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It is an established policy in the United States to separate commercial banking (the business of taking deposits and making commercial loans) from other commercial activities. The separation of banking and commercial activities is achieved by federal and state banking laws, which enumerate the powers that banks may exercise, the activities that banks may engage in, and the investments that banks may lawfully make, and expressly exclude banks from certain activities or relationships. Some of these provisions could be circumvented if a nonbank company could carry on banking activities through a banking subsidiary and nonbanking activities either itself or through a nonbanking subsidiary.
The issue of data security has become increasingly complex in the age of the internet and artificial intelligence. The developments seem to be almost unmanageable in some areas. Cooperation between jurisprudence and information technology is the only thing that can protect the individual and certain social groups from discrimination.
On April 24, 2001 the European Commission presented a proposal for a Directive1 introducing supplementary supervision of financial conglomerates (the Proposed Directive). The Proposed Directive requires a closer coordination among supervisory authorities of different sectors of the financial industry and leads to changes in the number of existing Directives relating to the supervision of credit institutions, insurance undertakings and investment firms.
Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) is short. Its title reads "Prohibition of collective expulsion of aliens", its text reads: "Collective expulsion of aliens is prohibited." It comes as a historical disappointment that the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in its decision in the case N.D. and N.T. v. Spain from 13 February 2020 distorts this clear guarantee to exclude apparently "unlawful" migrants from its protection. The decision is a shock for the effective protection of rights in Europe and at its external borders. Consequently the Guardian titled that the Court is "under fire". Reading the majority opinion is at times a puzzling experience, to say the least.
This article is directed towards addressing the employment related issues encountered by female workers in the gig economy in the EU. It revolves around analysing ‘the switch’ from the traditional labour market to the platform economy. It subsequently explains, by drawing comparisons, that the issues of gender inequality in the brick and mortar world are still prevalent in world of the digital platform. In fact, new challenges have emerged which are specifically related to the gig economy. Female workers are now affected by the inherent bias of algorithms. Moreover, due to the unequivocal propagation of ‘flexibility’ which is used as a weapon to glorify the gig economy; women are even more likely to be pushed into precarious work. The other prominent issues of gender inequality like the dynamics of intersectionality, the gender pay gap and hiring policies in traditional and digital platforms are also examined. Furthermore, the existing regulatory frameworks addressing these issues are discussed with the possibility of catering to the gender inequality issues in the gig economy through policy development. The article concludes with a reflection on the need for the EU to take immediate and efficacious policy measures in respect of female workers in the gig economy.
In April 2003 I commented on the European Commission’s Action Plan on a More Coherent European Contract Law [COM(2003) 68 final] and the Green Paper on the Modernisation of the 1980 Rome Convention [COM(2002) 654 final].1 While the main argument of that paper, i.e. the common neglect of the inherent interrelation between both the further harmonisation of substantive contract law by directives or through an optional European Civil Code on the one hand and the modernisation of conflict rules for consumer contracts in Art. 5 Rome Convention on the other hand, remain pressing issues, and as the German Law Journal continues its efforts in offering timely and critical analysis on consumer law issues,2 there is a variety of recent developments worth noting.
Every now and again, one is overcome by a sense of utter disbelief. How can it be that some conventional narratives are still so persistent and influential in this day and age? In fact, they are so pervasive that one feels compelled to put pen to paper in order to combat them. Among these narratives, we find the tale of cultural evolution, where law plays a fundamental role as an instrument for rationalizing archaic societies. Having rejected this kind of historiography in his last essay on the early history of law (ZRG RA 127, 1–13), the late Raymond Westbrook instead postulated new paradigms. Moving in the same direction, Philipp Ruch thwarts this story of civilizing progress in a twofold manner: In his eyes, honor and vengeance are not the anthropological factors that law has to contain in order to create civilization. According to Ruch, and the main thrust of his 2016 dissertation, it was in fact law in the context of honor and vengeance that produced emotionality. ...
