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It is widely believed that the ideal board in corporations is composed almost entirely of independent (outside) directors. In contrast, this paper shows that some lack of board independence can be in the interest of shareholders. This follows because a lack of board independence serves as a substitute for commitment. Boards that are dependent on the incumbent CEO adopt a less aggressive CEO replacement rule than independent boards. While this behavior is inefficient ex post, it has positive ex ante incentive effects. The model suggests that independent boards (dependent boards) are most valuable to shareholders if the problem of providing appropriate incentives to the CEO is weak (severe).
The German corporate governance system has long been cited as the standard example of an insider-controlled and stakeholder-oriented system. We argue that despite important reforms and substantial changes of individual elements of the German corporate governance system the main characteristics of the traditional German system as a whole are still in place. However, in our opinion the changing role of the big universal banks in the governance undermines the stability of the corporate governance system in Germany. Therefore a breakdown of the traditional system leading to a control vacuum or a fundamental change to a capital market-based system could be in the offing.
In this paper, I examine the potential of mobile alerting services empowering investors to react quickly to critical market events. Therefore, an analysis of short-term (intraday) price effects is performed. I find abnormal returns to company announcements which are completed within a timeframe of minutes. To make use of these findings, these price effects are predicted using pre-defined external metrics and different estimation methodologies. Compared to previous research, the results provide support that artificial neural networks and multiple linear regression are good estimation models for forecasting price effects also on an intraday basis. As most of the price effect magnitude and effect delay can be estimated correctly, it is demonstrated how a suitable mobile alerting service combining a low level of user-intrusiveness and timely information supply can be designed.
Wie können Unternehmen bei der Auswahl von Bewerbern zukünftig besser zwischen Quantität und Qualität abwägen? Welche Wege sollten Kandidaten bei der Suche nach ihrem Wunscharbeitgeber einschlagen? Fragen, mit denen sich die Frankfurter Wirtschaftsinformatiker beschäftigen. Das Internet hat in den letzten Jahren die Personalbeschaffung erobert: Viele große und mittlere Unternehmen suchen ihr neues Personal inzwischen überwiegend auf elektronischem Weg. So lassen sich nicht nur die Kosten für das Personalmarketing deutlich reduzieren, auch die Rekrutierungszeiten werden kürzer. Doch gleichzeitig sehen sich die Unternehmen einer wachsenden Flut von Bewerbern gegenüber: Stellensuchende nutzen – verstärkt durch den Druck des Arbeitsmarkts – zunehmend die Chance, ihre Bewerbung über das Internet schnell, kostengünstig und an mehrere Unternehmen gleichzeitig elektronisch zu versenden. Um schnell die relevantesten Bewerber für ausgeschriebene Stellen zu identifizieren, benötigen die Unternehmen entsprechende Tools. Das Team um Wolfgang König und Tobias Keim erforscht innovative Lösungen.
Asset securitisation as a risk management and funding tool : what does it hold in store for SMES?
(2005)
The following chapter critically surveys the attendant benefits and drawbacks of asset securitisation on both financial institutions and firms. It also elicits salient lessons to be learned about the securitisation of SME-related obligations from a cursory review of SME securitisation in Germany as a foray of asset securitisation in a bank-centred financial system paired with a strong presence of SMEs in industrial production. JEL Classification: D81, G15, M20
As a sign of ambivalence in the regulatory definition of capital adequacy for credit risk and the quest for more efficient refinancing sources collateral loan obligations (CLOs) have become a prominent securitisation mechanism. This paper presents a loss-based asset pricing model for the valuation of constituent tranches within a CLO-style security design. The model specifically examines how tranche subordination translates securitised credit risk into investment risk of issued tranches as beneficial interests on a designated loan pool typically underlying a CLO transaction. We obtain a tranchespecific term structure from an intensity-based simulation of defaults under both robust statistical analysis and extreme value theory (EVT). Loss sharing between issuers and investors according to a simplified subordination mechanism allows issuers to decompose securitised credit risk exposures into a collection of default sensitive debt securities with divergent risk profiles and expected investor returns. Our estimation results suggest a dichotomous effect of loss cascading, with the default term structure of the most junior tranche of CLO transactions (“first loss position”) being distinctly different from that of the remaining, more senior “investor tranches”. The first loss position carries large expected loss (with high investor return) and low leverage, whereas all other tranches mainly suffer from loss volatility (unexpected loss). These findings might explain why issuers retain the most junior tranche as credit enhancement to attenuate asymmetric information between issuers and investors. At the same time, the issuer discretion in the configuration of loss subordination within particular security design might give rise to implicit investment risk in senior tranches in the event of systemic shocks. JEL Classifications: C15, C22, D82, F34, G13, G18, G20