boards perform two main functions: setting CEO pay and overseeing the financial reporting process. The use of performance-based pay schemes induces the CEO to manipulate earnings, which leads to an increased need for board oversight. If the whole board is responsible for both functions, it is inclined to provide the CEO with a compensation scheme that is relatively insensitive to performance in order to reduce the burden of subsequent monitoring. When the functions are separated through the formation of committees, the compensation committee is willing to choose a higher pay-performance sensitivity as the increased cost of oversight is borne by the audit committee. Our model generates predictions relating the board committee structure to the pay-performance sensitivity of CEO compensation, the quality of board oversight, and the level of earnings management.
A number of authors have recently emphasized that the conventional model of unemployment dynamics due to Mortensen and Pissarides has difficulty accounting for the relatively volatile behavior of labor market activity over the business cycle. We address this issue by modifying the MP framework to allow for staggered multiperiod wage contracting. What emerges is a tractable relation for wage dynamics that is a natural generalization of the period-by-period Nash bargaining outcome in the conventional formulation. An interesting side-product is the emergence of spillover effects of average wages on the bargaining process. We then show that a reasonable calibration of the model can account well for the cyclical behavior of wages and labor market activity observed in the data. The spillover effects turn out to be important in this respect. JEL Classification: E32, E50, J64
We show theoretically that income redistribution benefits borrowingconstrained individuals more than is implied by standard relative-income and uninsurable-risk considerations. Empirically, we find in international opinion-survey data that younger and lower-income individuals express stronger support for government redistribution in countries where consumer credit is less easily available. This evidence supports our theoretical perspective if such individuals are more strongly affected by tighter credit supply, in that expectations of higher incomes in the future increase their propensity to borrow. JEL Classification: E21
This paper presents a simple new method for estimating the size of ‘wealth effects’ on aggregate consumption. The method exploits the well-documented sluggishness of consumption growth (often interpreted as ‘habits’ in the asset pricing literature) to distinguish between short-run and long-run wealth effects. In U.S. data, we estimate that the immediate (next-quarter) marginal propensity to consume from a $1 change in housing wealth is about 2 cents, with a final long-run effect around 9 cents. Consistent with several recent studies, we find a housing wealth effect that is substantially larger than the stock wealth effect. We believe that our approach is preferable to the currently popular cointegrationbased estimation methods, because neither theory nor evidence justifies faith in the existence of a stable cointegrating vector. JEL Classification: E21, E32, C22
Regional inflation dynamics within and across Euro area countries and a comparison with the US
(2006)
We investigate co-movements and heterogeneity in inflation dynamics of different regions within and across euro area countries using a novel disaggregate dataset to improve the understanding of inflation differentials in the European Monetary Union. We employ a model where regional inflation dynamics are explained by common euro area and country specific factors as well as an idiosyncratic regional component. Our findings indicate a substantial common area wide component, that can be related to the common monetary policy in the euro area and to external developments, in particular exchange rate movements and changes in oil prices. The effects of the area wide factors differ across regions, however. We relate these differences to structural economic characteristics of the various regions. We also find a substantial national component. Our findings do not differ substantially before and after the formal introduction of the euro in 1999, suggesting that convergence has largely taken place before the mid 90s. Analysing US regional inflation developments yields similar results regarding the relevance of common US factors. Finally, we find that disaggregate regional inflation information, as summarised by the area wide factors, is important in explaining aggregate euro area and US inflation rates, even after conditioning on macroeconomic variables. Therefore, monitoring regional inflation rates within euro area countries can enhance the monetary policy maker’s understanding of aggregate area wide inflation dynamics. JEL Classification: E31, E52, E58, C33
We analyse a 2-period competitive insurance market which is characterized by the simultaneous presence of standard moral hazard and adverse selection with regard to consumer time preferences. It is shown that there exists an equilibrium in which patient consumers use high effort and buy a profit-making insurance contract with high coverage, whereas impatient consumers use low effort and buy a contract with low coverage or even remain uninsured. This finding may help to explain why positive profits and the opposite of adverse selection with regard to risk types can sometimes be observed empirically. JEL Classification: D82, G22
We propose a new decision criterion under risk in which people extract both utility from anticipatory feelings ex ante and disutility from disappointment ex post. The decision maker chooses his degree of optimism, given that more optimism raises both the utility of ex ante feelings and the risk of disappointment ex post. We characterize the optimal beliefs and the preferences under risk generated by this mental process and apply this criterion to a simple portfolio choice/insurance problem. We show that these preferences are consistent with the preference reversal in the Allais’ paradoxes and predict that the decision maker takes on less risk compared to an expected utility maximizer. This speaks to the equity premium puzzle and to the preference for low deductibles in insurance contracts. Keywords: endogenous beliefs, anticipatory feeling, disappointment, optimism, decision under risk, portfolio allocation.