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Zur Offenlegung von Abfindungszahlungen und Pensionszusagen an ein ausgeschiedenes Vorstandsmitglied
(2008)
Abfindungszahlungen und Pensionszusagen gehören zu den besonders umstrittenen Bestandteilen der Vorstandsvergütung. Der deutsche Gesetzgeber ist mit dem Gesetz über die Offenlegung von Vorstandsvergütungen (VorstOG) der internationalen Entwicklung gefolgt. Bereits Ziff. 4.2.4 DCGK a.F. hatte die individualisierte Offenlegung der Bezüge aktueller Vorstandsmitglieder empfohlen. In Frankreich wurde bereits 2001 die Pflicht zur Offenlegung von Vorstandsgehältern in den Art. L. 225-102-1 des Code de commerce aufgenommen. Aktuell beschäftigt sich das französische Parlament mit dem Gesetz „Croissance, emploi et pouvoir d’achat: modernisation de l’économie“, das bei Vereinbarungen von Abfindungen einen Hauptversammlungsbeschluss notwendig machen würde. In England sind die Bezüge der „Directors“ in einem Remuneration Report offenzulegen (Sec. 420 CA 2006). Vorreiter auf dem Gebiet der Offenlegungspflicht waren die Vereinigten Staaten, die seit 1992 eine individualisierte Offenlegung vorschreiben. Auch die Europäische Kommission hat sich für die Pflicht zur individualisierten Offenlegung ausgesprochen. Im Mittelpunkt der Diskussion steht insbesondere die Frage der Offenlegung der Abfindungs- und Pensionszusagen. Scheidet ein Vorstandsmitglied vorzeitig aus, hat es grundsätzlich einen Vergütungsanspruch bis zur Beendigung seines Anstellungsvertrags, außer wenn der Aufsichtsrat ihm aus wichtigem Grund gekündigt hat. In der Regel werden aber mit dem Vorstandsmitglied Abfindungsvereinbarungen getroffen. Neben den Abfindungsvereinbarungen spielen auch die Pensions- und Versorgungszusagen in der Praxis eine wichtige Rolle. Mit Blick auf den Wortlaut des § 285 HGB stellt sich, auch zwei Jahre nach Inkrafttreten des VorstOG, immer noch die Frage, ob bei börsennotierten Aktiengesellschaften die Abfindungszahlungen und Pensionszusagen individualisiert oder nur aggregiert offenzulegen sind. Fraglich ist zum einen, wie eine vereinbarte Abfindungszahlung im Lagebericht bei der Angabe der Vorstandsbezüge zu behandeln ist, wenn ein Vorstandsmitglied vorzeitig ausscheidet (III.). Zum anderen stellt sich die Frage, wie Pensionszusagen darzustellen sind (IV.). Bevor auf diese beiden Fragen eingegangen werden kann, soll kurz der gesetzliche Rahmen der Offenlegungspflicht skizziert werden (II.). ...
We show that the use of correlations for modeling dependencies may lead to counterintuitive behavior of risk measures, such as Value-at-Risk (VaR) and Expected Short- fall (ES), when the risk of very rare events is assessed via Monte-Carlo techniques. The phenomenon is demonstrated for mixture models adapted from credit risk analysis as well as for common Poisson-shock models used in reliability theory. An obvious implication of this finding pertains to the analysis of operational risk. The alleged incentive suggested by the New Basel Capital Accord (Basel II), amely decreasing minimum capital requirements by allowing for less than perfect correlation, may not necessarily be attainable.
A data set of annual values of area equipped for irrigation for all 236 countries in the world during the time period 1900 - 2003 was generated. The basis for this data product was information available through various online data bases and from other published materials. The complete time series were then constructed around the reported data applying six statistical methods. The methods are discussed in terms of reliability and data uncertainties. The total area equipped for irrigation in the world in 1900 was 53.2 million hectares. Irrigation was mainly practiced in all the arid regions of the globe and in paddy rice areas of South and East Asia. In some temperate countries in Western Europe irrigation was practiced widely on pastures and meadows. The time series suggest a modest rate of increase of irrigated areas in the first half of the 20th century followed by a more dynamic development in the second half. The turn of the century is characterized by an overall consolidating trend resulting at a total of 285.8 million hectares in 2003. The major contributing countries have changed little throughout the century. This data product is regarded as a preliminary result toward an ongoing effort to develop a detailed data set and map of areas equipped for irrigation in the world over the 20th century using sub-national statistics and historical irrigation maps.
