Refine
Year of publication
- 2003 (150) (remove)
Document Type
- Working Paper (150) (remove)
Has Fulltext
- yes (150)
Is part of the Bibliography
- no (150)
Keywords
- Deutschland (27)
- Geldpolitik (11)
- Bank (7)
- Europäische Union (7)
- Corporate Governance (6)
- Going Public (6)
- Schätzung (6)
- Germany (5)
- Inflation (5)
- Kreditwesen (5)
Institute
- Center for Financial Studies (CFS) (53)
- Wirtschaftswissenschaften (35)
- Rechtswissenschaft (31)
- Informatik (5)
- Kulturwissenschaften (4)
- Extern (3)
- Zentrum für Nordamerika-Forschung (ZENAF) (2)
- Geographie (1)
- Geschichtswissenschaften (1)
- Institute for Law and Finance (ILF) (1)
- Medizin (1)
- Sustainable Architecture for Finance in Europe (SAFE) (1)
Das Wogeo ist eine austronesische Sprache, die von etwa 1500 Menschen auf den Inseln Vokeo […] und Koil […] gesprochen wird. Da es sich beim Wogeo um eine bislang größtenteils unbeschriebene Sprache handelt, sind zum Verständnis der Ausführungen im Hauptteil dieser Arbeit sowie zur allgemeinen Orientierung einige einleitende Erklärungen nötig. Diese sind von unterschiedlicher Art: Zunächst wird die natürliche Umgebung der beiden Inseln, auf denen die Sprache gesprochen wird, kurz dargestellt. Dann werden die für das Verständnis der soziolinguistischen Lage der Sprache relevanten Aspekte beleuchtet. Zur Orientierung folgt ein kurzer Abriß der Position des Wogeo innerhalb der austronesischen Sprachfamilie. Schließlich leitet eine Darstellung des bisherigen Forschungsstandes über das Wogeo zum Hauptteil der Arbeit über.
We investigate a restricted one-way cellular automaton (OCA) model where the number of cells is bounded by a constant number k, so-called kC-OCAs. In contrast to the general model, the generative capacity of the restricted model is reduced to the set of regular languages. A kC-OCA can be algorithmically converted to a deterministic finite automaton (DFA). The blow-up in the number of states is bounded by a polynomial of degree k. We can exhibit a family of unary languages which shows that this upper bound is tight in order of magnitude. We then study upper and lower bounds for the trade-off when converting DFAs to kC-OCAs. We show that there are regular languages where the use of kC-OCAs cannot reduce the number of states when compared to DFAs. We then investigate trade-offs between kC-OCAs with different numbers of cells and finally treat the problem of minimizing a given kC-OCA.
The effect of adding two-way communication to k cells one-way cellular automata (kC-OCAs) on their size of description is studied. kC-OCAs are a parallel model for the regular languages that consists of an array of k identical deterministic finite automata (DFAs), called cells, operating in parallel. Each cell gets information from its right neighbor only. In this paper, two models with different amounts of two-way communication are investigated. Both models always achieve quadratic savings when compared to DFAs. When compared to a one-way cellular model, the result is that minimum two-way communication can achieve at most quadratic savings whereas maximum two-way communication may provide savings bounded by a polynomial of degree k.
The descriptional complexity of iterative arrays (lAs) is studied. Iterative arrays are a parallel computational model with a sequential processing of the input. It is shown that lAs when compared to deterministic finite automata or pushdown automata may provide savings in size which are not bounded by any recursive function, so-called non-recursive trade-offs. Additional non-recursive trade-offs are proven to exist between lAs working in linear time and lAs working in real time. Furthermore, the descriptional complexity of lAs is compared with cellular automata (CAs) and non-recursive trade-offs are proven between two restricted classes. Finally, it is shown that many decidability questions for lAs are undecidable and not semidecidable.
Betrachtet man als Sprecher oder Sprecherin des Deutschen die mit '-su' derivierten Verben im Aymara und ihre spanischen Übersetzungen, so fällt auf, daß diese Verben häufig eine Entsprechung in einem deutschen Partikelverb mit 'aus-/heraus-' oder 'auf-' haben, und zwar nicht nur dann, wenn sie Bewegungsvorgänge bezeichnen, sondern auch, wenn keine Direktionalität erkennbar ist. [...] Diese Parallele zwischen '-su' und 'aus-' oder 'auf-' ist frappierend, wenn man bedenkt, dass die beiden Sprachen keinerlei genetische Beziehung haben, und die Annahme liegt nahe, daß hier ein ähnliches kognitives Konzept zugrundeliegt. Um dies genauer beurteilen zu können, ist allerdings mehr Information über '-su' im Aymara nötig. So habe ich mir für die vorliegende Arbeit zum Ziel gesetzt, die Semantik von '-su' im Aymara genauer herauszufinden und herauszuarbeiten, welche Funktionen das Suffix hat. Dabei interessierte mich zum einen, ob sich neben den in den Aymara-Grammatiken beschriebenen Funktionen des Morphems, nämlich der Markierung der Richtung 'nach außen' und des kompletiven Aspekts, noch weitere Funktionen herausarbeiten lassen und wie diese mit der Semantik der jeweiligen Verbwurzel interagieren. Daneben widmete ich mich der Fragestellung, worin der Zusammenhang zwischen den verschiedenen Funktionen des Morphems bestehen könnte.
Most systematic discussion of dyad morphemes has focussed on Australian languages, owing to a combination of their relative prevalence there, and the development of a descriptive tradition that investigates them in some depth. In the course of researching this paper, however, I became aware of functionally and semantically similar morphemes in many other parts of the world, almost invariably described in isolation from any typological reference point. I have incorporated such data as far as I am aware of it, in the hope that a systematic study will encourage other investigators to identify, and investigate in detail, similar constructions in a range of languages. The current state of our research, however, as well as some interesting geographical skewings that I discuss below, such that outside Australia dyad constructions almost exclusively employ reciprocal morphology, means that most of this paper will focus on Australian languages.
Methoden der Filmauswertung
(2003)
Liturgische Filmnächte
(2003)
Mord-Geschichten
(2003)
What constitutes a financial system in general and the German financial system in particular?
(2003)
This paper is one of the two introductory chapters of the book "The German Financial System". It first discusses two issues that have a general bearing on the entire book, and then provides a broad overview of the German financial system. The first general issue is that of clarifying what we mean by the key term "financial system" and, based on this definition, of showing why the financial system of a country is important and what it might be important for. Obviously, a definition of its subject matter and an explanation of its importance are required at the outset of any book. As we will explain in Section II, we use the term "financial system" in a broad sense which sets it clearly apart from the narrower concept of the "financial sector". The second general issue is that of how financial systems are described and analysed. Obviously, the definition of the object of analysis and the method by which the object is to be analysed are closely related to one another. The remainder of the paper provides a general overview of the German financial system. In addition, it is intended to provide a first indication of how the elements of the German financial system are related to each other, and thus to support our claim from Section II that there is indeed some merit in emphasising the systemic features of financial systems in general and of the German financial system in particular. The chapter concludes by briefly comparing the general characteristics of the German financial system with those of the financial systems of other advanced industrial countries, and taking a brief look at recent developments which might undermine the "systemic" character of the German financial system.
This paper investigates the magnitude and the main determinants of share price reactions to buy-back announcements of German corporations. Based on a sample of 224 announcements from the period May 1998 to April 2003 we find average cumulative abnormal returns around -7.5% for the thirty days preceding the announcement and around +7.0 % for the ten days following the announcement. We regress postannouncement abnormal returns with multiple firm characteristics and provide evidence which supports the undervaluation signaling hypothesis but not the excess cash hypothesis. In extending prior empirical work, we also analyze price effects from an initial statement by management that it intends to seek shareholder approval for a buy-back plan. Observed cumulative abnormal returns on this initial date are in excess of 5% implying a total average price effect between 12% and 15% from implementing a buy-back plan. We conjecture that the German regulatory environment is the main reason why market variations to buy-back announcements are much stronger in Germany than in other countries and conclude that initial statements by managers to seek shareholders’ approval for a buy-back plan should also be subject to legal ad-hoc disclosure requirements. EFM classification: 330, 350
Capital rationing is an empirically well-documented phenomenon. This constraint requires managers to make investment decisions between mutually exclusive investment opportunities. In a multiperiod agency setting, this paper analyses accounting rules that provide managerial incentives for efficient project selection. In order to motivate a shortsighted manager to expend unobservable effort and to make efficient investment decisions, the principal sets up an incentive scheme based on residual income (e.g. EVATM). The paper shows that income smoothing generates a trade-off between agency costs resulting from differences in discount rates and the costs associated with the "congruity" of residual earnings.
An economy in which deposit-taking banks of a Diamond/ Dybvig style and an asset market coexist is modelled. Firstly, within this framework we characterize distinct financial systems depending on the fraction of households with direct investment opportunities that are less efficient than those available to banks. With this fraction comparatively low, the evolving financial system can be interpreted as market-oriented. In this system, banks only provide efficient investment opportunities to households with inferior investment alternatives. Banks are not active in the secondary financial market nor do they provide any liquidity insurance to their depositors. Households participate to a large extent in the primary as well as in the secondary financial markets. In the other case of a relatively high fraction of households with inefficient direct investment opportunities, a bank-dominated financial system arises, in which banks provide liquidity transformation, are active in secondary financial markets and are the only player in primary markets, while households only participate in secondary financial markets. Secondly, we analyze the effect a run on a single bank has on the entire financial system. Interestingly, we can show that a bank run on a single bank causes contagion via the financial market neither in market-oriented nor in extremely bank-dominated financial systems. But in only moderately bank-dominated (or hybrid) financial systems fire sales of long-term financial claims by a distressed bank cause a sudden drop in asset prices that precipitates other banks into crisis.
Open source projects produce goods or standards that do not allow for the appropriation of private returns by those who contribute to their production. In this paper we analyze why programmers will nevertheless invest their time and effort to code open source software. We argue that the particular way in which open source projects are managed and especially how contributions are attributed to individual agents, allows the best programmers to create a signal that more mediocre programmers cannot achieve. Through setting themselves apart they can turn this signal into monetary rewards that correspond to their superior capabilities. With this incentive they will forgo the immediate rewards they could earn in software companies producing proprietary software by restricting the access to the source code of their product. Whenever institutional arrangements are in place that enable the acquisition of such a signal and the subsequent substitution into monetary rewards, the contribution to open source projects and the resulting public good is a feasible outcome that can be explained by standard economic theory.
Under a new Basel capital accord, bank regulators might use quantitative measures when evaluating the eligibility of internal credit rating systems for the internal ratings based approach. Based on data from Deutsche Bundesbank and using a simulation approach, we find that it is possible to identify strongly inferior rating systems out-of time based on statistics that measure either the quality of ranking borrowers from good to bad, or the quality of individual default probability forecasts. Banks do not significantly improve system quality if they use credit scores instead of ratings, or logistic regression default probability estimates instead of historical data. Banks that are not able to discriminate between high- and low-risk borrowers increase their average capital requirements due to the concavity of the capital requirements function.
