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No one seems to be neutral about the effects of EMU on the German economy. Roughly speaking, there are two camps: those who see the euro as the advent of a newly open, large, and efficient regime which will lead to improvements in European and in particular in German competitiveness; those who see the euro as a weakening of the German commitment to price stability. From a broader macroeconomic perspective, however, it is clear that EMU is unlikely to cause directly any meaningful change either for the better in Standort Deutschland or for the worse in the German price stability. There is ample evidence that changes in monetary regimes (so long as non leaving hyperinflation) induce little changes in real economic structures such as labor or financial markets. Regional asymmetries of the sorts in the EU do not tend to translate into monetary differences. Most importantly, there is no good reason to believe that the ECB will behave any differently than the Bundesbank.
This paper reviews the factors that will determine the shape of financial markets under EMU. It argues that financial markets will not be unified by the introduction of the euro. National central banks have a vested interest in preserving local idiosyncracies (e.g. the Wechsels in Germany) and they might be allowed to do so by promoting the use of so-called tier two assets under the common monetary policy. Moreover, a host of national regulations (prudential and fiscal) will make assets expressed in euro imperfect substitutes across borders. Prudential control will also continue to be handled differently from country to country. In the long run these national idiosyncracies cannot survive competitive pressures in the euro area. The year 1999 will thus see the beginning of a process of unification of financial markets that will be irresistible in the long run, but might still take some time to complete.
Derivatives usage in risk management by U.S. and German non-financial firms : a comparative survey
(1998)
This paper is a comparative study of the responses to the 1995 Wharton School survey of derivative usage among US non-financial firms and a 1997 companion survey on German non-financial firms. It is not a mere comparison of the results of both studies but a comparative study, drawing a comparable subsample of firms from the US study to match the sample of German firms on both size and industry composition. We find that German firms are more likely to use derivatives than US firms, with 78% of German firms using derivatives compared to 57% of US firms. Aside from this higher overall usage, the general pattern of usage across industry and size groupings is comparable across the two countries. In both countries, foreign currency derivative usage is most common, followed closely by interest rate derivatives, with commodity derivatives a distant third. Usage rates across all three classes of derivatives are higher for German firms than US firms. In contrast to the similarities, firms in the two countries differ notably on issues such as the primary goal of hedging, their choice of instruments, and the influence of their market view when taking derivative positions. These differences appear to be driven by the greater importance of financial accounting statements in Germany than the US and stricter German corporate policies of control over derivative activities within the firm. German firms also indicate significantly less concern about derivative related issues than US firms, which appears to arise from a more basic and simple strategy for using derivatives. Finally, among the derivative non-users, German firms tend to cite reasons suggesting derivatives were not needed whereas US firms tend to cite reasons suggesting a possible role for derivatives, but a hesitation to use them for some reason.
We review arguments for and against reserve requirements and conclude that the main question is whether a distinction between money creation and intermediation can be made. We argue that such a distinction can be made in a money-in-advance economy and show that if the money-in-advance constraint is universally binding then reserve requirements on checkable accounts have no effect on intermediation. We then proceed to show that in a model in which trade is uncertain and sequential, a fractional reserve banking system gives rise to endogenous monetary shocks. These endogenous monetary shocks lead to fluctuations in capacity utilisation and waste. When the moneyin-advance constraint is universally binding, a 100% reserve requirement on checkable accounts can eliminate this waste.
In this speech (given at the CFSresearch conference on the Implementation of Price Stability held at the Bundesbank Frankfurt am Main, 10. - 12. Sept 1998), John Vickers discusses theoretical and practical issues relating to inflation targeting as used in the United Kingdom doing the past six years. After outlining the role of the Bank s Monetary Policy Committee, he considers the Committee s task from a theoretical perspective, beforediscussing the concept and measurement of domestically generated inflation.