Reform of the securities class action is once again the subject of national debate. The impetus for this debate is the reports of three different groups – The Committee on Capital Market Regulation, The Commission on the Regulation of U.S. Capital Markets In the 21st Century, and McKinsey & Company. Each of the reports focuses on a single theme: how the contemporary regulatory culture places U.S. capital markets at a competitive disadvantage to foreign markets. While multiple regulatory forces are targeted by each report’s call for reform, each of the reports singles out securities class actions as one of the prime villains that place U.S. capital markets at a competitive disadvantage. The reports’ recommendations range from insignificant changes to drastic curtailments of private class actions. Surprisingly, these current-day cries echo calls for reform heeded by Congress in the not too distant past. Major reform of the securities class action occurred with the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995.5 Among the PSLRA’s contributions is the introduction of procedures by which the court chooses from among competing petitioners a lead plaintiff for the class. The statute commands that the petitioner with the largest financial loss suffered as a consequence of the defendant’s alleged misrepresentation is presumed to be the most adequate plaintiff. Thus, the lead plaintiff provision supplants the traditional “first to file” rule for selecting the suit’s plaintiff with a mechanism that seeks to harness to the plaintiff’s economic self interest to the suits’ prosecution. Also, by eliminating the race to be the first to file, the lead plaintiff provision seeks to avoid “hair trigger” filings by overly eager plaintiffs’ counsel which Congress believed too frequently gave rise to incomplete and insubstantially pled causes of action. The PSLRA also introduced for securities class actions a heightened pleading requirement8 as well as a bar to the plaintiff obtaining any discovery prior to the district court disposing of the defendants’ motions to dismiss. By introducing the requirement that allegations involving fraud must be plead not only with particularity, but also that the pled facts must establish a “strong inference” of fraud, the PSLRA cast aside, albeit only for securities actions, the much lower notice pleading requirement that has been a fixture of American civil procedure for decades. Substantive changes to the law were also introduced by the PSLRA. With few exceptions, joint and several liability was replaced by proportionate liability so that a particular defendant’s liability is capped by that defendant’s relative degree of fault. Similarly, contribution rights among co-violators are also based on proportionate fault of each defendant. Three years after the PSLRA, Congress returned to the topic again by enacting the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act;13 this provision was prompted by aggressive efforts of plaintiff lawyers to bypass the limitations, most notably the bar to discovery and higher pleading requirement, of the PSLRA by bringing suit in state court. Post-SLUSA, securities fraud class actions are exclusively the domain of the federal court. In this paper, we examine the impact of the PSLRA and more particularly the impact the type of lead plaintiff on the size of settlements in securities fraud class actions. We thus provide insight into whether the type of plaintiff that heads the class action impacts the overall outcome of the case. Furthermore, we explore possible indicia that may explain why some suits settle for extremely small sums – small relative to the “provable losses” suffered by the class, small relative to the asset size of the defendantcompany, and small relative to other settlements in our sample. This evidence bears heavily on the debate over “strike suits.” Part I of this paper sets forth the contemporary debate surrounding the need for further reforms of securities class actions. In this section, we set forth the insights advanced in three prominent reports focused on the competitiveness of U.S. capital markets. In Part II we first provide descriptive statistics of our extensive data set, and thenuse multivariate regression analysis to explore the underlying relationships. In Part III, we closely examine small settlements for clues to whether they reflect evidence of strike suits. We conclude in Part IV with a set of policy recommendations based on our analysis of the data. Our goals in this paper are more modest than the Committee Report, the Chamber Report and the McKinsey Report, each of which called for wide-ranging reforms: we focus on how the PSLRA changed securities fraud settlements so as to determine whether the reforms it introduced accomplished at least some of the Act’s important goals. If the PSLRA was successful, and we think it was, then one must be somewhat skeptical of the need for further cutbacks in private securities class action so soon after the Act was passed.
The reaction of consumer spending and debt to tax rebates – evidence from consumer credit data
(2008)
We use a new panel dataset of credit card accounts to analyze how consumer responded to the 2001 Federal income tax rebates. We estimate the monthly response of credit card payments, spending, and debt, exploiting the unique, randomized timing of the rebate disbursement. We find that, on average, consumers initially saved some of the rebate, by increasing their credit card payments and thereby paying down debt. But soon afterwards their spending increased, counter to the canonical Permanent-Income model. Spending rose most for consumers who were initially most likely to be liquidity constrained, whereas debt declined most (so saving rose most) for unconstrained consumers. More generally, the results suggest that there can be important dynamics in consumers’ response to “lumpy” increases in income like tax rebates, working in part through balance sheet (liquidity) mechanisms.