Die Begrenzung der Beteiligungen von Einlagenkreditinstituten an Unternehmen außerhalb des Finanzsektors nach § 12 Abs. 1 KWG ist mit der Einführung des Begriffs der qualifizierten Beteiligung (§ 1 Abs. 15 KWG) durch das Vierte Finanzmarktförderungsgesetz1 neu geregelt worden, nachdem § 12 KWG bereits zuvor im Rahmen der 6. KWG-Novelle2 gänzlich umgestaltet wurde3. Bislang knüpfte die bankaufsichtsrechtliche Reglementierung von Unternehmensbeteiligungen an den Begriff der bedeutenden Beteiligung im Sinne von § 1 Abs. 9 KWG an. Da dieser Begriff zugleich Anknüpfungspunkt für die Regeln über die Anteilseignerkontrolle gemäß § 2b KWG ist und beiden Regelungsbereichen ein unterschiedlicher Normzweck zugrunde liegt, hat es der Gesetzgeber aus Gründen der Rechtsklarheit für erforderlich gehalten, den Begriff der qualifizierten Beteiligung einzuführen, um nicht völlig unterschiedliche Sachverhalte mit dem gleichen juristischen Term zu besetzen 4. § 2b KWG dient dazu, die an Instituten tatsächlich bestehenden Machtverhältnisse offenzulegen, um es der Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht (BaFin) zu ermöglichen, etwaige Gefahren für die Funktionsfähigkeit von Instituten rechtzeitig abzuwehren5. Demgegenüber sollen durch die Begrenzung von Beteiligungen nach § 12 Abs. 1 und 2 KWG in erster Linie Ansteckungsrisiken reduziert werden6. Beteiligungen können die Solidität des beteiligten Unternehmens in Gefahr bringen, wenn das Beteiligungsunternehmen in finanzielle Schwierigkeiten gerät oder sogar insolvent wird. Für Einlagenkreditinstitute ist die Gefahr einer beteiligungsbedingten Ansteckung besonders hoch, da sie ihre Aktiva durch die Hereinnahme von Einlagen überwiegend fremd finanzieren7. Die bankaufsichtsrechtliche Beteiligungsreglementierung verdient vor dem Hintergrund ihrer neuen Fassung eine nähere Überprüfung. Bei der Untersuchung wird insbesondere der für die Begrenzung von Beteiligungen zentrale Begriff der qualifizierten Beteiligung nach 1 Abs. 15 KWG analysiert (dazu III.). Darüber hinaus werden die sonstigen Tatbestandsmerkmale des § 12 Abs. 1 KWG (dazu II. und IV.) sowie die Folgen der Überschreitung vorgegebener Beteiligungsbegrenzungen erörtert (dazu V.). Eine Beurteilung der Regulierung von Unternehmensbeteiligungen nach § 12 Abs. 1 KWG rundet den Beitrag ab.
This paper is a draft for the chapter German banks and banking structure of the forthcoming book The German financial system . As such, the paper starts out with a description of past and present structural features of the German banking industry. Given the presented empirical evidence it then argues that great care has to be taken when generalising structural trends from one financial system to another. Whilst conventio nal commercial banking is clearly in decline in the US, it is far from clear whether the dominance of banks in the German financial system has been significantly eroded over the last decades. We interpret the immense stability in intermediation ratios and financing patterns of firms between 1970 and 2000 as strong evidence for our view that the way in which and the extent to which German banks fulfil the central functions for the financial system are still consistent with the overall logic of the German financial system. In spite of the current dire business environment for financial intermediaries we do not expect the German financial system and its banking industry as an integral part of this system to converge to the institutional arrangements typical for a market-oriented financial system. This Version: March 25, 2003
Am 30. Juli 2002 hat der US-amerikanische Präsident George Bush den Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 unterzeichnet. Es handelt sich dabei um ein Artikelgesetz, das vor allem Änderungen im Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 ( Exchange Act ) vorsieht. Das Gesetz bezweckt nach der dem Gesetzestext vorangestellten Begründung den Schutz von Anlegern durch genauere und verlässlichere wertpapierrechtliche Publizitätspflichten. Der Gesetzgeber möchte sicherstellen, dass Unternehmen richtige und verlässliche Angaben machen, wenn sie periodisch bei der USamerikanischen Wertpapieraufsichtsbehörde SEC (Securities and Exchange Commission) einzureichende Berichte oder Ad-hoc Mitteilungen veröffentlichen.
Effiziente Zirkulationsmärkte für Wertpapiere sind wegen ihres Zusammenhanges mit den Emissionsmärkten für die Kapitalversorgung der Unternehmen ebenso unentbehrlich wie als Informationsquelle und Handelsplattform für institutionelle und private Investoren. Die juristische Aufarbeitung der Vorfälle am Neuen Markt weist deutlich auf Defizite des gegenwärtigen Systems hin. Eine überzeugende Ordnung der Sekundärmarktpublizität macht sich die mit einer richtig justierten Haftung verbundenen Anreize und die Privatinitiative betroffener Anleger als Regulierungsinstrument zunutze. Der nachstehende Beitrag greift Empfehlungen zur Verbesserung des Haftungsregimes für Falschinformation des Kapitalmarktes auf und erörtert Einzelfragen.
Im Rahmen dieses Artikels wurden die verschiedenen Möglichkeiten untersucht, die in einem Konzern bestehen, um die Liquiditätsflüsse zwischen den einzelnen Gesellschaften zu verwalten. Wie bereits erwähnt wurde, ist das untersuchte Organisationsmodell, auch wenn es in der italienischen Praxis am weitesten verbreitet ist, nur eines der verschiedenen Modelle, um das Cash-Management zu zentralisieren.58 Ausgehend davon wurde versucht, die Merkmale dieses Modells und die Aufgaben, die in dessen Rahmen normalerweise der Konzernfinanzgesellschaft übertragen werden, herauszuarbeiten. Dabei konnte festgestellt werden, dass die von der Finanzgesellschaft wahrgenommenen Aufgaben unter zahlreichen Gesichtspunkten den typischen Bankaufgaben ähneln. Diesbezüglich genügt der Hinweis, dass die Finanzgesellschaft, indem sie den Konzerngesellschaften Kredite gewährt, und zwar unter anderem durch Verwendung der Liquiditätsüberschüsse anderer Gesellschaften desselben Konzerns, ein wichtiges Verbindungsglied zwischen den Gesellschaften, die Liquiditätsüberschüsse ausweisen und denen, die diese benötigen, ist. Dadurch übernimmt die Finanzgesellschaft in operativer Hinsicht die Rolle einer echten Konzernbank. Auch die Banken bewirken effektiv den Ausgleich der unterschiedlichen Kassenflüsse zwischen den innerhalb des Wirtschaftssystems tätigen Akteuren. Diese Feststellung wird auch in quantitativer Hinsicht bestätigt, wenn man den Umfang der normalerweise von der Finanzgesellschaft verwalteten Ressourcen betrachtet. Die Beträge, die bei den konzerninternen Beschaffungs- und Anlagetransaktionen sowie bei den Finanzverwaltungsvorgängen vermittelt werden, ist mit den Beträgen vergleichbar, die Banken im Rahmen ihrer Tätigkeiten üblicherweise umsetzen. Aber auch wenn das zutrifft, wurde im Rahmen dieses Artikels gezeigt, dass die zwischen der Finanzgesellschaft und den einzelnen Konzerngesellschaften bestehenden Beziehungen nicht als Bankverträge im eigentlichen Sinn anzusehen sind. Insbesondere ist es nicht möglich, von Bankeinlagen zu sprechen. Daher wurden die verschiedenen Vertragsverhältnisse als atypische Verträge eingeordnet. Abschließend wurde noch auf einige Unterschiede zwischen den, im geprüften Modell vorhandenen, „ordentlichen Kontokorrenten“ und den „Bankkorrespondenzkonten“ hingewiesen. Dies gilt insbesondere für die vorhandene beziehungsweise fehlende Möglichkeit, im Rahmen ihrer jeweiligen Funktion eine rechtliche Kompensation zu sehen, die, wie erwähnt, dazu führen würde, dass eine Konkursanfechtung der Überweisungen auf das ordentliche Kontokorrent ausgeschlossen ist.
We estimate a model with latent factors that summarize the yield curve (namely, level, slope, and curvature) as well as observable macroeconomic variables (real activity, inflation, and the stance of monetary policy). Our goal is to provide a characterization of the dynamic interactions between the macroeconomy and the yield curve. We find strong evidence of the effects of macro variables on future movements in the yield curve and much weaker evidence for a reverse influence. We also relate our results to a traditional macroeconomic approach based on the expectations hypothesis.
Asset-backed securitisation (ABS) is an asset funding technique that involves the issuance of structured claims on the cash flow performance of a designated pool of underlying receivables. Efficient risk management and asset allocation in this growing segment of fixed income markets requires both investors and issuers to thoroughly understand the longitudinal properties of spread prices. We present a multi-factor GARCH process in order to model the heteroskedasticity of secondary market spreads for valuation and forecasting purposes. In particular, accounting for the variance of errors is instrumental in deriving more accurate estimators of time-varying forecast confidence intervals. On the basis of CDO, MBS and Pfandbrief transactions as the most important asset classes of off-balance sheet and on-balance sheet securitisation in Europe we find that expected spread changes for these asset classes tends to be level stationary with model estimates indicating asymmetric mean reversion. Furthermore, spread volatility (conditional variance) is found to follow an asymmetric stochastic process contingent on the value of past residuals. This ABS spread behaviour implies negative investor sentiment during cyclical downturns, which is likely to escape stationary approximation the longer this market situation lasts.
Ziel dieser Präsentation (anlässlich des Seminars „Die Auswirkungen von Asset Securitisation auf die Stabilität des Finanzmarktes“ Österreichische Nationalbank (ÖNB), Wien 1. Oktober 2003) ist es, eine Verbindung zwischen Verbriefung und Finanzmarkstabilität unter Berücksichtigung veränderter Finanzintermediation herzustellen. In der folgenden Abhandlung soll nun zunächst auf die Natur der Verbriefung per se eingegangen werden, um sodann anhand theoretischer Überlegungen und empirischer Beobachtungen mögliche Quelle systemischen Risikos in der Kreditverbriefung aufzuzeigen. In diesem Fall handelt es sich um die Informationsasymmetrien und die durch Handelbarkeit von Kreditrisiko bestimmte Transaktionsstruktur („security design“), die bei regulatorischer Nichtberücksichtigung eine destabilisierende Wirkung nicht nur im Bereich der Verbriefung, sondern auch hinsichtlich der gegenseitigen Zahlungsverpflichtungen von Finanzintermediären begründen könnte.
Intangible assets as goodwill, licenses, research and development or customer relations become in high technology and service orientated economies more and more important. But comparing the book values of listed companies and their market capitalization the financial reports seems to fail the information needs of market participants regarding the estimate of the proper firm value. Moreover, with the introduction of Anglo-American accounting systems in Europe and Asia we can observe even in the accounts of companies sited in the same jurisdiction diverging accounting practices for intangible assets caused by different accounting standards. To assess the relevance of intangible assets in Japanese and German accounts of listed companies we therefore measure certain balance sheet and profit and loss relations according to goodwill and self-developed software. We compare and analyze valuation rules for goodwill and software costs according to German GAAP, Japanese GAAP, US GAAP and IAS to determine the possible impact of diverging rules in the comparability of the accounts. Our results show that the comparability of the accounts is impaired because of different accounting practices. The recognition and valuation of goodwill and self-developed software varies significantly according to the accounting regime applied. However, for the recognition of self-developed software, the effect on the average impact on asset coefficients or profit is not that high. Moreover, an industry bias can only be found for the financial industry. In contrast, for goodwill accounting we found major differences especially between German and Japanese Blue Chips. The introduction of the new goodwill impairment only approach and the prohibition of the pooling method may have a major impact especially for Japanese companies’ accounts.