From the mid-seventies on, the central banks of most major industrial countries switched to monetary targeting. The Bundesbank was the first central bank to take this step, making the switch at the end of 1974. This changeover to monetary targeting was due to the difficulties which the Bundesbank - like other central banks - was facing in pursuing its original strategy, and whichcame to a head in the early seventies, when inflation escalated. A second factor was the collapse of the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates, which created the necessary scope for national monetary targeting. Finally, the advance of monetarist ideas fostered the explicit turn towards monetary targets, although the Bundesbank did not implement these in a mechanistic way. Whereas the Bundesbank has adhered to its policy of monetary targeting up to the present, nowadays monetary targeting plays only a minor role worldwide. Many central banks have switched to the strategy of direct inflation targeting. Others favour a more discretionary approach or a policy which is geared to the exchange rate. In the academic debate, monetary targeting is often presented as an outdated approach which has long since lost its basis of stable money demand. These findings give riseto a number of questions: Has monetary targeting actually become outdated? Which role is played by the concrete design of this strategy, and, against this background, how easily can it be transferred to European monetary union? This paper aims to answer these questions, drawing on the particular experience which the Bundesbank has gained of monetary targeting. It seems appropriate to discuss monetary targeting by using a specific example, since this notion is not very precise. This applies, for example, to the money definition used, the way the target is derived, the stringency applied in pursuing the target and the monetary management procedure.
This paper considers the desirability of the observed tendency of central banks to adjust interest rates only gradually in response to changes in economic conditions. It shows, in the context of a simple model of optimizing private-sector behavior, that such inertial behavior on the part of the central bank may indeed be optimal, in the sense of minimizing a loss function that penalizes inflation variations, deviations of output from potential, and interest-rate variability. Sluggish adjustment characterizes an optimal policy commitment, even though no such inertia would be present in the case of a reputationless (Markovian) equilibrium under discretion. Optimal interest-rate feedback rules are also characterized, and shown to involve substantial positive coefficients on lagged interest rates. This provides a theoretical explanation for the numerical results obtained by Rotemberg and Woodford (1998) in their quantitative model of the U.S. economy.
We analyze the role of different kinds of primary and secondary market interventions for the government's goal to maximize its revenues from public bond issuances. Some of these interventions can be thought of as characteristics of a "primary dealer system". After all, we see that a primary dealer system with a restricted number of participants may be useful in case of only restricted competition among sufficiently heterogeneous market makers. We further show that minimum secondary market turnover requirements for primary dealers with respect to bond sales seem to be in general more adequate than the definition of maximum bid-ask-spreads or minimum turnover requirements with respect to bond purchases. Moreover, official price management operations are not able to completely substitute for a system of primary dealers. Finally it should be noted that there is in general no reason for monetary compensations to primary dealers since they already possess some privileges with respect to public bond auction.
Since 1990, a number of countries have adopted inflation targeting as their declared monetary strategy. Interpretations of the significance of this movement, however, have differed widely. To some, inflation targeting mandates the single-minded, rule-like pursuit of price stability without regard for other policy objectives; to others, inflation targeting represents nothing more than the latest version of cheap talk by central banks unable to sustain monetary commitments. Advocates of inflation targeting, including the adopting central banks themselves, have expressed the view that the efforts at transparency and communication in the inflation targeting framework grant the central bank greater short-run flexibility in pursuit of its long-run inflation goal. This paper assesses whether the talk that inflation targeting central banks engage in matters to central bank behavior, and which interpretation of the strategy is consistent with that assessment. We identify five distinct interpretations of inflation targeting, consistent with various strands of the current literature, and identify those interpretations as movements between various strategies in a conventional model of time-inconsistency in monetary policy. The empirical implications of these interpretations are then compared to the response of central banks to movements in inflation of three countries that adopted inflation targets in the early 1990s: The United Kingdom, Canada, and New Zealand. For all three, the evidence shows a break in the behavior of inflation consistent with a strengthened commitment to price stability. In no case, however, is there evidence that the strategy entails a single-minded pursuit of the inflation target. For the U.K., the results are consistent with the successful implementation the optimal state-contingent rule, thereby combining flexibility and credibility; similarly, New Zealand's improved inflation performance was achieved without a discernable increase in counter-inflationary conservatism. The results for Canada are less clear, perhaps reflecting the broader fiscal and international developments affecting the Canadian economy during this period.
As inflation rates in the United States decline, analysts are asking if there are economic reasons to hold the rates at levels above zero. Previous studies of whether inflation "greases the wheels" of the labor market ignore inflation's potential for disrupting wage patterns in the same market. This paper outlines an institutionally-based model of wage-setting that allows the benefits of inflation (downward wage flexibility) to be separated from disruptive uncertainty about inflation rate (undue variation in relative prices). Our estimates, using a unique 40-year panel of wage changes made by large mid-western employers, suggest that low rates of inflation do help the economy to adjust to changes in labor supply and demand. However, when inflation's disruptive effects are balanced against this benefit the labor market justification for pursuing a positive long-term inflation goal effectively disappears.