Refine
Year of publication
Document Type
- Working Paper (1458)
- Report (77)
- Part of Periodical (58)
- Article (9)
- Conference Proceeding (3)
- Periodical (3)
- Book (1)
- Doctoral Thesis (1)
Is part of the Bibliography
- no (1610)
Keywords
- Deutschland (54)
- Geldpolitik (54)
- USA (45)
- monetary policy (41)
- Europäische Union (30)
- Monetary Policy (26)
- Schätzung (24)
- Währungsunion (22)
- Bank (21)
- Venture Capital (21)
Institute
- Center for Financial Studies (CFS) (1610) (remove)
Financial innovation is, as usual, faster than regulation. New forms of speculation and intermediation are rapidly emerging. Largely as a result of the evaporation of trust in financial intermediation, an exponentially increasing role is being played by the so-called peer to peer intermediation. The most prominent example at the moment is Bitcoin.
If one expects that shocks in these markets could destabilize also traditional financial markets, then it will be necessary to extend regulatory measures also to these innovations.
This article discusses the recent proposal for debt restructuring in the euro zone by Pierre Paris and Charles Wyplosz. It argues that the plan cannot realize the promised debt relief without producing moral hazard. Ester Faia revisits the Redemption Fund proposed in November 2011 by the German Council of Economic Experts and argues that this plan, up to date, still remains the most promising path towards succesful debt restructuring in Europe.
Social impact bonds are a special type of bond whose purpose is to provide long term funds to projects with a social impact. Especially in the UK and in the US these bonds are increasingly being used to raise funds to finance government projects. Their return depends on the social improvements achieved. Especially in times of crisis, governments lack funds to prevent the social consequences of recessions. Faia argues that the European Union should develop an equivalent to the British Social Finance Ltd. to finance projects for social improvement.
How people form beliefs is crucial for understanding decision-making un- der uncertainty. This is particularly true in a situation such as a pandemic, where beliefs will affect behaviors that impact public health as well as the aggregate economy. We conduct two survey experiments to shed light on potential biases in belief formation, focusing in particular on the tone of information people choose to consume and how they incorporate this information into their beliefs. In the first experiment, people express their preferences over pandemic-related articles with optimistic and pessimistic headlines, and are then randomly shown one of the articles. We find that respondents with more pessimistic prior beliefs about the pandemic are substantially more likely to prefer pessimistic articles, which we interpret as evidence of confirmation bias. In line with this, respondents assigned to the less preferred article rate it as less reliable and informative (relative to those who prefer it); they also discount information from the article when it is less preferred. We further find that these motivated beliefs end up impacting incentivized behavior. In a second experiment, we study how partisan views interact with information selection and processing. We find strong evidence of source dependence: revealing the news source further distorts information acquisition and processing, eliminating the role of prior beliefs in article choice.
This paper presents causal evidence of the effects of boardroom networks on firm value. We exploit exogenous variation in network centrality arising from a ban on interlocking directorates of Italian financial and insurance companies. We leverage this shock to show that firms that become more central in the network as a result of the shock experience positive abnormal returns around the announcement date. We find that information dissemination plays a central role: results are driven by firms that have higher idiosyncratic volatility, low analyst coverage, and more uncertainty surrounding their earnings forecasts. We also find that firms benefit more from boardroom centrality when they are more central in the input-output network, as this reinforces information complementarities, or when they are less central in the cross-ownership network, as well as when they suffer from low profitability and low growth opportunities. Network centrality also results in higher compensation for board directors.
We analyze welfare maximizing monetary policy in a dynamic two-country model with price stickiness and imperfect competition. In this context, a typical terms of trade externality affects policy interaction between independent monetary authorities. Unlike the existing literature, we remain consistent to a public finance approach by an explicit consideration of all the distortions that are relevant to the Ramsey planner. This strategy entails two main advantages. First, it allows an accurate characterization of optimal policy in an economy that evolves around a steady-state which is not necessarily efficient. Second, it allows to describe a full range of alternative dynamic equilibria when price setters in both countries are completely forward-looking and households' preferences are not restricted. In this context, we study optimal policy both in the long-run and along a dynamic path, and we compare optimal commitment policy under Nash competition and under cooperation. By deriving a second order accurate solution to the policy functions, we also characterize the welfare gains from international policy cooperation. Klassifikation: E52, F41 . This version: January, 2004. First draft: October 2003 .
Using a unique confidential contract level dataset merged with firm-level asset price data, we find robust evidence that firms' stock market valuations and employment levels respond more to monetary policy announcements the higher the degree of wage rigidity. Data on the renegotiations of collective bargaining agreements allow us to construct an exogenous measure of wage rigidity. We also find that the amplification induced by wage rigidity is stronger for firms with high labor intensity and low profitability, providing evidence of distributional consequences of monetary policy. We rationalize the evidence through a model in which firms in different sectors feature different degrees of wage rigidity due to staggered renegotiations vis-a-vis unions.
