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Using a novel dataset, we develop a structural model of the Very Large Crude Carrier (VLCC) market between the Arabian Gulf and the Far East. We study how fluctuations in oil tanker rates, oil exports, shipowner profits, and bunker fuel prices are determined by shocks to the supply and demand for oil tankers, to the utilization of tankers, and to the cost of operating tankers, including bunker fuel costs. Our analysis shows that time charter rates are largely unresponsive to tanker cost shocks. In response to higher costs, voyage profits decline, as cost shocks are only partially passed on to round-trip voyage rates. Oil exports from the Arabian Gulf also decline, reflecting lower demand for VLCCs. Positive utilization shocks are associated with higher profits, a slight increase in time charter rates and lower fuel prices and oil export volumes. Tanker supply and tanker demand shocks have persistent effects on time charter rates, round-trip voyage rates, the volume of oil exports, fuel prices, and profits with the expected sign.
A series of recent articles has called into question the validity of VAR models of the global market for crude oil. These studies seek to replace existing oil market models by structural VAR models of their own based on different data, different identifying assumptions, and a different econometric approach. Their main aim has been to revise the consensus in the literature that oil demand shocks are a more important determinant of oil price fluctuations than oil supply shocks. Substantial progress has been made in recent years in sorting out the pros and cons of the underlying econometric methodologies and data in this debate, and in separating claims that are supported by empirical evidence from claims that are not. The purpose of this paper is to take stock of the VAR literature on global oil markets and to synthesize what we have learned. Combining this evidence with new data and analysis, I make the case that the concerns regarding the existing VAR oil market literature have been overstated and that the results from these models are quite robust to changes in the model specification.
This article examines how the shale oil revolution has shaped the evolution of U.S. crude oil and gasoline prices. It puts the evolution of shale oil production into historical perspective, highlights uncertainties about future shale oil production, and cautions against the view that the U.S. may become the next Saudi Arabia. It then reviews the role of the ban on U.S. crude oil exports, of capacity constraints in refining and transporting crude oil, of differences in the quality of conventional and unconventional crude oil, and of the recent regional fragmentation of the global market for crude oil for the determination of U.S. oil and gasoline prices. It discusses the reasons for the persistent wedge between U.S. crude oil prices and global crude oil prices in recent years and for the fact that domestic oil prices below global levels need not translate to lower U.S. gasoline prices. It explains why the shale oil revolution unlike the shale gas revolution is unlikely to stimulate a boom in oil-intensive manufacturing industries. It also explores the implications of shale oil production for the transmission of oil price shocks to the U.S. economy.
This paper examines the advantages and drawbacks of alternative methods of estimating oil supply and oil demand elasticities and of incorporating this information into structural VAR models. I not only summarize the state of the literature, but also draw attention to a number of econometric problems that have been overlooked in this literature. Once these problems are recognized, seemingly conflicting conclusions in the recent literature can be resolved. My analysis reaffirms the conclusion that the one-month oil supply elasticity is close to zero, which implies that oil demand shocks are the dominant driver of the real price of oil. The focus of this paper is not only on correcting some misunderstandings in the recent literature, but on the substantive and methodological insights generated by this exchange, which are of broader interest to applied researchers.
In this study, we investigate the wealth decumulation decision from the perspective of a retiree who is averse to the prospect of fully annuitizing her accumulated savings. We field a large online survey of hypothetical product choices for phased drawdown offerings and annuities. While the demand for annuities remains low in our sample, we find significant demand for phased withdrawal products with equity-based asset allocations and flexible payout structures. Consistent with the product choice, the most important self-reported considerations for the wealth decumulation decision are low default risk in the products they purchase, the size of the withdrawal rates, and flexibility in the timing of their withdrawal. As determinants of the decision of how much wealth individuals are willing to draw down, we identify consumers’ attitudes towards future economic conditions, the extent to which they are protected against longevity risk, and their desire to leave bequests. Policy implications are discussed.
This paper examines the relationship between oil movements and systemic risk of financial institution in major petroleum-based economies. We estimate ΔCoVaR for those institutions and observe the presence of elevated increases in its levels corresponding to the subprime and global financial crises. The results provide evidence in favor of risk measurement improvements by accounting for oil returns in the risk functions. The spread between the standard CoVaR and the CoVaR that includes oil absorbs in a time range longer than the duration of the oil shock. This indicates that the drop in the oil price has a longer effect on risk and requires more time to be discounted by the financial institutions. To support the analysis, we consider also the other major market-based systemic risk measures.
Using hand-collected data on CEO appointments during shareholder activism campaigns, this study examines whether shareholder involvement in CEO recruiting affects frictions in CEO hiring decisions. The results indicate that appointments of CEOs who are recruited with shareholder activist influence are followed by more favorable stock market reactions and stronger profitability improvements than CEO appointments that also occur during activism campaigns but without the influence of activists. I find little evidence that shareholder activists increase hiring frictions by facilitating the recruiting of CEOs who will implement myopic corporate policies. Analyses of recruiting process characteristics reveal that activist influence is associated with more resources being dedicated to the CEO search process and with a higher propensity to recruit CEOs from outside the firm. These findings contribute to the CEO labor market literature, which tends to focus on the decision to remove incumbent CEOs but provides limited insights into CEO recruiting.
In recent years new methods and models have been developed to quantify credit risk on a portfolio basis. CreditMetrics (tm), CreditRisk+, CreditPortfolio (tm) are among the best known and many others are similar to them. At first glance they are quite different in their approaches and methodologies. A comparison of these models especially with regard to their applicability on typical middle market loan portfolios is in the focus of this study. The analysis shows that differences in the results of an application of the models on a certain loan portfolio is mainly due to different approaches in approximating default correlations. That is especially true for typically non-rated medium-sized counterparties. On the other hand distributional assumptions or different solution techniques in the models are more or less compatible.
We evaluate the importance of the precautionary saving motive by relying on a direct question about precautionary wealth from the 1995 and 1998 waves of the Survey of Consumer Finances. In this survey, a new question has been designed to elicit the amount of desired precautionary wealth. This allows us to assess the amount of precautionary accumulation and to overcome many of the problems of previous works on this topic. We find that a precautionary saving motive exists and affects virtually every type of household. However, precautionary savings account for only 8 percent of total wealth holdings. Even though this motive does not give rise to large amounts of wealth, particularly for young and middle-age households, it is particularly important for two groups: older households and business owners. Overall, we provide strong evidence that we need to take the precautionary saving motive into account when modeling saving behavior. Klassifizierung: D91, E21, C21
The growth and popularity of defined contribution pensions, along with the government’s increasing attention to retirement plan costs and investment choices provided, make it important to understand how people select their retirement plan investments. This paper shows how employees in a large firm altered their fund allocations when the employer streamlined its pension fund menu and deleted nearly half of the offered funds. Using administrative data, we examine the changes in plan participant investment choices that resulted from the streamlining and how these changes might affect participants’ eventual retirement wellbeing. We show that streamlined participants’ new allocations exhibited significantly lower within-fund turnover rates and expense ratios, and we estimate this could lead to aggregate savings for these participants over a 20-year period of $20.2M, or in excess of $9,400 per participant. Moreover, after the reform, streamlined participants’ portfolios held significantly less equity and exhibited significantly lower risks by way of reduced exposures to most systematic risk factors, compared to their non-streamlined counterparts.