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SAFE Newsletter : 2014, Q4
(2014)
We study the effect of weakening creditor rights on distress risk premia via a bankruptcy reform that shifts bargaining power in financial distress toward shareholders. We find that the reform reduces risk factor loadings and returns of distressed stocks. The effect is stronger for firms with lower firm-level shareholder bargaining power. An increase in credit spreads of riskier relative to safer firms, in particular for firms with lower firm-level shareholder bargaining power, confirms a shift in bargaining power from bondholders to shareholders. Out-of-sample tests reveal that a reversal of the reform's effects leads to a reversal of factor loadings and returns.
We study the effect of weakening creditor rights on distress risk premia via a bankruptcy reform that shifts bargaining power in financial distress toward shareholders. We find that the reform reduces risk factor loadings and returns of distressed stocks. The effect is stronger for firms with lower firm-level shareholder bargaining power. An increase in credit spreads of riskier relative to safer firms, in particular for firms with lower firm-level shareholder bargaining power, confirms a shift in bargaining power from bondholders to shareholders. Out-of-sample tests reveal that a reversal of the reform's effects leads to a reversal of factor loadings and returns.
Europe's debt crisis casts doubt on the effectiveness of fiscal austerity in highly-integrated economies. Closed-economy models overestimate its effectiveness, because they underestimate tax-base elasticities and ignore cross-country tax externalities. In contrast, we study tax responses to debt shocks in a two-country model with endogenous utilization that captures those externalities and matches the capital-tax-base elasticity. Quantitative results show that unilateral capital tax hikes cannot restore fiscal solvency in Europe, and have large negative (positive) effects at "home" ("abroad"). Restoring solvency via either Nash competition or Cooperation reduces (increases) capital (labor) taxes significantly, and leaves countries with larger debt shocks preferring autarky.
After the Global Financial Crisis a controversial rush to fiscal austerity followed in many countries. Yet research on the effects of austerity on macroeconomic aggregates was and still is unsettled, mired by the difficulty of identifying multipliers from observational data. This paper reconciles seemingly disparate estimates of multipliers within a unified and state-contingent framework. We achieve identification of causal effects with new propensity-score based methods for time series data. Using this novel approach, we show that austerity is always a drag on growth, and especially so in depressed economies: a one percent of GDP fiscal consolidation translates into 4 percent lower real GDP after five years when implemented in the slump rather than the boom. We illustrate our findings with a counterfactual evaluation of the impact of the U.K. government’s shift to austerity policies in 2010 on subsequent growth.
Austerity
(2014)
We shed light on the function, properties and optimal size of austerity using the standard sovereign model augmented to include incomplete information about credit risk. Austerity is defined as the shortfall of consumption from the level desired by a country and supported by its repayment capacity. We find that austerity serves as a tool for securing a more favorable loan package; that it is associated with over-investment even when investment does not create collateral; and that low risk borrowers may favor more to less severe austerity. These findings imply that the amount of fresh funds obtained by a sovereign is not a reliable measure of austerity suffered; and that austerity may actually be associated with higher growth. Our analysis accommodates costly signalling for gaining credibility and also assigns a novel role to spending multipliers in the determination of optimal austerity.
Does austerity pay off?
(2014)
Policy makers often implement austerity measures when the sustainability of public finances is in doubt and, hence, sovereign yield spreads are high. Is austerity successful in bringing about a reduction in yield spreads? We employ a new panel data set which contains sovereign yield spreads for 31 emerging and advanced economies and estimate the effects of cuts of government consumption on yield spreads and economic activity. The conditions under which austerity takes place are crucial. During times of fiscal stress, spreads rise in response to the spending cuts, at least in the short-run. In contrast, austerity pays off, if conditions are more benign.