Most recent regulations establish that resolution of global banking groups shall be done according to bail-in procedures and following a Single Point of Entry (SPE) as opposed to a Multiple Point of Entry (MPE) approach. The latter requires parent holding of global groups to put up front the equity capital needed to absorb losses possibly emerging in foreign subsidiaries-branches. No model rationalized so far such resolution regime. We build a model of optimal design of resolution regimes and compare three regimes: SPE with cooperative authorities, SPE with non-cooperative authorities and MPE (ring-fencing). We find that the costs for bondholders of bail-inable instruments is generally higher under noncooperative regimes and ring-fencing. We also find that in those cases banks have ex ante incentives to reduce their exposure in foreign assets. We also examine recent case studies that help us rationalize the model results.
To ensure the credibility of market discipline induced by bail-in, neither retail investors nor peer banks should appear prominently among the investor base of banks’ loss absorbing capital. Empirical evidence on bank-level data provided by the German Federal Financial Supervisory Authority raises a few red flags. Our list of policy recommendations encompasses disclosure policy, data sharing among supervisors, information transparency on holdings of bail-inable debt for all stakeholders, threshold values, and a well-defined upper limit for any bail-in activity. This document was provided by the Economic Governance Support Unit at the request of the ECON Committee.
In this paper we argue that the own findings of the SSM THEMATIC REVIEW ON PROFITABILITY AND BUSINESS MODEL and the academic literature on bank profitability do not provide support for the business model approach of supervisory guidance. We discuss in the paper several reasons why the regulator should stay away from intervening in management practices. We conclude that by taking the role of a coach instead of a referee, the supervisor generates a hazard for financial stability.
We study money creation and destruction in today’s monetary architecture and examine the impact of monetary policy and capital regulation in a general equilibrium setting. There are two types of money created and destructed: bank deposits, when banks grant loans to firms or to other banks and central bank money, when the central bank grants loans to private banks. We show that equilibria yield the first-best level of money creation and lending when prices are flexible, regardless of the monetary policy or capital regulation. When prices are rigid, we identify the circumstances in which money creation is excessive or breaks down and the ones in which an adequate combination of monetary policy and capital regulation can restore efficiency.
We establish a benchmark result for the relationship between the loanable funds and the money-creation approach to banking. In particular, we show that both processes yield the same allocations when there is no uncertainty and thus no bank default. In such cases, using the much simpler loanable funds approach as a shortcut does not imply any loss of generality.
A theory of the boundaries of banks with implications for financial integration and regulation
(2015)
We offer a theory of the "boundary of the
rm" that is tailored to banking, as it builds on a single ine¢ ciency arising from risk-shifting and as it takes into account both interbank lending as an alternative to integration and the role of possibly insured deposit funding. Amongst others, it explains both why deeper economic integration should cause also greater financial integration through both bank mergers and interbank lending, albeit this typically remains ine¢ ciently incomplete, and why economic disintegration (or "desychronization"), as currently witnessed in the European Union, should cause less interbank exposure. It also suggests that recent policy measures such as the preferential treatment of retail deposits, the extension of deposit insurance, or penalties on "connectedness" could all lead to substantial welfare losses.
The Basel Committee plans to differentiate risk-adjusted capital requirements between banks regulated under the internal ratings based (IRB) approach and banks under the standard approach. We investigate the consequences for the lending capacity and the failure risk of banks in a model with endogenous interest rates. The optimal regulatory response depends on the banks' inclination to increase their portfolio risk. If IRB-banks are well-capitalized or gain little from taking risks, then they will increase their market share and hold safe portfolios. As risk-taking incentives become more important, the optimal portfolio size of banks adopting intern rating systems will be increasingly constrained, and ultimately they may lose market share relative to banks using the standard approach. The regulator has only limited options to avoid the excessive adoption of internal rating systems. JEL Klassifikation: K13, H41.
This paper examines whether an exogenous anticipated monetary shock causes real economic effects, i.e. whether anticipated money is neutral. A major finding is that an anticipated monetary shock can in fact be massively non-neutral in the shortrun, if the economic environment is characterized by strategic complementarity. If the environment is characterized by strategic substitutability, anticipated monetary shocks are largely neutral.