This paper determines the cost of employee stock options (ESOs) to shareholders. I present a pricing method that seeks to replicate the empirics of exercise and cancellation as good as possible. In a first step, an intensity-based pricing model of El Karoui and Martellini is adapted to the needs of ESOs. In a second step, I calibrate the model with a regression analysis of exercise rates from the empirical work of Heath, Huddart and Lang. The pricing model thus takes account for all effects captured in the regression. Separate regressions enableme to compare options for top executives with those for subordinates. I find no price differences. The model is also applied to test the precision of the fair value accounting method for ESOs, SFAS 123. Using my model as a reference, the SFAS method results in surprisingly accurate prices.
Das Firmenkundensegment und die Präsenz auf den internationalen Märkten für gewerblichen Hypothekarkredit und der Finanzierung öffentlicher Haushalte gewinnen für die deutschen Hypothekenbanken bis zum Jahr 2007 erheblich an Bedeutung, so das Ergebnis eines Forschungsprojekts der Goethe-Universität Frankfurt. Die Immobilienfinanziers werden ihre Geschäftsbeziehungen zu Unternehmen in den nächsten fünf Jahren sowohl qualitativ als auch räumlich ausbauen. Real Estate Investment Banking und Expansion ins Ausland stehen auf der strategischen Agenda der Hypothekenbanken ganz oben.
This study contributes to the valuation of employee stock options (ESO) in two ways: First, a new pricing model is presented, admitting a major part of calculations to be solved in closed form. Designed with a focus on good replication of empirics, the model fits with publicly observable exercise characteristics better than earlier models. In particular, it is able to account for the correlation of the time of exercise and the stock price at exercise, suspected of being crucial for the option value. The impact of correlation is weak, however, whereas cancellations play a central role. The second contribution of this paper is an examination to what extent the ESO pricing method of SFAS 123 is subject to discretion of the accountant. Given my model were true, the SFAS price would be a good proxy. Yet, outside shareholders usually cannot observe one of the SFAS input parameters. On behalf of an example I show that there is wide latitude left to the accountant.
This study contributes to the valuation of employee stock options (ESO) in two ways: First, a new pricing model is presented, admitting a major part of calculations to be solved in closed form. Designed with a focus on good replication of empirics, the model fits with publicly observable exercise characteristics better than earlier models. In particular, it is able to account for the correlation of the time of exercise and the stock price at exercise, suspected of being crucial for the option value. The impact of correlation is weak, however, whereas cancellations play a central role. The second contribution of this paper is an examination to what extent the ESO pricing method of SFAS 123 is subject to discretion of the accountant. Given my model were true, the SFAS price would be a good proxy. Yet, outside shareholders usually cannot observe one of the SFAS input parameters. On behalf of an example I show that there is wide latitude left to the accountant.
While focusing on the protection of distressed sovereigns, the current debate intended to reform the International Financial Architecture has hardly addressed the protection of creditors rights that varies among laws. I suspect however that this constitutes an essential determinant of the success of suggested solutions, especially under the contractual approach. Based on a sample of bonds issued by developing countries states in the period, January 1987 to December 1997, I find that, for given contract characteristics (e.g. listing markets and currency), the governing law is selected according to its ability to enforce repayment. However, although the New York law seems looser and incur larger enforcement costs than the England&Wales law, the former permits equivalent yearly credit amounts. I interpret this as a consequence of the existence of a larger set of valuable assets (e.g. trade) in the US that constitute implicit securities. My findings yield important implications for the reforms. In particular, provided that there exists a seemingly equivalent enforcement credibility between England and New York laws, the prompt implementation of the contractual approach solution should constitute a valuable first step toward efficient sovereign debt markets. October 2003.
Based on a broad set of regional aggregated and disaggregated consumer price index (CPI) data from major industrialized countries in Asia, North America and Europe we are examining the role that national borders play for goods market integration. In line with the existing literature we find that intra-national markets are better integrated than international market. Additionally, our results show that there is a large "ocean" effect, i.e., inter-continental markets are significantly more segmented than intra-continental markets. To examine the impact of the establishment of the European Monetary Union (EMU) on integration, we split our sample into a pre-EMU and EMU sample. We find that border effects across EMU countries have declined by about 80% to 90% after 1999 whereas border estimates across non-EMU countries have remained basically unchanged. Since global factors have affected all countries in our sample similarly and major integration efforts across EMU countries were made before 1999, we suggest that most of the reduction in EMU border estimates has been "nominal". Panel unit root evidence shows that the observed large differences in integration across intra- and inter-continental markets remain valid in the long-run. This finding implies that real factors are responsible for the documented segmentations across our sample countries.
We show diverse beliefs is an important propagation mechanism of fluctuations, money non neutrality and efficacy of monetary policy. Since expectations affect demand, our theory shows economic fluctuations are mostly driven by varying demand not supply shocks. Using a competitive model with flexible prices in which agents hold Rational Belief (see Kurz (1994)) we show that (i) our economy replicates well the empirical record of fluctuations in the U.S. (ii) Under monetary rules without discretion, monetary policy has a strong stabilization effect and an aggressive anti-inflationary policy can reduce inflation volatility to zero. (iii) The statistical Phillips Curve changes substantially with policy instruments and activist policy rules render it vertical. (iv) Although prices are flexible, money shocks result in less than proportional changes in inflation hence the aggregate price level appears "sticky" with respect to money shocks. (v) Discretion in monetary policy adds a random element to policy and increases volatility. The impact of discretion on the efficacy of policy depends upon the structure of market beliefs about future discretionary decisions. We study two rationalizable beliefs. In one case, market beliefs weaken the effect of policy and in the second, beliefs bolster policy outcomes and discretion could be a desirable attribute of the policy rule. Since the central bank does not know any more than the private sector, real social gain from discretion arise only in extraordinary cases. Hence, the weight of the argument leads us to conclude that bank´s policy should be transparent and abandon discretion except for rare and unusual circumstances. (vi) An implication of our model suggests the current effective policy is only mildly activist and aims mostly to target inflation.
A financial system can only perform its function of channelling funds from savers to investors if it offers sufficient assurance to the providers of the funds that they will reap the rewards which have been promised to them. To the extent that this assurance is not provided by contracts alone, potential financiers will want to monitor and influence managerial decisions. This is why corporate governance is an essential part of any financial system. It is almost obvious that providers of equity have a genuine interest in the functioning of corporate governance. However, corporate governance encompasses more than investor protection. Similar considerations also apply to other stakeholders who invest their resources in a firm and whose expectations of later receiving an appropriate return on their investment also depend on decisions at the level of the individual firm which would be extremely difficult to anticipate and prescribe in a set of complete contingent contracts. Lenders, especially long-term lenders, are one such group of stakeholders who may also want to play a role in corporate governance; employees, especially those with high skill levels and firm-specific knowledge, are another. The German corporate governance system is different from that of the Anglo-Saxon countries because it foresees the possibility, and even the necessity, to integrate lenders and employees in the governance of large corporations. The German corporate governance system is generally regarded as the standard example of an insider-controlled and stakeholder-oriented system. Moreover, only a few years ago it was a consistent system in the sense of being composed of complementary elements which fit together well. The first objective of this paper is to show why and in which respect these characterisations were once appropriate. However, the past decade has seen a wave of developments in the German corporate governance system, which make it worthwhile and indeed necessary to investigate whether German corporate governance has recently changed in a fundamental way. More specifically one can ask which elements and features of German corporate governance have in fact changed, why they have changed and whether those changes which did occur constitute a structural change which would have converted the old insider-controlled system into an outsider-controlled and shareholder-oriented system and/or would have deprived it of its former consistency. It is the second purpose of this paper to answer these questions. Revised version forthcoming in "The German Financial System", edited by Jan P. Krahnen and Reinhard H. Schmidt, Oxford University Press.
We estimate a Bayesian vector autoregression for the U.K. with drifting coefficients and stochastic volatilities. We use it to characterize posterior densities for several objects that are useful for designing and evaluating monetary policy, including local approximations to the mean, persistence, and volatility of inflation. We present diverse sources of uncertainty that impinge on the posterior predictive density for inflation, including model uncertainty, policy drift, structural shifts and other shocks. We use a recently developed minimum entropy method to bring outside information to bear on inflation forecasts. We compare our predictive densities with the Bank of England's fan charts.
This paper investigates the role that imperfect knowledge about the structure of the economy plays in the formation of expectations, macroeconomic dynamics, and the efficient formulation of monetary policy. Economic agents rely on an adaptive learning technology to form expectations and to update continuously their beliefs regarding the dynamic structure of the economy based on incoming data. The process of perpetual learning introduces an additional layer of dynamic interaction between monetary policy and economic outcomes. We find that policies that would be efficient under rational expectations can perform poorly when knowledge is imperfect. In particular, policies that fail to maintain tight control over inflation are prone to episodes in which the public's expectations of inflation become uncoupled from the policy objective and stagflation results, in a pattern similar to that experienced in the United States during the 1970s. Our results highlight the value of effective communication of a central bank's inflation objective and of continued vigilance against inflation in anchoring inflation expectations and fostering macroeconomic stability. July 2003.
The development of tractable forward looking models of monetary policy has lead to an explosion of research on the implications of adopting Taylor-type interest rate rules. Indeterminacies have been found to arise for some specifications of the interest rate rule, raising the possibility of inefficient fluctuations due to the dependence of expectations on extraneous "sunspots ". Separately, recent work by a number of authors has shown that sunspot equilibria previously thought to be unstable under private agent learning can in some cases be stable when the observed sunspot has a suitable time series structure. In this paper we generalize the "common factor "technique, used in this analysis, to examine standard monetary models that combine forward looking expectations and predetermined variables. We consider a variety of specifications that incorporate both lagged and expected inflation in the Phillips Curve, and both expected inflation and inertial elements in the policy rule. We find that some policy rules can indeed lead to learnable sunspot solutions and we investigate the conditions under which this phenomenon arises.
Monetary policy is sometimes formulated in terms of a target level of inflation, a fixed time horizon and a constant interest rate that is anticipated to achieve the target at the specified horizon. These requirements lead to constant interest rate (CIR)instrument rules. Using the standard New Keynesian model, it is shown that some forms of CIR policy lead to both indeterminacy of equilibria and instability under adaptive learning. However, some other forms of CIR policy perform better. We also examine the properties of the different policy rules in the presence of inertial demand and price behaviour.
Permanent and transitory policy shocks in an empirical macro model with asymmetric information
(2003)
Despite a large literature documenting that the efficacy of monetary policy depends on how inflation expectations are anchored, many monetary policy models assume: (1) the inflation target of monetary policy is constant; and, (2) the inflation target is known by all economic agents. This paper proposes an empirical specification with two policy shocks: permanent changes to the inflation target and transitory perturbations of the short-term real rate. The public sector cannot correctly distinguish between these two shocks and, under incomplete learning, private perceptions of the inflation target will not equal the true target. The paper shows how imperfect policy credibility can affect economic responses to structural shocks, including transition to a new inflation target - a question that cannot be addressed by many commonly used empirical and theoretical models. In contrast to models where all monetary policy actions are transient, the proposed specification implies that sizable movements in historical bond yields and inflation are attributable to perceptions of permanent shocks in target inflation.
