Refine
Year of publication
- 2014 (13) (remove)
Document Type
- Report (13) (remove)
Has Fulltext
- yes (13) (remove)
Is part of the Bibliography
- no (13)
Keywords
- financial distress (2)
- law and finance (2)
- shareholder recovery (2)
- stock returns (2)
- Anlegerschutz (1)
- Bankberatung (1)
- EZB (1)
- Europarecht (1)
- FBSDE (1)
- Finanzbildung (1)
Institute
- Wirtschaftswissenschaften (13) (remove)
Trust in policy makers fluctuates signi
cantly over the cycle and affects the transmission mechanism. Despite this it is absent from the literature. We build a monetary model embedding trust cycles; the latter emerge as an equilibrium phenomenon of a game-theoretic interaction between atomistic agents and the monetary authority. Trust affects agents' stochastic discount factors, namely the price of future risk, and through this it interacts with the monetary transmission mechanism. Using data from the Eurobarometer surveys, we analyze the link between trust and the transmission mechanism of macro and monetary shocks: Empirical results are in line with theoretical ones.
We propose a novel approach on how to estimate systemic risk and identify its key determinants. For US financial companies with publicly traded equity options, we extract option-implied value-at-risks and measure the spillover effects between individual company value-at-risks and the option-implied value-at-risk of a financial index. First, we study the spillover effect of increasing company risks on the financial sector. Second, we analyze which companies are mostly affected if the tail risk of the financial sector increases. Key metrics such as size, leverage, market-to-book ratio and earnings have a significant influence on the systemic risk profiles of financial institutions.
We study the effect of weakening creditor rights on distress risk premia via a bankruptcy reform that shifts bargaining power in financial distress toward shareholders. We find that the reform reduces risk factor loadings and returns of distressed stocks. The effect is stronger for firms with lower firm-level shareholder bargaining power. An increase in credit spreads of riskier relative to safer firms, in particular for firms with lower firm-level shareholder bargaining power, confirms a shift in bargaining power from bondholders to shareholders. Out-of-sample tests reveal that a reversal of the reform's effects leads to a reversal of factor loadings and returns.
On January 29, 2014, EU Commissioner Barnier published a draft law proposing a ban for proprietary trading by big banks in Europe. In this opinion piece, published in a German newspaper on 30 January, 2014, Jan Pieter Krahnen, who was a member of the Liikanen Commission, argues that the proposal could prove to be effective in preventing systemic risk.
We study the dispersion of debt maturities across time, which we call "granularity of corporate debt,'' using a model in which a firm's inability to roll over expiring debt causes inefficiencies, such as costly asset sales or underinvestment. Since multiple small asset sales are less costly than a single large one, firms diversify debt rollovers across maturity dates. We construct granularity measures using data on corporate bond issuers for the 1991-2012 period and establish a number of novel findings. First, there is substantial variation in granularity in that we observe both very concentrated and highly dispersed maturity structures. Second, observed variation in granularity supports the model's predictions, i.e. maturities are more dispersed for larger and more mature firms, for firms with better investment oppo
Freiburg School of Law and Economics, Freiburg (Lehrstuhl-)Tradition and the Genesis of Norms
(2014)
The paper analyzes the parallels and differences between the Freiburg School of Law and Economics represented by the works of Eucken (and Röpke) and the Freiburg (Lehrstuhl-)Tradition represented by the works of Hayek and Vanberg. The parallels are illustrated by making use of the constitutional economics concepts Ordnungspolitik (i.e., order of rules/choices over rules) as well as freedom of privileges and discrimination. The differences, which have received surprisingly little attention, include the following aspects: 1. philosophy of science and epistemology, 2. genesis of norms, and 3. political philosophy. The paper tackles these issues in three steps. The second chapter presents Vanberg’s constitutional economics theory with special emphasis on the concepts of citizen sovereignty and normative individualism. The third chapter reviews the ordoliberal concepts of science and the state which are – to a certain degree – elitist and expertocratic, that is, they rely to a considerable degree on intellectual experts (in particular, scientists) being part of the societal elite. The fourth chapter differentiates two kinds of genesis of norms: an evolutionary one and an elitist-expertocratic one allowing for a differentiation between Eucken’s and Röpke’s Ordoliberalism on the on the hand and Vanberg’s Hayekian -- and Buchanan-style constitutional economics approach on the other hand. The paper ends with a summary of the main findings.
We study the effect of weakening creditor rights on distress risk premia via a bankruptcy reform that shifts bargaining power in financial distress toward shareholders. We find that the reform reduces risk factor loadings and returns of distressed stocks. The effect is stronger for firms with lower firm-level shareholder bargaining power. An increase in credit spreads of riskier relative to safer firms, in particular for firms with lower firm-level shareholder bargaining power, confirms a shift in bargaining power from bondholders to shareholders. Out-of-sample tests reveal that a reversal of the reform's effects leads to a reversal of factor loadings and returns.
Ein Freibrief für die Notenbank bedeutet, genau genommen, die Bankrotterklärung des demokratischen Verfassungsstaates vor technokratischen Beliebigkeiten, schreibt Helmut Siekmann in diesem Namensbeitrag. Er betont, dass die Europäische Union eine unverzichtbare Einrichtung ist und ein echter Bundesstaat sein sollte. Sie sei aber im Wesentlichen (nur) ein Rechtskonstrukt, weshalb es umso wichtiger sei, dass die rechtlichen Regeln, auf denen sie beruht, genauestens beachtet werden.
Die „Rente mit 63“ hat wieder einmal den Blick auf den Renteneintritt gerichtet. In der öffentlichen Debatte werden dabei zwei Ereignisse regelmäßig vermischt: das Ende des Arbeitslebens und der Beginn der Rentenzahlung. Dabei müssen beide nicht unmittelbar aufeinander folgen. Unter bestimmten Umständen kann es finanziell attraktiv sein, die staatliche Rente nicht sofort nach dem Ausstieg aus dem Erwerbsleben zu beantragen, sondern die Ausgaben bis zum späteren Rentenbeginn durch den Abbau von Finanzkapital zu finanzieren. Dieser Beitrag gibt einen kurzen Einblick in die neueste Studie von Olivia Mitchell, Andreas Hubener und Raimund Maurer zur Alterssicherung in den USA und stellt auch Berechnungen für Deutschland auf.
The recent financial crisis highlighted the limits of the "originate to distribute" model of banking, but its nexus with the macroeconomy remains unexplored. I build a business cycle model with banks engaging in credit risk transfer (CRT) under informational externalities. Markets for CRT provide liquidity insurance to banks, but the emergence of a pooling equilibrium can also impair the banks’ monitoring incentives. In normal times and in face of standard macro shocks the insurance benefits of CRT prevail and the business cycle is stabilized. In face of financial/liquidity shocks the extent of informational asymmetries is larger and the business cycle is amplified. The macro model with CRT can also reproduce well a number of macro and banking statistics over the period of rapid growth of this banks’ business model.