Die vorliegende empirische Studie analysiert die Vertragsgestaltung zwischen Investoren und europäischen Venture Capital-Fonds. Im Zentrum steht die Analyse der Vergütung des Fondsmanagements sowie der zum Einsatz kommenden Vertragsklauseln. Deren Ausgestaltung ist entscheidend für die Überwindung der Prinzipal-Agenten-Beziehung innewohnenden Agency-Probleme. Hierzu werden 122 Fondsprospekte sowie 46 Gesellschafterverträge von europäischen Venture Capital-Fonds ausgewertet, die in den Jahren 1996 bis 2001, der ersten großen Boomphase des europäischen Venture Capital-Marktes, aufgelegt wurden. Während die jährliche Vergütung des Fondsmanagements auf den ersten Blick sehr standardisiert erscheint, ergeben sich bei einer Barwertbetrachtung aller zu leistenden Management Fees über die gesamte Fondslaufzeit deutliche Anzeichen für Preisdifferenzierung. In Bezug auf den Einsatz von Vertragsklauseln kann eine Zunahme im Zeitablauf und mithin eine zunehmende Komplexität des Vertragsdesigns festgestellt werden. Vor dem Hintergrund der Erfahrungen aus dem US-amerikanischen Venture Capital-Markt kann diese Entwicklung jedoch noch nicht als abgeschlossen gelten. Der europäische Markt bewegt sich in Bezug auf die Verwendung vertraglicher Restriktionen auf dem Niveau, das in den USA bereits Anfang der neunziger Jahre erreicht war.
We use the Italian Survey of Household Income and Wealth, a rather unique dataset with a long time dimension of panel information on consumption, income and wealth, to structurally estimate a buffer-stock saving model. We exploit the information contained in the joint dynamics of income, consumption and wealth to quantify the degree of insurance against income risk. The estimated model implies that Italian households can insure between 89 and 95 percent of a transitory and between 7 and 9 percent of a permanent income shock. Compared to existing empirical estimates for the same dataset, our findings suggest that Italian households do not have access to significant insurance beyond self-insurance.
The overvaluation hypothesis (Miller 1977) predicts that a) stocks are overvalued in the presence of short selling restrictions and that b) the overvaluation increases in the degree of divergence of opinion. We design an experiment that allows us to test these predictions in the laboratory. The results indicate that prices are higher with short selling constraints, but the overvaluation does not increase in the degree of divergence of opinion. We further find that trading volume is lower and bid-ask spreads are higher when short sale restrictions are imposed. JEL Classification: C92, G14 Keywords: Overvaluation Hypothesis , Short Selling Constraints , Divergence of Opinion
Reliability and relevance of fair values : private equity investments and investee fundamentals
(2018)
We directly test the reliability and relevance of fair values reported by listed private equity firms (LPEs), where the unit of account for fair value measurement attribute (FVM) is an investment stake in an individual investee company. FVMs are observable for multiple investment stakes, fair values are economically important, and granular data on investee economic fundamentals that should underpin fair values are available in public disclosures. We find that LPE fund managers determine valuations based on accounting-based fundamentals—equity book value and net income—that are in line with those investors derive for listed companies. Additionally, our findings suggest that LPE fund managers apply a lower valuation weight to investee net income if direct market inputs are unobservable during investment value estimation. We interpret these findings as evidence that LPE fund managers do not appear mechanically to apply market valuation weights for publicly traded investees when determining valuations of non-listed. We also document that the judgments that LPE fund managers apply when determining investee valuations appear to be perceived as reliable by their investors.
We find and describe four futures markets where the bid-ask spread is bid down to the fixed price tick size practically all the time, and which match counterparties using a pro-rata rule. These four markets´ offered depths at the quotes on average exceed mean market order size by two orders of magnitude, and their order cancellation rates (the probability of any given offered lot being cancelled) are significantly over 96 per cent. We develop a simple theoretical model to ex- plain these facts, where strategic complementarities in the choice of limit order size cause traders to risk overtrading by submitting over-sized limit orders, most of which they expect to cancel.
Highly interconnected global supply chains make countries vulnerable to supply chain disruptions. The authors estimate the macroeconomic effects of global supply chain shocks for the euro area. Their empirical model combines business cycle variables with data from international container trade.
Using a novel identification scheme, they augment conventional sign restrictions on the impulse responses by narrative information about three episodes: the Tohoku earthquake in 2011, the Suez Canal obstruction in 2021, and the Shanghai backlog in 2022. They show that a global supply chain shock causes a drop in euro area real economic activity and a strong increase in consumer prices. Over a horizon of one year, the global supply chain shock explains about 30% of inflation dynamics. They also use regional data on supply chain pressure to isolate shocks originating in China.
Their results show that supply chain disruptions originating in China are an important driver for unexpected movements in industrial production, while disruptions originating outside China are an especially important driver for the dynamics of consumer prices.
When the COVID-19 crisis struck, banks using internal-rating based (IRB) models quickly recognized the increase in risk and reduced lending more than banks using a standardized approach. This effect is not driven by borrowers’ quality or by banks in countries with credit booms before the pandemic. The higher risk sensitivity of IRB models does not always result in lower credit provision when risk intensifies. Certain features of the IRB models – the use of a downturn Loss Given Default parameter – can increase banks’ resilience and preserve their intermediation capacity also during downturns. Affected borrowers were not able to fully insulate and decreased corporate investments.