Escapist policy rules
(2003)
We study a simple, microfounded macroeconomic system in which the monetary authority employs a Taylor-type policy rule. We analyze situations in which the self-confirming equilibrium is unique and learnable according to Bullard and Mitra (2002). We explore the prospects for the use of 'large deviation' theory in this context, as employed by Sargent (1999) and Cho, Williams, and Sargent (2002). We show that our system can sometimes depart from the self-confirming equilibrium towards a non-equilibrium outcome characterized by persistently low nominal interest rates and persistently low inflation. Thus we generate events that have some of the properties of "liquidity traps" observed in the data, even though the policymaker remains committed to a Taylor-type policy rule which otherwise has desirable stabilization properties.
This paper investigates the macroeconomic effects of job creation schemes and vocational training on the matching processes in West Germany. The empirical analysis is based on regional data for local employment office districts for the period from 1999 to 2003. The empirical model relies on a dynamic version of a matching function augmented by ALMP. In order to obtain consistent estimates in the presence of a dynamic panel data model, a first-differences GMM estimator and a transformed maximum likelihood estimator are applied. Furthermore the paper considers the endogeneity problem of the policy measures. The results obtained from our estimates indicate that vocational training does not significantly affect the matching process and that job creation schemes have a negative effect. JEL Classification: C23, E24, H43, J64, J68
Recent empirical work shows that a better legal environment leads to lower expected rates of return in an international cross-section of countries. This paper investigates whether differences in firm-specific corporate governance also help to explain expected returns in a cross-section of firms within a single jurisdiction. Constructing a corporate governance rating (CGR) for German firms, we document a positive relationship between the CGR and firm value. In addition, there is strong evidence that expected returns are negatively correlated with the CGR, if dividend yields and price-earnings ratios are used as proxies for the cost of capital. Most results are robust for endogeneity, with causation running from corporate governance practices to firm fundamentals. Finally, an investment strategy that bought high-CGR firms and shorted low-CGR firms would have earned abnormal returns of around 12 percent on an annual basis during the sample period. We rationalize the empirical evidence with lower agency costs and/or the removal of certain governance malfunctions for the high-CGR firms.
Kurz nach dem Inkrafttreten des Vierten Finanzmarktförderungsgesetzes im Juni letzten Jahres sind schon die nächsten Reformüberlegungen in Gang gekommen. Der 64. Deutsche Juristentag im September beschäftigte sich u.a. mit der Frage, ob im Interesse des Anlegerschutzes und zur Förderung des Finanzplatzes Deutschland Kurz nach dem Inkrafttreten des Vierten Finanzmarktförderungsgesetzes im Juni letzten Jahres sind schon die nächsten Reformüberlegungen in Gang gekommen. Der 64. Deutsche Juristentag im September beschäftigte sich u.a. mit der Frage, ob im Interesse des Anlegerschutzes und zur Förderung des Finanzplatzes Deutschland das Kapitalmarkt- und Börsenrecht neu zu regeln sei. Nun liegt zudem seit November 2002 ein Entwurf der Europäischen Kommission für eine neue Wertpapierdienstleistungsrichtlinie auf dem Tisch. Die verschiedenen Reformüberlegungen bzw. -entwürfe sind in jedem Fall zu begrüßen. Der jüngste Akt unseres nationalen Gesetzgebers wird wohl zu Recht lediglich als Schritt in die richtige Richtung, nicht aber als hinreichende Lösung der aktuellen Probleme in diesem Bereich gesehen. Der folgende Aufsatz untersucht, welche Nachteile sich aus dem zunehmenden außerbörslichen Wertpapierhandel für den Finanzplatz ergeben und welche regulatorischen Antworten sich zu deren Vermeidung anbieten.
This memorandum describes the approach of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (the "SEC") in monitoring and, where appropriate, regulating the use of research reports by investment banking firms in connection with securities transactions. The memorandum addresses the historical system of regulation, which continues in large measure to apply. It also examines the new initiatives taken, following a number of prominent corporate, accounting and banking scandals and a significant decline in U.S. and international capital markets, to supplement the current system in what some have dubbed the "post-Enron era".
Vortrag auf der Konferenz „Europäischer Kapitalmarkt im 21. Jahrhundert“, Düsseldorf, 6. Dezember 2002. Am 4.11. dieses Jahres hat eine von dem Niederländer Jaap Winter geleitete Gruppe von Gesellschaftsrechtsexperten, die Kommissar Bolkestein eingesetzt hatte, ihren Bericht „A Modern Regulatory Framework for Company Law in Europe“ (im Folgenden: Bericht) vorgelegt. Der Bericht umfaßt mit Anhängen 160 Druckseiten und enthält Empfehlungen u. a. zu Corporate Governance, Unternehmensfinanzierung, Konzernen, Umwandlung und Sitzverlegung, aber auch zu einer Europäischen Privatgesellschaft analog zur deutschen GmbH, zu europäischen Genossenschaften und weiteren Unternehmensformen. In meinem Vortrag heute beschränke ich mich auf die Vorschläge zur Corporate Governance.
Price stability and monetary policy effectiveness when nominal interest rates are bounded at zero
(2003)
This paper employs stochastic simulations of a small structural rational expectations model to investigate the consequences of the zero bound on nominal interest rates. We find that if the economy is subject to stochastic shocks similar in magnitude to those experienced in the U.S. over the 1980s and 1990s, the consequences of the zero bound are negligible for target inflation rates as low as 2 percent. However, the effects of the constraint are non-linear with respect to the inflation target and produce a quantitatively significant deterioration of the performance of the economy with targets between 0 and 1 percent. The variability of output increases significantly and that of inflation also rises somewhat. Also, we show that the asymmetry of the policy ineffectiveness induced by the zero bound generates a non-vertical long-run Phillips curve. Output falls increasingly short of potential with lower inflation targets.
Equal size, equal role? : interest rate interdependence between the Euro area and the United States
(2003)
This paper investigates whether the degree and the nature of economic and monetary policy interdependence between the United States and the euro area have changed with the advent of EMU. Using real-time data, it addresses this issue from the perspective of financial markets by analysing the effects of monetary policy announcements and macroeconomic news on daily interest rates in the United States and the euro area. First, the paper finds that the interdependence of money markets has increased strongly around EMU. Although spillover effects from the United States to the euro area remain stronger than in the opposite direction, we present evidence that US markets have started reacting also to euro area developments since the onset of EMU. Second, beyond these general linkages, the paper finds that certain macroeconomic news about the US economy have a large and significant effect on euro area money markets, and that these effects have become stronger in recent years. Finally, we show that US macroeconomic news have become good leading indicators for economic developments in the euro area. This indicates that the higher money market interdependence between the United States and the euro area is at least partly explained by the increased real integration of the two economies in recent years.
This paper analyses the effects of the Initial Public Offering (IPO) market on real investment decisions in emerging industries. We first propose a model of IPO timing based on divergence of opinion among investors and short-sale constraints. Using a real option approach, we show that firms are more likely to go public when the ratio of overvaluation over profits is high, that is after stock market run-ups. Because initial returns increase with the demand from optimistic investors at the time of the offer, the model provides an explanation for the observed positive causality between average initial returns and IPO volume. Second, we discuss the possibility of real overinvestment in high-tech industries. We claim that investing in the industry gives agents an option to sell the project on the stock market at an overvalued price enabling then the financing of positive NPV projects which would not be undertaken otherwise. It is shown that the IPO market can however also lead to overinvestment in new industries. Finally, we present some econometric results supporting the idea that funds committed to the financing of high-tech industries may respond positively to optimistic stock market valuations.
This paper proposes an intertemporal model of venture capital investment with screening and advising where the venture capitalist´s time endowment is the scarce input factor. Screening improves the selection of firms receiving finance, advising allows firms to develop a marketable product, both have a variable intensity. In our setup, optimal linear contracts solves the moral hazard problem. Screening however asks for an entrepreneur wage and does not allow for upfront payments which would cause severe adverse selection. Project characteristics have implications for screening and advising intensity and the distribution of profits. Finally, we develop a formal version of the "venture capital cycle" by extending the basic setup to a simple model of venture capital supply and demand.
A rapidly growing literature has documented important improvements in volatility measurement and forecasting performance through the use of realized volatilities constructed from high-frequency returns coupled with relatively simple reduced-form time series modeling procedures. Building on recent theoretical results from Barndorff-Nielsen and Shephard (2003c,d) for related bi-power variation measures involving the sum of high-frequency absolute returns, the present paper provides a practical framework for non-parametrically measuring the jump component in realized volatility measurements. Exploiting these ideas for a decade of high-frequency five-minute returns for the DM/$ exchange rate, the S&P500 market index, and the 30-year U.S. Treasury bond yield, we find the jump component of the price process to be distinctly less persistent than the continuous sample path component. Explicitly including the jump measure as an additional explanatory variable in an easy-to-implement reduced form model for realized volatility results in highly significant jump coefficient estimates at the daily, weekly and quarterly forecast horizons. As such, our results hold promise for improved financial asset allocation, risk management, and derivatives pricing, by separate modeling, forecasting and pricing of the continuous and jump components of total return variability.
The paper suggests an innovative contribution to the investigation of banking liabilities pricing contracted by sovereign agents. To address fundamental issues of banking, the study focuses on the determinants of the up-front fees (the up-front fee is a charge paid out at the signature of the loan arrangement). The investigation is based on a uniquely extensive sample of bank loans contracted or guaranteed by 58 less-developed countries sovereigns in the period from 1983 to 1997. The well detailed reports allow for the calculation of the equivalent yearly margin on the utilization period for all individual loan. The main findings suggest a significant impact of the renegotiation and agency costs on front-end borrowing payments. Unlike the sole interest spread, the all-in interest margin better takes account of these costs. The model estimates however suggest the non-linear pricing is hardly associated with an exogenous split-up intended by the borrower and his banker to cover up information. Instead the up-front payment is a liquidity transfer as described by Gorton and Kahn (2000) to compensate for renegotiation and monitoring costs. The second interesting result is that banks demand payment for all types of sovereign risk in an identical manner public debt holders do. The difference is that, unlike bond holders, bankers have the possibility to charge an up-front fee to compensate for renegotiation costs. Hence, beyond the information related issues, the higher complexity of the pricing design makes bank loan optimal for lenders on sovereign capital markets, especially relative to public debt, thus motivating for their presence. The paper contributes to the expanding literature on loan syndication and banking related issues. The study also has relevance for the investigation of the developing countries debt pricing.
Using the Johansen test for cointegration, we examine to which extent inflation rates in the Euro area have converged after the introduction of a single currency. Since the assumption of non-stationary variables represents the pivotal point in cointegration analyses we pay special attention to the appropriate identification of non-stationary inflation rates by the application of six different unit root tests. We compare two periods, the first ranging from 1993 to 1998 and the second from 1993 to 2002 with monthly observations. The Johansen test only finds partial convergence for the former period and no convergence for the latter.
