Refine
Year of publication
Document Type
- Working Paper (1365)
- Part of Periodical (58)
- Report (42)
- Conference Proceeding (3)
- Article (2)
- Periodical (2)
- Book (1)
- Doctoral Thesis (1)
Language
- English (1474) (remove)
Is part of the Bibliography
- no (1474) (remove)
Keywords
- Deutschland (48)
- Geldpolitik (46)
- USA (44)
- monetary policy (40)
- Europäische Union (28)
- Monetary Policy (26)
- Schätzung (24)
- Bank (21)
- Risikokapital (19)
- Venture Capital (19)
Institute
- Center for Financial Studies (CFS) (1474) (remove)
The economic rise of China has changed the global economy. The authors explore China’s transformation from a low-cost manufacturing hub to an increasingly innovation- and service-driven economy. Major growth drivers for the period 2010-2025 are analysed, including the paradigms of “Made in China” and the “Dual Circulation Strategy”. The export intensity of China’s economy is declining overall, with a tendency towards greater regional diversification and a gradual decoupling from North America and the European Union. At the same time, trade and investment activities are increasingly geared to the Belt and Road Initiative. Furthermore, labour and energy cost advantages for manufacturing operations in China are likely to diminish in the coming years, calling into question China’s attractiveness as a global manufacturing hub. In this regard, the further development of regional and industrial clusters is pivotal for China to enhance its global competitiveness and remain an attractive destination for foreign direct investment (FDI) in the medium term. On the other hand, high productivity in science and technology and rich deposits of critical minerals put China in a favourable position in advanced industries. Important challenges include the still wide development gap between rural and urban areas, the structural mismatch in the labour market, with persistently high youth unemployment, and the race to achieve carbon neutrality by 2060.
The Federal Reserve has been publishing federal funds rate prescriptions from Taylor rules in its Monetary Policy Report since 2017. The signals from the rules aligned with Fed action on many occasions, but in some cases the Fed opted for a different route. This paper reviews the implications of the rules during the coronavirus pandemic and the subsequent inflation surge and derives projections for the future.
In 2020, the Fed took the negative prescribed rates, which were far below the effective lower bound on the nominal interest rate, as support for extensive and long-lasting quantitative easing. Yet, the calculations overstate the extent of the constraint, because they neglect the supply side effects of the pandemic.
The paper proposes a simple model-based adjustment to the resource gap used by the rules for 2020. In 2021, the rules clearly signaled the need for tightening because of the rise of inflation, yet the Fed waited until spring 2022 to raise the federal funds rate. With the decline of inflation over the course of 2023, the rules’ prescriptions have also come down. They fall below the actual federal funds rate target range in 2024. Several caveats concerning the projections of the interest rate prescriptions are discussed.
Almost ten years after the European Commission action plan on building a capital markets union (CMU) and despite incremental progress, e.g. in the form of the EU Listing Act, the picture looks dire. Stock exchanges, securities markets, and supervisory authorities remain largely national, and, in many cases, European companies have decided to exclusively list overseas. Notwithstanding the economic and financial benefits of market integration, CMU has become a geopolitical necessity. A unified capital market can bolster resilience, strategic autonomy, and economic sovereignty, reduce dependence on external funding, and may foster economic cooperation between member states.
The reason for the persistent stand-still in Europe’s CMU development is not so much the conflict between market- and state-based integration, but rather the hesitancy of national regulatory and supervisory bodies to relinquish powers. If EU member states wanted to get real about CMU (as they say, and as they should), they need to openly accept the loss of sovereignty that follows from a true unified capital market. Building on economic as well as historical evidence, the paper offers viable proposals on how to design competent institutions within the current European framework.
This note outlines the case for speedy capital market integration and for the adoption of a common regulatory framework and single supervisory authority from a political economy perspective. We also show the alternative case for harmonization and centralization via regulatory competition, elaborating how competition between EU jurisdictions by way of full mutual recognition may lead to a (cost-)efficient and standardized legal framework for capital markets. Lastly, the note addresses the political economy conflict that underpins the implementation of both models for integrating capital markets. We point out that, in both cases, national authorities experience a loss of legislative and jurisdictional competence at the national level. We predict that any plan to foster a stronger capital market union, following an institution based or a market-based strategy, will face opposition from powerful national stakeholders.
Why do banks issue contingent convertible debt? To answer this question we study comprehensive data covering all issues by publicly traded banks in Europe of contingent convertible bonds (CoCos) that count as additional tier 1 capital (AT1). We find that banks with lower asset volatility are more likely to issue AT1 CoCos than their riskier counterparts, but that CDS spreads do not react following issue announcements. Our estimates therefore suggest that agency costs play a crucial role in banks' ability to successfully issue CoCos. The agency costs may be higher for CoCos than for equity explaining why we observe riskier or lowly capitalized banks to issue equity rather than CoCos.