Since the 2008 financial crisis, in which the Reserve Primary Fund “broke the buck,” money market funds (MMFs) have been the subject of ongoing policy debate. Many commentators view MMFs as a key contributor to the crisis because widespread redemption demands during the days following the Lehman bankruptcy contributed to a freeze in the credit markets. In response, MMFs were deemed a component of the nefarious shadow banking industry and targeted for regulatory reform. The Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) misguided 2014 reforms responded by potentially exacerbating MMF fragility while potentially crippling large segments of the MMF industry.
Determining the appropriate approach to MMF reform has been difficult. Banks regulators supported requiring MMFs to trade at a floating net asset value (NAV) rather than a stable $1 share price. By definition, a floating NAV prevents MMFs from breaking the buck but is unlikely to eliminate the risk of large redemptions in a time of crisis. Other reform proposals have similar shortcomings. More fundamentally, the SEC’s reforms may substantially reduce the utility of MMFs for many investors, which could, in turn, affect the availability of short term credit.
The shape of MMF reform has been influenced by a turf war among regulators as the SEC has battled with bank regulators both about the need for additional reforms and about the structure and timing of those reforms. Bank regulators have been influential in shaping the terms of the debate by using banking rhetoric to frame the narrative of MMF fragility. This rhetoric masks a critical difference between banks and MMFs – asset segregation. Unlike banks, MMF sponsors have assets and operations that are separate from the assets of the MMF itself. This difference has caused the SEC to mistake sponsor support as a weakness rather than a key stability-enhancing feature. As a result, the SEC mistakenly adopted reforms that burden sponsor support instead of encouraging it.
As this article explains, required sponsor support offers a novel and simple regulatory solution to MMF fragility. Accordingly this article proposes that the SEC require MMF sponsors explicitly to guarantee the $1 share price. Taking sponsor support out of the shadows embraces rather than ignores the advantage that MMFs offer over banks through asset partitioning. At the same time, sponsor support harnesses market discipline as a constraint against MMF risk-taking and moral hazard.
Event studies have become increasingly important in securities fraud litigation after the Supreme Court’s decision in Halliburton II. Litigants have used event study methodology, which empirically analyzes the relationship between the disclosure of corporate information and the issuer’s stock price, to provide evidence in the evaluation of key elements of federal securities fraud, including materiality, reliance, causation, and damages. As the use of event studies grows and they increasingly serve a gatekeeping function in determining whether litigation will proceed beyond a preliminary stage, it will be critical for courts to use them correctly.
This Article explores an array of considerations related to the use of event studies in securities fraud litigation. It starts by describing the basic function of the event study: to determine whether a highly unusual price movement has occurred and the traditional statistical approach to making that determination. The Article goes on to identify special features of securities fraud litigation that distinguish litigation from the scholarly context in which event studies were developed. The Article highlights the fact that the standard approach can lead to the wrong conclusion and describes the adjustments necessary to address the litigation context. We use the example of six dates in the Halliburton litigation to illustrate these points.
Finally, the Article highlights the limitations of event studies – what they can and cannot prove – and explains how those limitations relate to the legal issues for which they are introduced. These limitations bear upon important normative questions about the role event studies should play in securities fraud litigation.
There is mounting evidence that retail investors make predictable, costly investment mistakes, including underinvestment, naïve diversification, and payment of excessive fund fees. Over the past thirty-five years, however, participant-directed 401(k) plans have largely replaced professionally managed pension plans, requiring unsophisticated retail investors to navigate the financial markets themselves. Policy-makers have struggled with regulatory interventions designed to improve the quality of investment decisions without a clear understanding of the reasons for investor mistakes. Absent such an understanding, it is difficult to design effective regulatory responses. This article offers a first step in understanding the investor decision-making process. We use an internet-based experiment to disentangle possible explanations for inefficient investment decisions. The experiment employs a simplified construct of an employee’s allocation among the options in a retirement plan coupled with technology that enables us to collect data on the specific information that investors choose to view. In addition to collecting general information about the process by which investors choose among mutual fund options, we employ an experimental manipulation to test the effect of an instruction on the importance of mutual fund fees. Pairing this instruction with simplified fee disclosure allows us to distinguish between motivation-limits and cognition-limits as explanations for the widespread findings that investors ignore fees in their investment decisions. Our results offer partial but limited grounds for optimism. On the one hand, within our simplified experimental construct, our subjects allocated more money, on average, to higher-value funds. Furthermore, subjects who received the fees instruction paid closer attention to mutual fund fees and allocated their investments into funds with lower fees. On the other hand, the effects of even a blunt fees instruction were limited, and investors were unable to identify and avoid clearly inferior fund options. In addition, our results suggest that excessive, naïve diversification strategies are driving many investment decisions. Although our findings are preliminary, they suggest valuable avenues for future research and important implications for regulation of retail investing.
The dramatic shift from traditional pension plans to participant-directed 401(k) plans has increased the decision-making responsibility of individual investors for their own retirement planning. With this shift comes increasing evidence that investors are making poor decisions in choosing how much to save for retirement and in selecting among their investment options. Studies question the value of efforts to improve these decisions through regulatory reforms or investor education.