We present an analysis of VaR forecasts and P&L-series of all 13 German banks that used internal models for regulatory purposes in the year 2001. To this end, we introduce the notion of well-behaved forecast systems. Furthermore, we provide a series of statistical tools to perform our analyses. The results shed light on the forecast quality of VaR models of the individual banks, the regulator's portfolio as a whole, and the main ingredients of the computation of the regulatory capital required by the Basel rules.
Wissen ist in jüngster Zeit zu einem zentralen Begriff in der Debatte um regionale Entwicklung geworden. Wissen gilt schlechthin als Motor des innovationsgetriebenen ökonomischen Wachstums. Es nimmt gegenwärtig neben den bekannten klassischen Produktionsfaktoren die Rolle desjenigen Produktionsfaktors ein, der als grundlegend für regionale Entwicklung verstanden wird. In diesem Kontext übernehmen wissensintensive Dienstleister die zentrale Rolle als Mittler von Wissen: Sie dienen als Transmissionsriemen in Wissensprozessen. Sie sind heute von erheblicher Bedeutung, da man annimmt, dass Unternehmen nicht mehr in der Lage sind, allein durch eigene Anstrengungen in ausreichendem Maße neues Wissen zu schaffen; neues Wissen, das nur durch Transfer für Unternehmen nutzbar gemacht werden müsste, schlicht nicht in akademischen Einrichtungen wie Universitäten vorhanden ist; die Bedingungen volatiler Märkte und eines zunehmenden Innovationswettbewerbs die Anforderungen an die Wissensgenerierung durch Unternehmen radikal erhöht haben. Neue Wege der Wissensgenerierung müssen daher beschritten werden. Die alte Vorstellung eines linearen Prozesses der Wissensgenerierung vom akademischen Grundlagenwissen über die Angewandte Forschung bis zur Entwicklung und Anwendung, den man auch mit dem Konzept des mode 1 Modells bezeichnet, wird durch das Konzept des interaktiven Modells beziehungsweise des mode 2 Modells der Wissensgenerierung ergänzt, wenn nicht ersetzt (Gibbons et al. 1994). Dieses Konzept sieht die Wissensgenerierung als einen vielfältig vernetzten, rekursiven und reflexiven Prozess (zusammenfassend Malecki 2000). Fragen, wie Prozesse der Wissensgenerierung und des Lernens organisiert werden, rücken damit in den Vordergrund. Daher wird das gegenwärtige Stadium der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung gerne als Lernende Ökonomie bezeichnet (Lundvall/Johnson 1994, OECD 2001, Archibugi/Lundvall 2002). Eine der Konsequenzen dieser Debatte ist, dass uns heute wissensintensive Prozesse als solche sowie in ihrer Geographie komplexer erscheinen als früher. Auf der einen Seite wird den wissensintensiven Dienstleistern ein wesentlicher und zunehmender Anteil an der Generierung von Innovationen und Lösungen für neue Geschäftsvorgänge zugemessen (Bryson u.a. 2000). Die Organisation von Wissensprozessen wird für diese Unternehmen zu einem wichtigen Faktor ihrer Wettbewerbsfähigkeit. Auf der anderen Seite wird vermutet, dass Wissen eine 3 räumliche Komponente hat und daher Wege der räumlichen Organisation von Wissensprozessen zu den bedeutenden Instrumenten gehören, im Wettbewerb zu bestehen. Der kognitive Prozess der Generierung und Aneignung von Wissen macht die Organisation von Kommunikation und sozialer Interaktion notwendig. Dies ist eine wesentliche Aufgabe des Wissensmanagements, das sich dazu verschiedener Dimensionen von Nähe bedient. Dieser Beitrag will die Rolle, die ökonomische Akteure den verschiedenen Dimensionen von Nähe im Management von Wissensprozessen zumessen, an zwei Fallstudien beleuchten. Er wird mit dem M&AGeschäft einen Fall wissens-basierter Dienstleistungen für den Dienstleistungssektor, genauer den Finanzsektor, mit einem Fall wissens-basierter Dienstleistungen für den produzierenden Sektor hier die Modellentwicklung in der Automobilindustrie vergleichen. Wir hoffen, mit dem Vergleich einerseits aufzuzeigen, dass die konkrete Form der Organisation von Nähen in Wissensprozessen kontext-spezifisch ist, und andererseits die Bedingungen aufzudecken, die die jeweilige Form der Organisation bestimmen.
Wer die unmittelbare oder mittelbare Kontrolle über eine börsennotierte Aktiengesellschaft erlangt hat, muss nach § 35 Abs. 2 WpÜG allen anderen Aktionären ein Pflichtangebot unterbreiten. § 37 Abs. 1 WpÜG gibt der Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht (BAFin) die Möglichkeit, den Erwerber der Kontrolle von der Angebotspflicht zu befreien. Bislang lehnt es die BAFin ab, die Aktionäre der Zielgesellschaft an dem Befreiungsverfahren zu beteiligen. Das Oberlandesgericht Frankfurt hat die Behörde in einem kürzlich im Eilverfahren dazu ergangenen Beschluss, der die ProSiebenSat.1 Media AG betraf, darin bestätigt. Der Verf. legt im folgenden dar, warum seiner Ansicht nach die Aktionäre die Zielgesellschaft jedenfalls einen Anspruch auf ermessensfehlerfreie Entscheidung über die Hinzuziehung zum Befreiungsverfahren nach § 13 Abs. 2 Satz 1 VwVfG haben. Darüber hinaus werden einige Aspekte des konkreten Falls, es ging um eine Befreiung im Zusammenhang mit der Sanierung der Zielgesellschaft nach § 37 WpÜG i. V. m. § 9 Satz 1 Nr. 3 WpÜG-Angebotsverordnung, näher beleuchtet.
1. Die Vorschrift des § 18 Abs. 2 WpÜG ist gegen den zu weit geratenen Wortlaut unter Berücksichtigung des Regelungszwecks einschränkend dahin auszulegen, dass ein Angebot mit einem Widerrufs- oder Rücktrittsvorbehalt versehen werden kann, sofern der Bieter oder ihm nach § 18 Abs. 1 WpÜG zuzurechnende Personen oder Unternehmen den Eintritt des Widerrufs- oder Rücktrittsgrunds nicht ausschließlich selbst herbeiführen können. 2. Eine Entscheidung zur Abgabe eines Angebots i.S. des § 10 Abs. 1 Satz 1 WpÜG ist gegeben, wenn die Entscheidung nur noch von Umständen abhängt, deren Eintritt der Bieter oder ihm nach § 18 Abs. 1 WpÜG zuzurechnende Personen oder Unternehmen nicht ausschließlich selbst herbeiführen können, die also nicht aus dem Herrschaftsbereich des Bieters stammen. 3. Der Bieter kann die Entscheidung zur Abgabe eines Angebots analog § 18 Abs. 2 WpÜG ebenso wie ein Angebot unter einen Widerrufs- oder Rücktrittsvorbehalt stellen, sofern der Bieter oder ihm nach § 18 Abs. 1 WpÜG zuzurechnende Personen oder Unternehmen den Eintritt des Widerrufs- oder Rücktrittsgrunds nicht ausschließlich selbst herbeiführen können. Zulässig ist analog §§ 18 Abs. 1, 25 WpÜG zudem ein auf die Zustimmung der Gesellschafterversammlung des Bieters bezogener Vorbehalt. Darüber hinaus darf der Bieter eine Angebotsankündigung mit einem Finanzierungsvorbehalt für den Fall versehen, dass die Gesellschafterversammlung nicht vor Veröffentlichung der Angebotsunterlage einer für die Finanzierung des Angebots erforderlichen Kapitalmaßnahme zustimmt. 4. Der Widerruf der Entscheidung zur Abgabe eines Angebots ist als actus contrarius zu der Angebotsankündigung erst mit Veröffentlichung analog § 10 Abs. 3 Satz 1 WpÜG beachtlich. 5. Mit ordnungsgemäß veröffentlichtem Widerruf der Entscheidung wird der Bieter von der Pflicht zur Übermittlung einer Angebotsunterlage an die BaFin (§ 14 Abs. 1 Satz 1 WpÜG) sowie zur Veröffentlichung einer Angebotsunterlage (§ 14 Abs. 2 Satz 1 WpÜG) frei. Eine Untersagung des Angebots gemäß § 15 Abs. 1 Nr. 3 oder 4 WpÜG kommt damit nicht mehr in Betracht. Darüber hinaus stellt die Nichtübermittlung oder Nichtveröffentlichung der Angebotsunterlage in diesem 15 Fall keine Ordnungswidrigkeit gemäß § 60 Abs. 1 Nr. 1 a) oder Nr. 2 a) WpÜG dar.
Taking shareholder protection seriously? : Corporate governance in the United States and Germany
(2003)
The paper undertakes a comparative study of the set of laws affecting corporate governance in the United States and Germany, and an evaluation of their design if one assumes that their objective were the protection of the interests of minority outside shareholders. The rationale for such an objective is reviewed, in terms of agency cost theory, and then the institutions that serve to bound agency costs are examined and critiqued. In particular, there is discussion of the applicable legal rules in each country, the role of the board of directors, the functioning of the market for corporate control, and (briefly) the use of incentive compensation. The paper concludes with the authors views on what taking shareholder protection seriously, in each country s legal system, would require.
Mit dem 3. Finanzmarktförderungsgesetz wurde im Jahr 1998 die Investmentaktiengesellschaft in das deutsche Investmentrecht eingeführt. Die in Anlehnung an die USamerikanische "Investment Company" geschaffene Rechtsform sollte das deutsche Kapitalanlagegeschäft beleben und insbesondere für ausländische Fondssponsoren attraktiver machen. Diese Erwartungen wurden enttäuscht: Die Bestimmungen zur Investmentaktiengesellschaft sind bis heute totes Recht geblieben.1 Dies haben einige Autoren frühzeitig vorhergesehen.2 Im Zuge der anstehenden tiefgreifenden Reform des Investmentrechts durch das Gesetz zur Modernisierung des Investmentwesens und zur Besteuerung von Investmentvermögen (Investmentmodernisierungsgesetz) 3 wird auch das Recht der Investmentaktiengesellschaft wesentlich geändert. Neue Wege beschreitet der Gesetzgeber dabei insbesondere mit der Einführung der Investmentaktiengesellschaft mit veränderlichem Kapital. Dieser zur Vervollständigung der Bestimmungen zur Investmentaktiengesellschaft in das deutsche Recht eingeführte Typus wirft aus Sicht des Aktienrechts eine Vielzahl interessanter Fragen auf, denen im Folgenden nachgegangen werden soll. Zuvor sollen jedoch die investmentrechtlichen Rahmenbedingungen der Investmentaktiengesellschaft und der Investmentaktiengesellschaft mit veränderlichem Kapital im Besonderen kurz beleuchtet werden.
This paper studies a setting in which a risk averse agent must be motivated to work on two tasks: he (1) evaluates a new project and, if adopted, (2) manages it. While a performance measure which is informative of an agent´s action is typically valuable because it can be used to improve the risk sharing of the contract, this is not necessarily the case in this two-task setting. I provide a sufficient condition under which a performance measure that is informative of the second task is worthless for contracting despite the agent being risk averse. This shows that information content is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for a performance measure to be valuable.