In this concise volume, author and legal scholar Michael Stolleis provides an overview of the development of the modern German welfare state. Stolleis’ analysis focuses on labor law and social policy, while acknowledging the influence of economic, social, and cultural factors thereon. Origins of the German Welfare State does not emphasize a complete understanding of its subject; rather it seeks to provide insight into the development of German social policy in relation to the political/ historical eras in which it finds itself, leading to a deeper understanding of the foundations of social policy. ...
[Tagungsbericht] Making finance sustainable: Ten years equator principles – success or letdown?
(2013)
In 2003, a number of banks adopted the Equator Principles (EPs), a voluntary Code of Conduct based on the International Finance Corporation’s (IFC) performance standards, to ensure the ecological and social sustainability of project finance. These so called Equator Principles Financial Institutions (EPFI) commit to requiring their borrowers to adopt sustainable management plans of environmental and social risks associated with their projects. The Principles apply to the project finance business segment of the banks and cover projects with a total cost of US $10 million or more. While for long developing countries relied on World Bank and other public assistance to finance infrastructure projects there has occurred a shift in recent years to private funding. The NGOs have been frustrated by this shift of project finance as they had spent their resources to exercise pressure on the public financial institutions to incorporate environmental and social standards in their project finance activities. However, after a shift of NGO pressure to private financial institutions the latter adopted the EPs for fear of reputational risks. NGOs had laid down their own more ambitious ideas about sustainable finance in the Collevecchio Declaration on Financial Institutions and Sustainability. Legally speaking, the EPs are a self-regulatory soft law instrument. However, it has a hard law dimension as the Equator Banks require their borrowers to comply with the EPs through covenants in the loan contracts that may trigger a default in a case of violation. ...
There is an increasing interest in incorporating significant citizen participation into the law-making process by developing the use of the internet in the public sphere. However, no well-accepted e-participation model has prevailed. This article points out that, to be successful, we need critical reflection of legal theory and we also need further institutional construction based on the theoretical reflection.
Contemporary dominant legal theories demonstrate too strong an internal legal point of view to empower the informal, social normative development on the internet. Regardless of whether we see the law as a body of rules or principles, the social aspect is always part of people’s background and attracts little attention. In this article, it is advocated that the procedural legal paradigm advanced by Jürgen Habermas represents an important breakthrough in this regard.
Further, Habermas’s co-originality thesis reveals a neglected internal relationship between public autonomy and private autonomy. I believe the co-originality theory provides the essential basis on which a connecting infrastructure between the legal and the social could be developed. In terms of the development of the internet to include the public sphere, co-originality can also help us direct the emphasis on the formation of public opinion away from the national legislative level towards the local level; that is, the network of governance.1
This article is divided into two sections. The focus of Part One is to reconstruct the co-originality thesis (section 2, 3). This paper uses the application of discourse in the adjudication theory of Habermas as an example. It argues that Habermas would be more coherent, in terms of his insistence on real communication in his discourse theory, if he allowed his judges to initiate improved interaction with the society. This change is essential if the internal connection between public autonomy and private autonomy in the sense of court adjudication is to be truly enabled.
In order to demonstrate such improved co-original relationships, the empowering character of the state-made law is instrumental in initiating the mobilization of legal intermediaries, both individual and institutional. A mutually enhanced relationship is thus formed; between the formal, official organization and its governance counterpart aided by its associated ‘local’ public sphere. Referring to Susan Sturm, the Harris v Forklift Systems Inc. (1930) decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in the field of sexual harassment is used as an example.
Using only one institutional example to illustrate how the co-originality thesis can be improved is not sufficient to rebuild the thesis but this is as much as can be achieved in this article.
In Part Two, the paper examines, still at the institutional level, how Sturm develops an overlooked sense of impartiality, especially in the derivation of social norms; i.e. multi-partiality instead of neutral detachment (section 4). These two ideas should be combined as the criterion for impartiality to evaluate the legitimacy of the joint decision-making processes of both the formal official organization and ‘local’ public sphere.