This article posits that deficiencies in workplace retirement savings cannot be adequately addressed until the reasons for poor investment decisions are better understood. We report the results of an exploratory study that asked subjects to complete a simulated retirement investment task and collected information about their financial knowledge and preferences. The study enabled us to measure financial literacy and evaluate its relationship to retirement investment decision-making. In line with existing research, we found a strong relationship between financial literacy and successful retirement investing. Our results suggest, however, that the relevant understanding in this context is not about math so much as it is a basic knowledge of the relative costs and benefits of the major investment categories. Finally, we present results suggesting that financial literacy is separate from investment preferences — specifically, that tolerance for risk is a separate and highly predictive variable in estimating retirement planning success.
Our research suggests that individual employees are likely to lack the skills necessary to support the current regulatory model of participant-directed retirement investing. The structure and regulation of retirement plans ought to take this fact seriously. We explore the potential for investor education and professional advice, respectively, to overcome the limitations of individualized choice.
In Germany a public discussion on the "power of banks" has been going on for decades now with power having at least two meanings. On the one hand it is the power of banks to control public corporations through direct shareholdings or the exercise of proxy votes - this is the power of banks in corporate control. On the other hand it is market power - due to imperfect competition in markets for financial services - that banks exercise vis-à-vis their loan and deposit customers. In the past, bank regulation has often been blamed to undermine competition and the working of market forces in the financial industry for the sake of soundness and stability of financial services firms. This chapter tries to shed some light on the historical development and current state of bank regulation in Germany. In so doing it tries to embed the analysis of bank regulation into a more general industrial organisation framework. For every regulated industry, competition and regulation are deeply interrelated as most regulatory institutions - even if they do not explicitly address the competitiveness of the market - either affect market structure or conduct. This paper tries to uncover some of the specific relationships between monetary policy, government interference and bank regulation on the one hand and bank market structure and economic performance on the other. In so doing we hope to point to several areas for fruitful research in the future. While our focus is on Germany, some of the questions that we raise and some of our insights might also be applicable to banking systems elsewhere. Revised version forthcoming in "The German Financial System", edited by Jan P. Krahnen and Reinhard H. Schmidt, Oxford University Press.
Central banks sowing the seeds for a green financial sector? NGFS membership and market reactions
(2024)
In December 2017, during the One Planet Summit in Paris, a group of eight central banks and supervisory authorities launched the “Network for Greening the Financial Sector” (NGFS) to address challenges and risks posed by climate change to the global financial system. Until 06/2023 an additional 69 central banks from all around the world have joined the network. We find that the propensity to join the network can be described as a function in the country’s economic development (e.g., GDP per capita), national institutions (e.g., central bank independence), and performance of the central bank on its mandates (e.g., price stability and output gap). Using an event study design to examine consequences of network expansions in capital markets, we document that a difference portfolio that is long in clean energy stocks and short in fossil fuel stocks benefits from an enlargement of the NGFS. Overall, our results suggest that an increasing number of central banks and supervisory authorities are concerned about climate change and willing to go beyond their traditional objectives, and that the capital market believes they will do so.
Managed portfolios that exploit positive first-order autocorrelation in monthly excess returns of equity factor portfolios produce large alphas and gains in Sharpe ratios. We document this finding for factor portfolios formed on the broad market, size, value, momentum, investment, prof- itability, and volatility. The value-added induced by factor management via short-term momentum is a robust empirical phenomenon that survives transaction costs and carries over to multi-factor portfolios. The novel strategy established in this work compares favorably to well-known timing strategies that employ e.g. factor volatility or factor valuation. For the majority of factors, our strategies appear successful especially in recessions and times of crisis.
Short sale bans may improve market quality during crises: new evidence from the 2020 Covid crash
(2022)
In theory, banning short selling stabilizes stock prices but undermines pricing efficiency and has ambiguous impacts on market liquidity. Empirical studies find mixed and conflicting results. This paper leverages cross-country policy variation during the 2020 Covid crisis to assess differential impacts of bans on stock liquidity, prices, and volatility. Results suggest that bans improved liquidity and stabilized prices for illiquid stocks but temporarily diminished liquidity for highly liquid stocks.The findings support theories in which short sale bans may improve liquidity by selectively filtering out informed— potentially predatory—traders. Thus, policies that target the most illiquid stocks may deliver better overall market quality than uniform short sale bans imposed on all stocks.