In this paper we demonstrate how to relate the semantics given by the nondeterministic call-by-need calculus FUNDIO [SS03] to Haskell. After introducing new correct program transformations for FUNDIO, we translate the core language used in the Glasgow Haskell Compiler into the FUNDIO language, where the IO construct of FUNDIO corresponds to direct-call IO-actions in Haskell. We sketch the investigations of [Sab03b] where a lot of program transformations performed by the compiler have been shown to be correct w.r.t. the FUNDIO semantics. This enabled us to achieve a FUNDIO-compatible Haskell-compiler, by turning o not yet investigated transformations and the small set of incompatible transformations. With this compiler, Haskell programs which use the extension unsafePerformIO in arbitrary contexts, can be compiled in a "safe" manner.
Taking shareholder protection seriously? : Corporate governance in the United States and Germany
(2003)
The attitude expressed by Carl Fuerstenberg, a leading German banker of his time, succinctly embodies one of the principal issues facing the large enterprise – the divergence of interest between the management of the firm and outside equity shareholders. Why do, or should, investors put some of their savings in the hands of others, to expend as they see fit, with no commitment to repayment or a return? The answers are far from simple, and involve a complex interaction among a number of legal rules, economic institutions and market forces. Yet crafting a viable response is essential to the functioning of a modern economy based upon technology with scale economies whose attainment is dependent on the creation of large firms.
Der vorliegende Aufsatz befasst sich mit Fragen, die auftreten, wenn die an einer deutschen Börse notierten Aktien einer deutschen Gesellschaft auch an der New York Stock Exchange (im Folgenden “NYSE”) notiert werden und zwar ohne Zwischenschaltung von Hinterlegungsscheinen (American Depositary Receipts, im Folgenden “ADR”). Der Aufsatz behandelt dagegen nicht die Rechtsfragen, die sowohl bei einer Börsennotierung von Aktien als auch bei einer Börsennotierung von ADR einer deutschen Gesellschaft gelöst werden müssen, z.B. Rechtsfragen, die sich auf das US-amerikanische Kapitalmarktrecht, insbesondere das Bilanzrecht, die US-amerikanischen Anforderungen an die Corporate Governance, das Insiderverbot und Verhaltensregeln im Umgang mit der Presse beziehen.
In response to recent developments in the financial markets and the stunning growth of the hedge fund industry in the United States, policy makers, most notably the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”), are turning their attention to the regulation, or lack thereof, of hedge funds. U.S. regulators have scrutinized the hedge fund industry on several occasions in the recent past without imposing substantial regulatory constraints. Will this time be any different? The focus of the regulators’ interest has shifted. Traditionally, they approached the hedge fund industry by focusing on systemic risk to and integrity of the financial markets. The current inquiry is almost exclusively driven by investor protection concerns. What has changed? First, since 2000, new kinds of investors have poured capital into hedge funds in the United States, facilitated by the “retailization” of hedge funds through the development of funds of hedge funds and the dismal performance of the stock market. Second, in a post-Enron era, regulators and policy makers are increasingly sensitive to investor protection concerns. On May 14 and 15, 2003, the SEC held for the first time a public roundtable discussion on the single topic of hedge funds. Among the investor protection concerns highlighted were: an increase in incidents of fraud, inadequate suitability determinations by brokers who market hedge fund interests to individual investors, conflicts of interest of managers who manage mutual funds and hedge funds side-by-side, a lack of transparency that hinders investors from making informed investment decisions, layering of fees, and unbounded discretion by managers in pricing private hedge fund securities. Although there has been discussion about imposing wide-ranging restrictions onhedge funds, such as reining in short selling, requiring disclosure of long/short positions and limiting leverage, such a response would be heavy-handed and probably unnecessary. The existing regulatory regime is largely adequate to address the most flagrant abuses. Moreover, as the hedge fund market further matures, it is likely that institutional investors will continue to weed out weak performers and mediocre or dishonest hedge fund managers. What is likely to emerge from the newest regulatory focus on investor protection is a measured response that would enhance the SEC’s enforcement and inspection authority, while leaving hedge funds’ inherent investment flexibility largely unfettered. A likely scenario, for example, might be a requirement that some, or possibly all, hedge fund sponsors register with the SEC as investment advisers. Today, most are exempt from registration, although more and more are registering to provide advice to public hedge funds and attract institutions. Registration would make it easier for the SEC to ferret out potential fraudsters in advance by reviewing the professional history of hedge fund operators, allow the SEC to bring administrative proceedings against hedge fund advisers for statutory violations and give the agency access to books and records that it does not have today. Other possible initiatives, including additional disclosure requirements for publicly offered hedge funds, are discussed below. This article addresses the question whether U.S. regulation of hedge funds is really taking a new direction. It (i) provides a brief overview of the current U.S. regulatory scheme, from which hedge funds are generally exempt, (ii) describes recent events in the United States that have contributed to regulators’ anxiety, (iii) examines the investor protection rationale for hedge fund regulation and considers whether these concerns do, in fact, merit increased regulation of hedge funds at this time, and (iv) considers the likelihood and possible scope of a potential regulatory response, principally by the SEC.
Lassen Sie mich einleitend mit fünf Thesen zu Basel II beginnen: 1. Basel II stellt einen flexiblen Regulierungsansatz dar, welcher auf einem Mix von privater Selbstregulierung und einer ständigen Überwachung durch staatliche Aufsichtsbehörden beruht. Möglicherweise repräsentiert Basel II einen Prototyp für einen neuartigen Regulierungsansatz im 21. Jahrhundert. 2. An dem Prozess bei Basel II auf internationaler Ebene nehmen neben staatlichen Stellen auch Marktteilnehmergruppen teil. Die Verhandlungen, die derzeit noch nicht abgeschlossen sind, erfolgen außerhalb der etablierten Regierungszirkel. Die Regelungen werden in unterschiedlich zusammengesetzten Unter- und Nebengruppen beim Basler Ausschuss für Bankenaufsicht vorbereitet. 3. Basel II reflektiert den Fakt der sich rasch wandelnden Finanzmärkte und anhaltender Fortentwicklungen bei den Bankgeschäften. Insoweit bildet Basel II eher einen Prozess als einen festen Zustand ab. 4. Stärker als die bisherigen Aufsichtsregularien bewirkt Basel II einen Anpassungsdruck in Richtung eines globalen Standards, im Zuge dessen eine Nivellierung der bestehenden, historisch gewachsenen und national geprägten Finanzierungsformen latent einhergehen dürfte. 5. Basel II verlangt eine aufwendige Betreuung –sowohl im Hinblick auf dessen Ausgestaltung als Regelungswerk als auch auf dessen praktische Anwendung. Expertise gewinnt an Bedeutung. Daraus könnten möglicherweise Verunsicherungen oder gar ein latentes Unbehagen bei den Bankkunden resultieren. Hier erscheint eine Aufklärung über die sachlichen Zusammenhänge bei Basel II angebracht.
With the Council regulation (EC) No. 1346/2000 of 29 May 2000 on insolvency proceedings, that came into effect May 31, 2002 the European Union has introduced a legal framework for dealing with cross-border insolvency proceedings. In order to achieve the aim of improving the efficiency and effectiveness of insolvency proceedings having cross-border effects within the European Community, the provisions on jurisdiction, recognition and applicable law in this area are contained in a Regulation, a Community law measure which is binding and directly applicable in Member States. The goals of the Regulation, with 47 articles, are to enable cross-border insolvency proceedings to operate efficiently and effectively, to provide for co-ordination of the measures to be taken with regard to the debtor’s assets and to avoid forum shopping. The Insolvency Regulation, therefore, provides rules for the international jurisdiction of a court in a Member State for the opening of insolvency proceedings, the (automatic) recognition of these proceedings in other Member States and the powers of the ‘liquidator’ in the other Member States. The Regulation also deals with important choice of law (or: private international law) provisions. The Regulation is directly applicable in the Member States3 for all insolvency proceedings opened after 31 May 2002.
Der Titel des Vortrags benennt eine der wichtigsten Abgrenzungsfragen, die man sich zu stellen hat, sobald man es mit Kurs- und Marktpreismanipulation zu tun hat. Was ist zulässiges Marktverhalten, was muss jeder Marktteilnehmer tun dürfen, ohne mit einem Bein im Gefängnis zu stehen und wo fängt die verbotene Kursmanipulation an? Eine bedeutsame Unterscheidung für die aktiven Akteure am Kapitalmarkt, um Klarheit darüber zu haben, was erlaubt ist und was nicht. Der Markt braucht das Vertrauen der Anleger, und Anleger vertrauen nur in ordnungsgemäß funktionierende Märkte, in Märkte, an denen Preisbildungsmechanismen funktionieren und kontrolliert werden. Daher ist es notwendig,Vorkehrungen zu treffen, die gewährleisten, dass Märkte funktionieren und Preise sich an Märkten manipulationsfrei bilden können und auch bilden. Auf der präventiven Seite tragen hierzu die Handelsregeln der verschiedenen Börsen bei, die insbesondere dezidierte Regelungen zur Preisbildung beinhalten. Sie sollen gewährleisten, dass Preise ordnungsgemäß zustande kommen und einen fairen Ausgleich von Angebot und Nachfrage darstellen. Ergänzt wird dieser präventive Aspekt durch die repressive Seite, nämlich die Ahndung von Fehlverhalten. Hierzu gab es bisher die Regelung des Kursbetrugs in § 88 Börsengesetz. Diese Vorschrift existierte inhaltlich bereits über 100 Jahre, in denen sie aber, wenn nicht tot, so doch zumindest annähernd scheintot war. Denn es sind kaum Verurteilungen oder sonstige Maßnahmen auf der Grundlage dieser Norm bekannt. Wollte man aus diesem Schattendasein allerdings folgern, dass aufgrund des integren Verhaltens der Marktteilnehmer eine solche Regelung obsolet sei, so wäre das ein Fehlschluss. Mit dem Vierten Finanzmarktförderungsgesetz, das zum 01. Juli 2002 in Kraft tat, wurde dann auch eine Reform durchgeführt. Die alte Vorschrift wurde gestrichen und durch die neue Regelung des Verbots der Kurs- und Marktpreismanipulation im Wertpapierhandelsgesetz ersetzt. Dort wurden §§ 20a und 20b neu eingefügt. Die Aufgabe der Überwachung dieses Manipulationsverbots und die Verfolgung von Verstößen wurde der BaFin übertragen.