In this paper, we investigate how the introduction of complex, model-based capital regulation affected credit risk of financial institutions. Model-based regulation was meant to enhance the stability of the financial sector by making capital charges more sensitive to risk. Exploiting the staggered introduction of the model-based approach in Germany and the richness of our loan-level data set, we show that (1) internal risk estimates employed for regulatory purposes systematically underpredict actual default rates by 0.5 to 1 percentage points; (2) both default rates and loss rates are higher for loans that were originated under the model-based approach, while corresponding risk-weights are significantly lower; and (3) interest rates are higher for loans originated under the model-based approach, suggesting that banks were aware of the higher risk associated with these loans and priced them accordingly. Further, we document that large banks benefited from the reform as they experienced a reduction in capital charges and consequently expanded their lending at the expense of smaller banks that did not introduce the model-based approach. Counter to the stated objectives, the introduction of complex regulation adversely affected the credit risk of financial institutions. Overall, our results highlight the pitfalls of complex regulation and suggest that simpler rules may increase the efficacy of financial regulation.
We show that the correct experiment to evaluate the effects of a fiscal adjustment is the simulation of a multi year fiscal plan rather than of individual fiscal shocks. Simulation of fiscal plans adopted by 16 OECD countries over a 30-year period supports the hypothesis that the effects of consolidations depend on their design. Fiscal adjustments based upon spending cuts are much less costly, in terms of output losses, than tax-based ones and have especially low output costs when they consist of permanent rather than stop and go changes in taxes and spending. The difference between tax-based and spending-based adjustments appears not to be explained by accompanying policies, including monetary policy. It is mainly due to the different response of business confidence and private investment.
Are rules and boundaries sufficient to limit harmful central bank discretion? Lessons from Europe
(2014)
Marvin Goodfriend’s (2014) insightful, informative and provocative work explains concisely and convincingly why the Fed needs rules and boundaries. This paper reviews the broader institutional design problem regarding the effectiveness of the central bank in practice and confirms the need for rules and boundaries. The framework proposed for improving the Fed incorporates key elements that have already been adopted in the European Union. The case of ELA provision by the ECB and the Central Bank of Cyprus to Marfin-Laiki Bank during the crisis, however, suggests that the existence of rules and boundaries may not be enough to limit harmful discretion. During a crisis, novel interpretations of the legal authority of the central bank may be introduced to create a grey area that might be exploited to justify harmful discretionary decisions even in the presence of rules and boundaries. This raises the question how to ensure that rules and boundaries are respected in practice
This article examines how the shale oil revolution has shaped the evolution of U.S. crude oil and gasoline prices. It puts the evolution of shale oil production into historical perspective, highlights uncertainties about future shale oil production, and cautions against the view that the U.S. may become the next Saudi Arabia. It then reviews the role of the ban on U.S. crude oil exports, of capacity constraints in refining and transporting crude oil, of differences in the quality of conventional and unconventional crude oil, and of the recent regional fragmentation of the global market for crude oil for the determination of U.S. oil and gasoline prices. It discusses the reasons for the persistent wedge between U.S. crude oil prices and global crude oil prices in recent years and for the fact that domestic oil prices below global levels need not translate to lower U.S. gasoline prices. It explains why the shale oil revolution unlike the shale gas revolution is unlikely to stimulate a boom in oil-intensive manufacturing industries. It also explores the implications of shale oil production for the transmission of oil price shocks to the U.S. economy.
One of the leading methods of estimating the structural parameters of DSGE models is the VAR-based impulse response matching estimator. The existing asympotic theory for this estimator does not cover situations in which the number of impulse response parameters exceeds the number of VAR model parameters. Situations in which this order condition is violated arise routinely in applied work. We establish the consistency of the impulse response matching estimator in this situation, we derive its asymptotic distribution, and we show how this distribution can be approximated by bootstrap methods. Our methods of inference remain asymptotically valid when the order condition is satisfied, regardless of whether the usual rank condition for the application of the delta method holds. Our analysis sheds new light on the choice of the weighting matrix and covers both weakly and strongly identified DSGE model parameters. We also show that under our assumptions special care is needed to ensure the asymptotic validity of Bayesian methods of inference. A simulation study suggests that the frequentist and Bayesian point and interval estimators we propose are reasonably accurate in finite samples. We also show that using these methods may affect the substantive conclusions in empirical work.