Over the life-cycle, wealth holdings tend to be highest in the early part of retirement. The quality of financial decisions among older adults is therefore an important determinant of their financial security during the asset drawdown phase. This paper assesses how financial literacy shapes financial decision-making at older ages. We devised a special module in the Singapore Life Panel survey to measure financial literacy to study its relationship with three aspects of household financial and investment behaviors: credit card debt repayment, stock market participation, and adherence to age-based investment glide paths. We found that the majority of respondents age 50+ has some grasp of concepts such as interest compounding and inflation, but fewer know about risk diversification. We provide evidence of a statistically significant positive association between financial literacy and each of the three aspects of suboptimal financial decision-making, controlling for many other factors, including education. A one-unit increase in the financial literacy score was associated with an 8.3 percentage point greater propensity to hold stocks, and a 1.7 percentage point higher likelihood of following an age-appropriate investment glide path. The financial literacy score is only weakly positively linked with timely credit card balance repayment, both in terms of statistical significance and estimate size.
Relying on a perspective borrowed from monetary policy announcements and introducing an econometric twist in the traditional event study analysis, we document the existence of an .event risk transfer., namely a significant credit risk transmission from the sovereign to the corporate sector after a sovereign rating downgrade. We find that after the delivery of the downgrade, corporate CDS spreads rise by 36% per annum and there is a widespread contagion across countries, in particular among those which were most exposed to the sovereign debt crisis. This effect exists on top of the standard relation between sovereign and corporate credit risk.
The Capital Markets Union-project of the European Commission aims for an increase of marketbased debt financing of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), complementing bank lending. In this essay we argue that rather than focussing on pure non-bank lending, a reasonable mix of bankand market-based financing should be considered. Banks are said to have a comparative advantage in critical lending functions such as credit screening, debtor monitoring and debt renegotiation. All forms of lending require a persistent skin-in-the-game of critical players in order to be effective. The regulator should insist on full disclosure of skin-in-the-game, thereby improving capital allocation and reducing systemic risks.
Wir halten das bisher in Deutschland und anderen Ländern praktizierte Krisenmanagement für ordnungspolitisch inakzeptabel. Die aktuelle Notlage 2007 und 2008, verbunden mit einem enormen Überraschungsmoment, ließ möglicherweise keine andere Wahl, als die betroffenen Banken unbürokratisch zu retten - aber nun ist es Zeit, grundlegende Lehren aus den Rettungsaktionen zu ziehen.
The future of securitization
(2008)
Securitization is a financial innovation that experiences a boom-bust cycle, as many other innovations before. This paper analyzes possible reasons for the breakdown of primary and secondary securitization markets, and argues that misaligned incentives along the value chain are the primary cause of the problems. The illiquidity of asset and interbank markets, in this view, is a market failure derived from ill-designed mechanisms of coordinating financial intermediaries and investors. Thus, illiquidity is closely related to the design of the financial chains. Our policy conclusions emphasize crisis prevention rather than crisis management, and the objective is to restore a “comprehensive incentive alignment”. The toe-hold for strengthening regulation is surprisingly small. First, we emphasize the importance of equity piece retention for the long-term quality of the underlying asset pool. As a consequence, equity piece allocation needs to be publicly known, alleviating market pricing. Second, on a micro level, accountability of managers can be improved by compensation packages aiming at long term incentives, and penalizing policies with destabilizing effects on financial markets. Third, on a macro level, increased transparency relating to effective risk transfer, risk-related management compensation, and credible measurement of rating performance stabilizes the valuation of financial assets and, hence, improves the solvency of financial intermediaries. Fourth, financial intermediaries, whose risk is opaque, may be subjected to higher capital requirements.
Default risk sharing between banks and markets : the contribution of collateralized debt obligations
(2005)
This paper contributes to the economics of financial institutions risk management by exploring how loan securitization a.ects their default risk, their systematic risk, and their stock prices. In a typical CDO transaction a bank retains through a first loss piece a very high proportion of the expected default losses, and transfers only the extreme losses to other market participants. The size of the first loss piece is largely driven by the average default probability of the securitized assets. If the bank sells loans in a true sale transaction, it may use the proceeds to to expand its loan business, thereby incurring more systematic risk. We find an increase of the banks' betas, but no significant stock price e.ect around the announcement of a CDO issue. Our results suggest a role for supervisory requirements in stabilizing the financial system, related to transparency of tranche allocation, and to regulatory treatment of senior tranches. JEL Klassifikation: D82, G21, D74 .
This essay reviews a cornerstone of the European Banking Union project, the resolution of systemically important banks. The focus is on the inherent conflict between a possible intervention by resolution authorities, conditional on a crisis situation, and effective prevention prior to a crisis. Moreover, the paper discusses the rules for bail-in debt and conversion rules for different layers of debt. Finally, some organizational requirements to achieve effective resolution results will be analyzed.
Mis-selling by banks has occurred repeatedly in many nations over the last decade. While clients may benefit from competition – enabling them to choose financial services at lowest costs – economic frictions between banks and clients may give rise to mis-selling. Examples of mis-selling are mis-representation of information, overly complex product design and non-customized advice. European regulators address the problem of mis-selling in the "Markets in Financial Instruments Directive" (MiFID) I and II and the "Markets in Financial Instruments Regulation" (MiFIR), by setting behavioral requirements for banks, regulating the compensation of employees, and imposing re-quirements on offered financial products and disclosure rules.