While hedge funds have been around at least since the 1940's, it has only been in the last decade or so that they have attracted the widespread attention of investors, academics and regulators. Investors, mainly wealthy individuals but also increasingly institutional investors, are attracted to hedge funds because they promise high “absolute” returns -- high returns even when returns on mainstream asset classes like stocks and bonds are low or negative. This prospect, not surprisingly, has increased interest in hedge funds in recent years as returns on stocks have plummeted around the world, and as investors have sought alternative investment strategies to insulate them in the future from the kind of bear markets we are now experiencing. Government regulators, too, have become increasingly attentive to hedge funds, especially since the notorious collapse of the hedge fund Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) in September 1998. Over the course of only a few months during the summer of 1998 LTCM lost billions of dollars because of failed investment strategies that were not well understood even by its own investors, let alone by its bankers and derivatives counterparties. LTCM had built up huge leverage both on and off the balance sheet, so that when its investments soured it was unable to meet the demands of creditors and derivatives counterparties. Had LTCM’s counterparties terminated and liquidated their positions with LTCM, the result could have been a severe liquidity shortage and sharp changes in asset prices, which many feared could have impaired the solvency of other financial institutions and destabilized financial markets generally. The Federal Reserve did not wait to see if this would happen. It intervened to organize an immediate (September 1998) creditor-bailout by LTCM’s largest creditors and derivatives counterparties, preventing the wholesale liquidation of LTCM’s positions. Over the course of the year that followed the bailout, the creditor committee charged with managing LTCM’s positions effected an orderly work-out and liquidation of LTCM’s positions. We will never know what would have happened had the Federal Reserve not intervened. In defending the Federal Reserve’s unusual actions in coming to the assistance of an unregulated financial institutions like a hedge fund, William McDonough, the president of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, stated that it was the Federal Reserve’s judgement that the “...abrupt and disorderly close-out of LTCM’s positions would pose unacceptable risks to the American economy. ... there was a likelihood that a number of credit and interest rate markets would experience extreme price moves and possibly cease to function for a period of one or more days and maybe longer. This would have caused a vicious cycle: a loss of investor confidence, lending to further liquidations of positions, and so on.” The near-collapse of LTCM galvanized regulators throughout the world to examine the operations of hedge funds to determine if they posed a risk to investors and to financial stability more generally. Studies were undertaken by nearly every major central bank, regulatory agency, and international “regulatory” committee (such as the Basle Committee and IOSCO), and reports were issued, by among others, The President’s Working Group on Financial Markets, the United States General Accounting Office (GAO), the Counterparty Risk Management Policy Group, the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, and the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO). Many of these studies concluded that there was a need for greater disclosure by hedge funds in order to increase transparency and enhance market discipline, by creditors, derivatives counterparties and investors. In the Fall of 1999 two bills were introduced before the U.S. Congress directed at increasing hedge fund disclosure (the “Hedge Fund Disclosure Act” [the “Baker Bill”] and the “Markey/Dorgan Bill”). But when the legislative firestorm sparked by the LTCM’s episode finally quieted, there was no new regulation of hedge funds. This paper provides an overview of the regulation of hedge funds and examines the key regulatory issues that now confront regulators throughout the world. In particular, two major issues are examined. First, whether hedge funds pose a systemic threat to the stability of financial markets, and, if so, whether additional government regulation would be useful. And second, whether existing regulation provides sufficient protection for hedge fund investors, and, if not, what additional regulation is needed.
In an ideal world all investment products, including hedge funds, would be marketable to all investors. In this ideal world, all investors would fully understand the nature of the products and would be able to make an informed choice whether to invest. Of course the ideal world does not exist – the retail investment market is characterised by asymmetries of information. Product providers know most about the products on offer (or at least they should do). Investment advisers often know rather less than the provider but much more than their retail customers. Providers and intermediary advisers are understandably motivated by the desire to sell their products. There is therefore a risk that investment products will be mis-sold by investment advisers or mis-bought by ill-informed investors. This asymmetry of information is dealt with in most countries through regulation. However, the regulatory response in different countries is not necessarily the same. There are various ways in which protections can be applied and it is important to understand that the cultural background and regulatory histories of countries flavours the way regulation has developed. This means (as will be explained in greater detail later) that some countries are better able than others to admit hedge funds to the retail sector. Following this Introduction, Section II looks at some key background issues. Section III then looks at some important questions raised by the retail hedge fund issue. Many of these are questions of balance. Balance lies at the heart of regulation of course – regulation must always balance the needs of investors and with market efficiency. Understanding the “retail hedge fund” question requires particular attention to balance. Section IV then looks at the UK regime and how the FSA has answered the balance question. Section V offers some international perspectives. Section VI concludes. It will be seen that there is no obviously right answer to the question whether hedge fund products should be marketed to retail investors. Each regulator in each jurisdiction needs to make up its own mind on how to deal with the various issues and balances. It is evident, however, that internationally there is a move towards a greater variety of retail funds. There is nothing wrong with that, provided the regulators and the retail customers they protect, understand sufficiently what sort of protection is, or is not, being offered in the regulatory regime.
In this paper we estimate a small model of the euro area to be used as a laboratory for evaluating the performance of alternative monetary policy strategies. We start with the relationship between output and inflation and investigate the fit of the nominal wage contracting model due to Taylor (1980)and three different versions of the relative real wage contracting model proposed by Buiter and Jewitt (1981)and estimated by Fuhrer and Moore (1995a) for the United States. While Fuhrer and Moore reject the nominal contracting model in favor of the relative contracting model which induces more inflation persistence, we find that both models fit euro area data reasonably well. When considering France, Germany and Italy separately, however, we find that the nominal contracting model fits German data better, while the relative contracting model does quite well in countries which transitioned out of a high inflation regime such as France and Italy. We close the model by estimating an aggregate demand relationship and investigate the consequences of the different wage contracting specifications for the inflation-output variability tradeoff, when interest rates are set according to Taylor 's rule.
Learning and equilibrium selection in a monetary overlapping generations model with sticky prices
(2003)
We study adaptive learning in a monetary overlapping generations model with sticky prices and monopolistic competition for the case where learning agents observe current endogenous variables. Observability of current variables is essential for informational consistency of the learning setup with the model set up but generates multiple temporary equilibria when prices are flexible and prevents a straightforward construction of the learning dynamics. Sticky prices overcome this problem by avoiding simultaneity between prices and price expectations. Adaptive learning then robustly selects the determinate (monetary) steady state independent from the degree of imperfect competition. The indeterminate (non-monetary) steady state and non-stationary equilibria are never stable. Stability in a deterministic version of the model may differ because perfect foresight equilibria can be the limit of restricted perceptions equilibria of the stochastic economy with vanishing noise and thereby inherit different stability properties. This discontinuity at the zero variance of shocks suggests to analyze learning in stochastic models.
This paper considers a sticky price model with a cash-in-advance constraint where agents forecast inflation rates with the help of econometric models. Agents use least squares learning to estimate two competing models of which one is consistent with rational expectations once learning is complete. When past performance governs the choice of forecast model, agents may prefer to use the inconsistent forecast model, which generates an equilibrium where forecasts are inefficient. While average output and inflation result the same as under rational expectations, higher moments differ substantially: output and inflation show persistence, inflation responds sluggishly to nominal disturbances, and the dynamic correlations of output and inflation match U.S. data surprisingly well.
This paper compares Bayesian decision theory with robust decision theory where the decision maker optimizes with respect to the worst state realization. For a class of robust decision problems there exists a sequence of Bayesian decision problems whose solution converges towards the robust solution. It is shown that the limiting Bayesian problem displays infinite risk aversion and that decisions are insensitive (robust) to the precise assignment of prior probabilities. This holds independent from whether the preference for robustness is global or restricted to local perturbations around some reference model.
This paper is a draft for the chapter "German banks and banking structure" of the forthcoming book "The German financial system" edited by J.P. Krahnen and R.H. Schmidt (Oxford University Press). As such, the paper starts out with a description of past and present structural features of the German banking industry. Given the presented empirical evidence it then argues that great care has to be taken when generalising structural trends from one financial system to another. Whilst conventional commercial banking is clearly in decline in the US, it is far from clear whether the dominance of banks in the German financial system has been significantly eroded over the last decades. We interpret the immense stability in intermediation ratios and financing patterns of firms between 1970 and 2000 as strong evidence for our view that the way in which and the extent to which German banks fulfil the central functions for the financial system are still consistent with the overall logic of the German financial system. In spite of the current dire business environment for financial intermediaries we do not expect the German financial system and its banking industry as an integral part of this system to converge to the institutional arrangements typical for a market-oriented financial system.
In Germany a public discussion on the "power of banks" has been going on for decades now with power having at least two meanings. On the one hand it is the power of banks to control public corporations through direct shareholdings or the exercise of proxy votes - this is the power of banks in corporate control. On the other hand it is market power - due to imperfect competition in markets for financial services - that banks exercise vis-à-vis their loan and deposit customers. In the past, bank regulation has often been blamed to undermine competition and the working of market forces in the financial industry for the sake of soundness and stability of financial services firms. This chapter tries to shed some light on the historical development and current state of bank regulation in Germany. In so doing it tries to embed the analysis of bank regulation into a more general industrial organisation framework. For every regulated industry, competition and regulation are deeply interrelated as most regulatory institutions - even if they do not explicitly address the competitiveness of the market - either affect market structure or conduct. This paper tries to uncover some of the specific relationships between monetary policy, government interference and bank regulation on the one hand and bank market structure and economic performance on the other. In so doing we hope to point to several areas for fruitful research in the future. While our focus is on Germany, some of the questions that we raise and some of our insights might also be applicable to banking systems elsewhere. Revised version forthcoming in "The German Financial System", edited by Jan P. Krahnen and Reinhard H. Schmidt, Oxford University Press.
Some of the most widely expressed myths about the German financial system are concerned with the close ties and intensive interaction between banks and firms, often described as Hausbank relationships. Links between banks and firms include direct shareholdings, board representation, and proxy voting and are particularly significant for corporate governance. Allegedly, these relationships promote investment and improve the performance of firms. Furthermore, German universal banks are believed to play a special role as large and informed monitoring investors (shareholders). However, for the very same reasons, German universal banks are frequently accused of abusing their influence on firms by exploiting rents and sustaining the entrenchment of firms against efficient transfers of firm control. In this paper, we review recent empirical evidence regarding the special role of banks for the corporate governance of German firms. We differentiate between large exchangelisted firms and small and medium sized companies throughout. With respect to the role of banks as monitoring investors, the evidence does not unanimously support a special role of banks for large firms. Only one study finds that banks´ control of management goes beyond what nonbank shareholders achieve. Proxyvoting rights apparently do not provide a significant means for banks to exert management control. Most of the recent evidence regarding small firms suggests that a Hausbank relationship can indeed be beneficial. Hausbanks are more willing to sustain financing when borrower quality deteriorates, and they invest more often than arm´s length banks in workouts if borrowers face financial distress.
The paper describes the legal and economic environment of mergers and acquisitions in Germany and explores barriers to obtaining and executing corporate control. Various cases are used to demonstrate that resistance by different stakeholders including minority shareholders, organized labour and the government may present powerful obstacles to takeovers in Germany. In spite of the overall convergence of European takeover and securities trading laws, Germany still shows many peculiarities that make its market for corporate control distinct from other countries. Concentrated share ownership, cross shareholdings and pyramidal ownership structures are frequent barriers to acquiring majority stakes. Codetermination laws, the supervisory board structure and supermajority requirements for important corporate decisions limit the execution of control by majority shareholders. Bidders that disregard the German preference for consensual solutions and the specific balance of powers will risk their takeover attempt be frustrated by opposing influence groups. Revised version forthcoming in "The German Financial System", edited by Jan P. Krahnen and Reinhard H. Schmidt, Oxford University Press.