Sturm’s emphasis on the deployment of intermediaries, both institutional and individual, can also enlighten the discourse theory. Intermediaries are essential for connecting the disassociated social networks, especially when a breakdown of communication occurs due to a lack of data, information, knowledge, or disparity of value orientation, all of which can affect social networks. If intermediaries are used, further communication will not be blocked as a result of the lack of critical data, information, knowledge or misunderstandings due to disparity of value orientation or other causes.
The institutional impact of the newly constructed co-originality thesis is also discussed in Part Two. Landwehr’s work on institutional design and assessment for deliberative interaction is first discussed. This article concludes with an indication of how the ‘local’ public sphere, through e-rulemaking or online dispute resolution, for example, can be constructed in light of the discussion of this article.
The article, which summarizes key findings of my German book ‘Die Gemeinfreiheit. Begriff, Funktion, Dogmatik’ (‘The Public Domain: Theory, Func-tion, Doctrine’), asks whether there are any provisions or principles under Ger-man and EU law that protect the public domain from interference by the legisla-ture, courts and private parties. In order to answer this question, it is necessary to step out of the intellectual property (IP) system and to analyze this body of law from the outside, and – even more important – to develop a positive legal conception of the public domain as such. By giving the public domain a proper doctrinal place in the legal system, the structural asymmetry between heavily theorized and protected IP rights on the one hand and a neglected public do-main on the other is countered. The overarching normative purpose is to devel-op a framework for a balanced IP system, which can only be achieved if the public domain forms an integral part of the overall regulation of information.
The application of the EU Commission’s Rule of Law Framework in the current Polish case is a step in the right direction. It seems a good instance to develop the Framework as an EU mechanism to protect European constitutional values in a European legal space which is rife with constitutional crises, but short of instruments to address them. Its pertinence appears even more clearly in comparison to the Council’s (in)activity under its own rule-of-law mechanism, hastily put forward after the Commission’s Framework. The activation of the Framework has shown its potential to mobilize European public opinion and orient public discourses to the current condition of EU values
Fundamental rights protection, once a side show, has become important for the EU, as proved by the newfound treaty recognition of the EU fundamental rights charter (CFREU), and the upcoming accession to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). At the same time the fundamental rights situation in a considerable number of Member States is an increasing cause for concern. This has mostly been illustrated with reference to minorities and asylum seekers. However, recent reports of organizations like the Council of Europe, the OSCE and various NGOs have also highlighted serious problems with regard to media freedom, such as overt political influence, media concentration, disproportionate sanctions on journalists, misuse of counter-terrorism legislation against the press, deficient protection of journalistic sources and failure to investigate violence against reporters. ...
From the late middle ages to early modern times (ca. 1200-1600) the Lübeck City Council was the most important courthouse in the Baltic. About 100 cities and towns on its shores lived according to the law of Lübeck. The paper deals with the old theory that Imperial law, i.e. mainly the learned Ius commune, was generally rejected by the council on the grounds of its foreign nature. The paper rejects this view with the help of 8 case studies. There exist rather spectacular statements against Imperial Law, but a closer look reveals that they have to be seen in the light of a specific practical context. They must not be confounded with general statements in which the council had no interest. Its attitude towards Learned Law was flexible and purely pragmatic.
Akrasia, or weak-will, is a term denoting a phenomenon when one acts freely and intentionally contrary to his or her better judgment. Discussion of akrasia originates in the Plato's Protagoras where he states that “No one who either knows or believes that there is another possible course of action, better than the one he is following, will ever continue on his present course”. However, in his influential article from 1970, Donald Davidson argued that akrasia is theoretically possible yet irrational. Some other critics of Plato's stance point out that phenomenon of akrasia is common in our everyday experience, therefore it must be possible.
These two arguments in favor of akrasia existence – theoretical and empirical – will be discussed from both – philosophical and psychological points of view. Especially, George Ainslie's argument that akrasia results from hyperbolic discounting will be taken into consideration to show how it affects traditional thinking about weak-willed actions.
Finally, the paper will discuss how the contemporary notion of akrasia may affect the idea of responsibility and free will. Implications for the philosophy of law will be shown, i.a. whether it is possible to claim that a given example of a weak-willed action was indeed free and intentional and one should be held responsible for its results.