This paper argues that MiFID II protects clients but is not as effective as it could be. (1) It does not differentiate between client groups with different levels of financial literacy. Effective advice requires different advice for different client groups. (2) MiFID II uses too many rules and too many instruments to achieve identical goals and thereby generates excessive compliance costs. High compliance costs and low revenues would drive banks out of some segments of retail business.
Resolving financial distress where property rights are not clearly defined: the case of China
(2022)
We use data on financially distressed Chinese companies in order to study a debt market where property rights are crudely defined and poorly enforced. To help with identification we use an event where a business-friendly province published new guidelines regarding the administration and enforcement of assets pledged as collateral. Although by no means a comprehensive reform of bankruptcy law or property rights, by instructing courts to enforce existing, albeit rudimentary, contractual rights the new guidelines virtually eliminated creditors runs and produced a sharp increase in the survival rate of financially-distressed companies. These changes illustrate how piecemeal reforms of property rights and their enforcement may have a significant impact on economic outcomes. Our analysis and results challenge the view that a fully fledged system of private property is a precondition for economic development.
This paper analyzes a comprehensive data set of 108 non venture-backed, 58 venture-backed and 33 bridge financed companies going public at Germany s Neuer Markt between March 1997 and March 2000. I examine whether these three types of issues differ with regard to issuer characteristics, balance sheet data or offering characteristics. Moreover, this empirical study contributes to the underpricing literature by focusing on the complementary or rather competing role of venture capitalists and underwriters in certifying the quality of a company when going public. Companies backed by a prestigious venture capitalist and/or underwritten by a top bank are expected to show less underpricing at the initial public offering (IPO) due to a reduced ex-ante uncertainty. This study provides evidence to the contrary: VC-backed IPOs appear to be more underpriced than non VCbacked IPOs.
This paper analyzes a comprehensive data set of 160 non venture-backed, 79 venture-backed and 61 bridge financed companies going public at Germany´s Neuer Markt between March 1997 and March 2002. I examine whether these three types of issues differ with regard to issuer characteristics, balance sheet data or offering characteristics. Moreover, this empirical study contributes to the underpricing literature by focusing on the complementary or rather competing role of venture capitalists and underwriters in certifying the quality of a company when going public. Companies backed by a prestigious venture capitalist and/or underwritten by a top bank are expected to show less underpricing at the initial public offering (IPO) due to a reduced ex-ante uncertainty. This analysis provides evidence to the contrary: VC-backed IPOs appear to be more underpriced than non VC-backed IPOs.
Over-allotment arrangements are nowadays part of almost any initial public offering. The underwriting banks borrow stocks from the previous shareholders to issue more than the initially announced number of shares. This is combined with the option to cover this short position at the issue price. We present empirical evidence on the value of these arrangements to the underwriters of initial public offerings on the Neuer Markt. The over-allotment arrangement is regarded as a portfolio of a long call option and a short position in a forward contract on the stock, which is different from other approaches presented in the literature.
Given the economically substantial values for these option- like claims we try to identify benefits to previous shareholders or new investors when the company is using this instrument in the process of going public. Although we carefully control for potential endogeneity problems, we find virtually no evidence for a reduction in underpricing for firms using over-allotment arrangements. Furthermore, we do not find evidence for more pronounced price stabilization activities or better aftermarket performance for firms granting an over-allotment arrangement to the underwriting banks.
EFM Classification: 230, 410
Over-allotment arrangements are nowadays part of almost any initial public offering. The underwriting banks borrow stocks from the previous shareholders to issue more than the initially announced number of shares. This is combined with the option to cover this short position at the issue price. We present empirical evidence on the value of these arrangements to the underwriters of initial public offerings on the Neuer Markt. The over-allotment arrangement is regarded as a portfolio of a long call option and a short position in a forward contract on the stock, which is different from other approaches presented in the literature. Given the economically substantial values for these option-like claims we try to identify benefits to previous shareholders or new investors when the company is using this instrument in the process of going public. Although we carefully control for potential endogeneity problems, we find virtually no evidence for a reduction in underpricing for firms using over-allotment arrangements. Furthermore, we do not find evidence for more pronounced price stabilization activities or better aftermarket performance for firms granting an over-allotment arrangement to the underwriting banks.