The German financial system is the archetype of a bank-dominated system. This implies that organized equity markets are, in some sense, underdeveloped. The purpose of this paper is, first, to describe the German equity markets and, second, to analyze whether it is underdeveloped in any meaningful sense. In the descriptive part we provide a detailed account of the microstructure of the German equity markets, putting special emphasis on recent developments. When comparing the German market with its peers, we find that it is indeed underdeveloped with respect to market capitalization. In terms of liquidity, on the other hand, the German equity market is not generally underdeveloped. It does, however, lack a liquid market for block trading. Klassifikation: G 51 . Revised version forthcoming in "The German Financial System", edited by Jan P. Krahnen and Reinhard H. Schmidt, Oxford University Press.
The experience in the period during and after the Asian crisis of 1997-98 has provoked an extensive debate about the credit rating agencies' evaluation of sovereign risk in emerging markets lending. This study analyzes the role of credit rating agencies in international finan-cial markets, particularly whether sovereign credit ratings have an impact on the financial stability in emerging market economies. The event study and panel regression results indicate that credit rating agencies have substantial influence on the size and volatility of emerging markets lending. The empirical results are significantly stronger in the case of government's downgrades and negative imminent sovereign credit rating actions such as credit watches and rating outlooks than positive adjustments by the credit rating agencies while by the market participants' anticipated sovereign credit rating changes have a smaller impact on financial markets in emerging economies.
Do changes in sovereign credit ratings contribute to financial contagion in emerging market crises?
(2003)
Credit rating changes for long-term foreign currency debt may act as a wake-up call with upgrades and downgrades in one country affecting other financial markets within and across national borders. Such a potential (contagious) rating effect is likely to be stronger in emerging market economies, where institutional investors' problems of asymmetric information are more present. This empirical study complements earlier research by explicitly examining cross-security and cross-country contagious rating effects of credit rating agencies' sovereign risk assessments. In particular, the specific impact of sovereign rating changes during the financial turmoil in emerging markets in the latter half of the 1990s has been examined. The results indicate that sovereign rating changes in a ground-zero country have a (statistically) significant impact on the financial markets of other emerging market economies although the spillover effects tend to be regional.
This paper deals with the proposed use of sovereign credit ratings in the "Basel Accord on Capital Adequacy" (Basel II) and considers its potential effect on emerging markets financing. It investigates in a first attempt the consequences of the planned revisions on the two central aspects of international bank credit flows: the impact on capital costs and the volatility of credit supply across the risk spectrum of borrowers. The empirical findings cast doubt on the usefulness of credit ratings in determining commercial banks' capital adequacy ratios since the standardized approach to credit risk would lead to more divergence rather than convergence between investment-grade and speculative-grade borrowers. This conclusion is based on the lateness and cyclical determination of credit rating agencies' sovereign risk assessments and the continuing incentives for short-term rather than long-term interbank lending ingrained in the proposed Basel II framework.
Using a unique, hand-collected database of all venture-backed firms listed on Germany´s Neuer Markt, we analyze the history of venture capital financing of these firms before the IPO and the behavior of venture capitalists at the IPO. We can detect significant differences in the behavior and characteristics of German vs. foreign venture capital firms. The discrepancy in the investment and divestment strategies may be explained by the grandstanding phenomenon, the value-added hypothesis and certification issues. German venture capitalists are typically younger and smaller than their counterparts from abroad. They syndicate less. The sectoral structure of their portfolios differs from that of foreign venture capital firms. We also find that German venture capitalists typically take companies with lower offering volumes on the market. They usually finance firms in a later stage, carry through fewer investment rounds and take their portfolio firms public earlier. In companies where a German firm is the lead venture capitalist, the fraction of equity held by the group of venture capitalists is lower, their selling intensity at the IPO is higher and the committed lock-up period is longer.
We analyze the venture capitalist´s decision on the timing of the IPO, the offer price and the fraction of shares he sells in the course of the IPO. A venture capitalist may decide to take a company public or to liquidate it after one or two financing periods. A longer venture capitalist´s participation in a firm (later IPO) may increase its value while also increasing costs for the venture capitalist. Due to his active involvement, the venture capitalist knows the type of firm and the kind of project he finances before potential new investors do. This information asymmetry is resolved at the end of the second period. Under certain assumptions about the parameters and the structure of the model, we obtain a single equilibrium in which high-quality firms separate from low-quality firms. The latter are liquidated after the first period, while the former go public either after having been financed by the venture capitalist for two periods or after one financing period using a lock-up. Whether a strategy of one or two financing periods is chosen depends on the consulting intensity of the project and / or on the experience of the venture capitalist. In the separating equilibrium, the offer price corresponds to the true value of the firm. An earlier version of this paper appeared as: The Decision of Venture Capitalists on Timing and Extent of IPOs (ZEW Discussion Paper No. 03-12). This version July 2003.
We present a survey on the role of initial public offerings (Epos) and venture capital (VC) in Germany after the Second World War. Between 1945 and 1983 IPOs hardly played a role at all and only a minor role thereafter. In addition, companies that chose an IPO were much older and larger than the average companies going public for the first time in the US or the UK. The level of IPO underpricing in Germany, in contrast, has not been fundamentally different from that in other countries. The picture for venture capital financing is not much different from that provided by IPOs in Germany. For a long time venture capital financing was hardly significant, particularly as a source of early stage financing. The unprecedented boom on the Neuer Markt between 1997 and 2000, when many small venture capital financed firms entered the market, provides a striking contrast to the preceding era. However, by US standards, the levels of both IPO and venture capital activities remained rather low even in this boom phase. The extent to which recent developments will have a lasting impact on the financing of German firms, the level of IPO activity, and venture capital financing, remains to be seen. At the time of writing, activity has come to a near stand still and the Neuer Markt has just been dissolved. The low number of IPOs and the fairly low volume of VC financing in Germany before the introduction of the Neuer Markt are a striking and much debated phenomenon. Understanding the reasons for these apparent peculiarities is vital to understanding the German financial system. The potential explanations that have been put forward range from differentces in mentality to legal and institutional impediments and the availability of alternative sources of financing. Moreover the recent literature discusses how interest groups may have benefited and influenced the situation. These groups include politicians, unions/workers, managers/controlling-owners of established firms as well as banks. Revised version forthcoming in "The German Financial System", edited by Jan P. Krahnen and Reinhard H. Schmidt, Oxford University Press.
The paper explores factors that influence the design of financing contracts between venture capital investors and European venture capital funds. 122 Private Placement Memoranda and 46 Partnership Agreements are investigated in respect to the use of covenant restrictions and compensation schemes. The analysis focuses on the impact of two key factors: the reputation of VC-funds and changes in the overall demand for venture capital services. We find that established funds are more severely restricted by contractual covenants. This contradicts the conventional wisdom which assumes that established market participants care more about their reputation, have less incentive to behave opportunistically and therefore need less covenant restrictions. We also find that managers of established funds are more often obliged to invest own capital alongside with investors money. We interpret this as evidence that established funds have actually less reason to care about their reputation as compared to young funds. One reason for this surprising result could be that managers of established VC funds are older and closer to retirement and therefore put less weight on the effects of their actions on future business opportunities. We also explore the effects of venture capital supply on contract design. Gompers and Lerner (1996) show that VC-funds in the US are able to reduce the number of restrictive covenants in years with high supply of venture capital and interpret this as a result of increased bargaining power by VC-funds. We do not find similar evidence for Europe. Instead, we find that VC-funds receive less base compensation and higher performance related compensation in years with strong capital inflows into the VC industry. This may be interpreted as a signal of overconfidence: Strong investor demand seems to coincide with overoptimistic expectations by fund managers which make them willing to accept higher powered incentive schemes.
This chapter analyzes the role of financial accounting in the German financial system. It starts from the common perception that German accounting is rather "uninformative". This characterization is appropriate from the perspective of an arm´s length or outside investor and when confined to the financial statements per se. But it is no longer accurate when a broader perspective is adopted. The German accounting system exhibits several arrangements that privately communicate information to insiders, notably the supervisory board. Due to these features, the key financing and contracting parties seem reasonably well informed. The same cannot be said about outside investors relying primarily on public disclosure. A descriptive analysis of the main elements of the Germany system and a survey of extant empirical accounting research generally support these arguments.
In this paper we study the role of the exchange rate in conducting monetary policy in an economy with near-zero nominal interest rates as experienced in Japan since the mid-1990s. Our analysis is based on an estimated model of Japan, the United States and the euro area with rational expectations and nominal rigidities. First, we provide a quantitative analysis of the impact of the zero bound on the effectiveness of interest rate policy in Japan in terms of stabilizing output and inflation. Then we evaluate three concrete proposals that focus on depreciation of the currency as a way to ameliorate the effect of the zero bound and evade a potential liquidity trap. Finally, we investigate the international consequences of these proposals.
We develop a behavioral exchange rate model with chartists and fundamentalists to study cyclical behavior in foreign exchange markets. Within our model, the market impact of fundamentalists depends on the strength of their belief in fundamental analysis. Estimation of a STAR GARCH model shows that the more the exchange rate deviates from its fundamental value, the more fundamentalists leave the market. In contrast to previous findings, our paper indicates that due to the nonlinear presence of fundamentalists, market stability decreases with increasing misalignments. A stabilization policy such as central bank interventions may help to deflate bubbles.
In this study a regime switching approach is applied to estimate the chartist and fundamentalist (c&f) exchange rate model originally proposed by Frankel and Froot (1986). The c&f model is tested against alternative regime switching specifications applying likelihood ratio tests. Nested atheoretical models like the popular segmented trends model suggested by Engel and Hamilton (1990) are rejected in favour of the multi agent model. Moreover, the c&f regime switching model seems to describe the data much better than a competing regime switching GARCH(1,1) model. Finally, our findings turned out to be relatively robust when estimating the model in subsamples. The empirical results suggest that the model is able to explain daily DM/Dollar forward exchange rate dynamics from 1982 to 1998.
We study optimal nominal demand policy in an economy with monopolistic competition and flexible prices when firms have imperfect common knowledge about the shocks hitting the economy. Parametrizing firms´ information imperfections by a (Shannon) capacity parameter that constrains the amount of information flowing to each firm, we study how policy that minimizes a quadratic objective in output and prices depends on this parameter. When price setting decisions of firms are strategic complements, for a large range of capacity values optimal policy nominally accommodates mark-up shocks in the short-run. This finding is robust to the policy maker observing shocks imperfectly or being uncertain about firms´ capacity parameter. With persistent mark-up shocks accommodation may increase in the medium term, but decreases in the long-run thereby generating a hump-shaped price response and a slow reduction in output. Instead, when prices are strategic substitutes, policy tends to react restrictively to mark-up shocks. However, rational expectations equilibria may then not exist with small amounts of imperfect common knowledge.
Inflation-targeting central banks have only imperfect knowledge about the effect of policy decisions on inflation. An important source of uncertainty is the relationship between inflation and unemployment. This paper studies the optimal monetary policy in the presence of uncertainty about the natural unemployment rate, the short-run inflation-unemployment tradeoff and the degree of inflation persistence in a simple macroeconomic model, which incorporates rational learning by the central bank as well as private sector agents. Two conflicting motives drive the optimal policy. In the static version of the model, uncertainty provides a motive for the policymaker to move more cautiously than she would if she knew the true parameters. In the dynamic version, uncertainty also motivates an element of experimentation in policy. I find that the optimal policy that balances the cautionary and activist motives typically exhibits gradualism, that is, it still remains less aggressive than a policy that disregards parameter uncertainty. Exceptions occur when uncertainty is very high and in inflation close to target.