The recent financial crisis highlighted the limits of the "originate to distribute" model of banking, but its nexus with the macroeconomy remains unexplored. I build a business cycle model with banks engaging in credit risk transfer (CRT) under informational externalities. Markets for CRT provide liquidity insurance to banks, but the emergence of a pooling equilibrium can also impair the banks’ monitoring incentives. In normal times and in face of standard macro shocks the insurance benefits of CRT prevail and the business cycle is stabilized. In face of financial/liquidity shocks the extent of informational asymmetries is larger and the business cycle is amplified. The macro model with CRT can also reproduce well a number of macro and banking statistics over the period of rapid growth of this banks’ business model.
On 23 July 2014, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) passed the “Money Market Reform: Amendments to Form PF ,” designed to prevent investor runs on money market mutual funds such as those experienced in institutional prime funds following the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers. The present article evaluates the reform choices in the U.S. and draws conclusions for the proposed EU regulation of money market funds.
Can a tightening of the bank resolution regime lead to more prudent bank behavior? This policy paper reviews arguments for why this could be the case and presents evidence linking changes in bank resolution regimes with bank risk-taking. The authors find that the tightening of bank resolution in the U.S. (i.e., the introduction of the Orderly Liquidation Authority) significantly decreased overall risk-taking of the most affected banks. This effect, however, does not hold for the largest and most systemically important banks – too-big-to-fail seems to be unresolved. Building on the insights from the U.S. experience, the authors derive principles for effective resolution regimes and evaluate the emerging resolution regime for Europe.
Da Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) nicht den Beschränkungen der deutschen Schuldenbremse unterliegen, können diese der Politik als Mittel dienen, Lasten in die Zukunft zu verschieben, ohne dabei den Verschuldungsgrad zu erhöhen. Der vorliegende Beitrag beschreibt Vor- und Nachteile von PPP-Konstrukten im Rahmen der öffentlichen Auftragsvergabe. Alfons Weichenrieder argumentiert, dass bei der Wahl von PPP-Instrumenten die Effizienz der Bereitstellung von öffentlicher Infrastruktur und Dienstleistungen im Vordergrund stehen sollte. Die Budgetregeln könnten so angepasst werden, dass das Motiv der Schuldenverschleierung nicht vordergründig die Wahl von PPP-Konstrukten bestimmt.
Das Financial Stability Board (FSB) schlägt zur Lösung des "too big to fail"-Problems einen neuen Risikokapital-Puffer für global tätige systemrelevante Banken vor. Die Kennzahl „Total Loss Absorbing Capacity“ (TLAC), setzt sich zusammen aus hartem Kernkapital und verlustabsorbierendem Fremdkapital. Das verlustabsorbierende, also bail-in-fähige Fremdkapital soll vor anderen Positionen der Passivseite einer Bank in einer Krisensituation vorrangig haften oder aber in Eigenkapital umgewandelt werden. Jan Krahnen argumentiert, dass es für eine glaubhafte Verringerung des "too big to fail"-Problems auf die Anforderungen an das verlustabsorbierende Fremdkapital ankommt. Dass die Aufsicht die Halter von Bail-in Anleihen im Verlustfall tatsächlich einem Bail-in unterzieht ist vor allem nur dann glaubwürdig, wennn andere Banken nicht die Halter solcher Anleihen sind.
A recent proposal by the Financial Stability Board (FSB) suggests a new risk capital buffer for globally operating systemically important financial institutions. The suggested metric, “Total Loss Absorbing Capacity“ (TLAC), is composed of Tier-1 capital and loss absorbing debt. In a crisis situation, “bail-in-able” debt is to be written down or converted into equity. Jan Krahnen argues that the credibility of bail-in, in the case of systemically important financial institutions, hinges crucially on the design of TLAC and the requirements that will be placed on loss absorbing “bail-in-able” debt.The fear of direct systemic consequences through bail-in could be overcome, if a holding ban were placed on the “bail-in-bonds” of financial institutions. The holding ban would stipulate that these bonds cannot be held by other institutions within the banking sector.
We characterize optimal redistribution in a dynastic family model with human capital. We show how a government can improve the trade-off between equality and incentives by changing the amount of observable human capital. We provide an intuitive decomposition for the wedge between human-capital investment in the laissez faire and the social optimum. This wedge differs from the wedge for bequests because human capital carries risk: its returns depend on the non-diversi
able risk of children's ability. Thus, human capital investment is encouraged more than bequests in the social optimum if human capital is a bad hedge for consumption risk.