We present a survey on the role of initial public offerings (Epos) and venture capital (VC) in Germany after the Second World War. Between 1945 and 1983 IPOs hardly played a role at all and only a minor role thereafter. In addition, companies that chose an IPO were much older and larger than the average companies going public for the first time in the US or the UK. The level of IPO underpricing in Germany, in contrast, has not been fundamentally different from that in other countries. The picture for venture capital financing is not much different from that provided by IPOs in Germany. For a long time venture capital financing was hardly significant, particularly as a source of early stage financing. The unprecedented boom on the Neuer Markt between 1997 and 2000, when many small venture capital financed firms entered the market, provides a striking contrast to the preceding era. However, by US standards, the levels of both IPO and venture capital activities remained rather low even in this boom phase. The extent to which recent developments will have a lasting impact on the financing of German firms, the level of IPO activity, and venture capital financing, remains to be seen. At the time of writing, activity has come to a near stand still and the Neuer Markt has just been dissolved. The low number of IPOs and the fairly low volume of VC financing in Germany before the introduction of the Neuer Markt are a striking and much debated phenomenon. Understanding the reasons for these apparent peculiarities is vital to understanding the German financial system. The potential explanations that have been put forward range from differentces in mentality to legal and institutional impediments and the availability of alternative sources of financing. Moreover the recent literature discusses how interest groups may have benefited and influenced the situation. These groups include politicians, unions/workers, managers/controlling-owners of established firms as well as banks. Revised version forthcoming in "The German Financial System", edited by Jan P. Krahnen and Reinhard H. Schmidt, Oxford University Press.
The eurozone remains in a deep, largely macro-economic crisis. A robust global economy and falling oil prices have supported Europe’s economy for some time, but by now it is clear that the eurozone will only be able to pull itself out of this crisis by means of more decisive action. One response, the recent easing of monetary policy by the European Central Bank (ECB), has, for the most part, been sharply and one-sidedly criticised in Germany. Monetary policy inaction seems to be the preferred option of many in Germany.
The authors discuss the following question: What would happen if the ECB failed to respond to the excessively low inflation and the weak economy? And what economic policy would be suitable under the current circumstances, if not monetary policy?
The aim of this paper is to examine what has been the role of information provision to the market throughout the crisis. We consider two main sources of information to the market, financial statements and information provided by credit rating agencies. We examine how these sources of information work and the effectiveness of their disclosure process during the crisis. Contrary to the commonly held view, fair value accounting did not have a major impact on the crisis development and severity. However, the structure and lack of accountability of credit rating agencies had a profound impact on their incentives, which may have jeopardized the accuracy of the whole rating process. We claim that the crisis experience has changed the way we think about information as well as market discipline and discuss policy implications and proposals for regulation. JEL Classification: G01, G24, G28, M41, M48
We report evidence that the presence of hidden liquidity is associated with greater liquidity in the order books, greater trading volume, and smaller price impact. Limit and market order submission behavior changes when hidden liquidity is present consistent with at least some traders being able to detect hidden liquidity. We estimate a model of liquidity provision that allows us to measure variations in the marginal and total payoffs from liquidity provision in states with and without hidden liquidity. Our estimates of the expected surplus to providers of visible and hidden liquidity are positive and typically of the order of one-half to one basis points per trade. The positive liquidity provider surpluses combined with the increased trading volume when hidden liquidity is present are both consistent with liquidity externalities.
Art-related non-fungible tokens (NFTs) took the digital art space by storm in 2021, generating massive amounts of volume and attracting a large number of users to a previously obscure part of blockchain technology. Still, very little is known about the attributes that influence the price of these digital assets. This paper attempts to evaluate the level of speculation associated with art NFTs, comprehend the characteristics that confer value on them and design a profitable trading strategy based on our findings. We analyze 860,067 art NFTs that have been deployed on the Ethereum blockchain and have been involved in 317,950 sales using machine learning methods to forecast the probability of sale, the trade frequency and the average price. We find that NFTs are highly speculative assets and that their price and recurrence of sale are heavily determined by the floor and the last sale prices, independent of any fundamental value.
We test two hypotheses, based on sexual selection theory, about gender differences in costly social interactions. Differential selectivity states that women invest less than men in interactions with new individuals. Differential opportunism states that women’s investment in social interactions is less responsive to information about the interaction’s payoffs. The hypotheses imply that women’s social networks are more stable and path dependent and composed of a greater proportion of strong relative to weak links. During their introductory week, we let new university students play an experimental trust game, first with one anonymous partner, then with the same and a new partner. Consistent with our hypotheses, we find that women invest less than men in new partners and that their investments are only half as responsive to information about the likely returns to the investment. Moreover, subsequent formation of students’ real social networks is consistent with the experimental results: being randomly assigned to the same introductory group has a much larger positive effect on women’s likelihood of reporting a subsequent friendship.
In the context of Brexit, changes to the regulatory architecture of CCPs that empower the European securities markets regulator are under way to prevent the threat of a regulatory race to the bottom. However, this empowerment currently leaves the national supervision of common European rules within the EU intact. This policy letter argues that supervisory arbitrage is as much a threat within the EU as outside of it, wherefore a common supervision of CCP rules in the EU is called for. The paper traces the origins of the current set-up and criticizes the current regulatory proposal by the EU Commission as too cumbersome while discussing possible ways forward to achieve European supervision. In contrast to the current proposal of the Commission, we call for a unified supervision within ESMA, combined with a European fiscal backstop.