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The Crusade movement is one of the most important occurrences of medieval history. It took place throughout two centuries in the Levant and affected both Muslims and Crusaders and in turn changed the way in which West and East related to one another. When the Crusaders took control of the Holy Land and many Islamic cities in the Levant, they transferred their feudal European system there. They established four main fiefdoms or lordships, Jerusalem, Edessa, Antioch and Tripoli. In addition, there were another twelve secondary fiefdoms, of which Tibnīn was one. Tibnīn was called “Toron” by the Crusaders. Once the Crusaders had captured Tibnīn, they began building its fortified castle, from which the fief of Tibnīn gained its importance throughout the period of the Crusades.
This paper traces the military role of Tibnīn and its rulers in the Latin East against the Muslims until 1187/ 583. Tibnīn played a key role in overcoming the Muslims in Tyre and controlled it in 1124. It also played a vital role in the conflict between Damascus and the Kingdom of Jerusalem. Tibnīn participated in defending Antioch, Banyas, Hebron and Transjordan several times. Furthermore, its soldiers and Knights joined the army of the Kingdom of Jerusalem to capture Ascalon in 1153, and joined the campaigns of Amaury I, King of Jerusalem, against Egypt from 1164 to1169. The military situation of Tibnīn under the rule of the royal house until its fall to the Muslims in 1187/ 583 will be studied as well.
“WAR IS PEACE, FREEDOM IS SLAVERY, AND IGNORANCE IS STRENGTH”. The slogan from George Orwell’s “1984” dystopia appears to capture the state of Russia’s 2014 official discourse quite accurately. This has not gone unnoticed by public and academic spectators in and outside Russia: while Bild magazine is counting Putin’s lies in his recent ARD interview, a Zeit article declares Russia itself to be a post-modern “lie”...
Trust in policy makers fluctuates signi
cantly over the cycle and affects the transmission mechanism. Despite this it is absent from the literature. We build a monetary model embedding trust cycles; the latter emerge as an equilibrium phenomenon of a game-theoretic interaction between atomistic agents and the monetary authority. Trust affects agents' stochastic discount factors, namely the price of future risk, and through this it interacts with the monetary transmission mechanism. Using data from the Eurobarometer surveys, we analyze the link between trust and the transmission mechanism of macro and monetary shocks: Empirical results are in line with theoretical ones.
We study the dispersion of debt maturities across time, which we call "granularity of corporate debt,'' using a model in which a firm's inability to roll over expiring debt causes inefficiencies, such as costly asset sales or underinvestment. Since multiple small asset sales are less costly than a single large one, firms diversify debt rollovers across maturity dates. We construct granularity measures using data on corporate bond issuers for the 1991-2012 period and establish a number of novel findings. First, there is substantial variation in granularity in that we observe both very concentrated and highly dispersed maturity structures. Second, observed variation in granularity supports the model's predictions, i.e. maturities are more dispersed for larger and more mature firms, for firms with better investment oppo
Euro area data show a positive connection between sovereign and bank risk, which increases with banks’ and sovereign long run fragility. We build a macro model with banks subject to moral hazard and liquidity risk (sudden deposit withdrawals): banks invest in risky government bonds as a form of capital buffer against liquidity risk. The model can replicate the positive connection between sovereign and bank risk observed in the data. Central bank liquidity policy, through full allotment policy, is successful in stabilizing the spiraling feedback loops between bank and sovereign risk.
Part IV of our series "Cyberpeace: Dimensionen eines Gegenentwurfs" on cyberpeace. Matthias Schulze argues that what some perceive as cyberwar is not actually war but rather cyber conflict. The question therefore arises if this conflict will ever be solved. Ben Kamis on the other hand identifies motives in the use of language. He argues that talking about cyberpeace reinforces the impression that we are right in the middle of a cyberwar. I would not agree with that. As Johan Galtung puts it: “The use of the term ‘peace’ may in itself be peace-productive” (Galtung 1969: 167). But how do we define cyberpeace? Who should define it and how do we pursue it?...
How to abolish cyberwar
(2014)
Part III of our series "Cyberpeace: Dimensionen eines Gegenentwurfs" on cyberpeace: Cyberwar is like a discursive plague. After years and years of writing texts about it and against it, the concept is still scary, still spreading, still harmful. Its power is such that it is not simply being used in discourse – but is in fact forcing its specific discursive structures and rules on us. In short, we may keep questioning this concept, but we will never get rid of it...
The recent financial crisis highlighted the limits of the "originate to distribute" model of banking, but its nexus with the macroeconomy remains unexplored. I build a business cycle model with banks engaging in credit risk transfer (CRT) under informational externalities. Markets for CRT provide liquidity insurance to banks, but the emergence of a pooling equilibrium can also impair the banks’ monitoring incentives. In normal times and in face of standard macro shocks the insurance benefits of CRT prevail and the business cycle is stabilized. In face of financial/liquidity shocks the extent of informational asymmetries is larger and the business cycle is amplified. The macro model with CRT can also reproduce well a number of macro and banking statistics over the period of rapid growth of this banks’ business model.
We study the effect of weakening creditor rights on distress risk premia via a bankruptcy reform that shifts bargaining power in financial distress toward shareholders. We find that the reform reduces risk factor loadings and returns of distressed stocks. The effect is stronger for firms with lower firm-level shareholder bargaining power. An increase in credit spreads of riskier relative to safer firms, in particular for firms with lower firm-level shareholder bargaining power, confirms a shift in bargaining power from bondholders to shareholders. Out-of-sample tests reveal that a reversal of the reform's effects leads to a reversal of factor loadings and returns.