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WE DECOMPOSE INDIVIDUAL INVESTORS’ PORTFOLIO RETURNS INTO PASSIVE BENCHMARK RETURNS, ACTIVE SECURITY SELECTION RETURNS, AND ACTIVE MARKET TIMING RETURNS. FOR THE AVERAGE INVESTOR IN OUR SAMPLE, PASSIVE BENCHMARK RETURNS EXPLAIN SOME 40% OF VARIATION IN LONGITUDINAL PORTFOLIO RETURNS, SECURITY SELECTION EXPLAINS AN ADDITIONAL 50%, AND MARKET TIMING PLAYS ONLY A MINOR ROLE. THIS STANDS IN STARK CONTRAST TO EARLIER RESULTS ON INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS WHERE PASSIVE BENCHMARK RETURNS (REFLECTING DIFFERENT ASSET ALLOCATION STRATEGIES) EXPLAIN OVER 90%. THE PREDOMINANCE OF SECURITY SELECTION COMES AT A COST FOR INDIVIDUAL INVESTORS: INVESTORS FROM THE HIGHEST QUINTILE IN TERMS OF SECURITY SELECTION ACTIVITY UNDERPERFORM THEIR PEERS FROM THE LOWEST QUINTILE BY MORE THAN 10 PERCENTAGE POINTS PER YEAR. TRANSACTION COSTS EXPLAIN ONLY PART OF THIS UNDERPERFORMANCE. THE LESS INVESTORS DIVERSIFY, THE WORSE THEY DO.
The German corporate governance system has long been cited as the standard example of an insider-controlled and stakeholder-oriented system. We argue that despite important reforms and substantial changes of individual elements of the German corporate governance system the main characteristics of the traditional German system as a whole are still in place. However, in our opinion the changing role of the big universal banks in the governance undermines the stability of the corporate governance system in Germany. Therefore a breakdown of the traditional system leading to a control vacuum or a fundamental change to a capital market-based system could be in the offing.
In diesem Beitrag wird ein Vorschlag vorgestellt, wie es trotz langfristiger Niedrigzinsen möglich ist, die vor 18 Jahren eingeführte Riester-Rente so umzugestalten, dass alle Beteiligten davon profitieren. Wird die Mindestauszahlung am Ende der Vertragslaufzeit nur für die Eigenbeiträge, nicht aber für die staatlichen Zulagen garantiert, können deutlich höhere Renditen erzielt werden. Unter dem Strich haben dann nicht nur Privatleute mehr Geld aus ihrer Altersvorsorge, sondern der Staat wird mehr Steuern einnehmen und die Anbieter haben mehr Spielraum für bedarfsgerechte Produktgestaltung.
ON JUNE 18TH, WIRECARD’S SHARE PRICE PLUMMETED BY MORE THAN 60% FOLLOWING THE FIRM’S ADMISSION OF BEING SUBJECT TO “ENORMOUS FRAUD” AND BILLIONS OF EUROS MISSING. THIS REPORT DOCUMENTS GERMAN RETAIL INVESTORS’ RESPONSE AND FINDS THAT THE POPULARITY OF WIRECARD AMONG RETAIL INVESTORS LED TO SUBSTANTIAL LOSSES IN THEIR PORTFOLIOS. THESE LOSSES WERE EXACERBATED BY STRONG BUYING SENTIMENT AFTER THE ANNOUNCEMENT. THE FAILING STOCK WAS PURCHASED BY INVESTORS ALREADY ENGAGED IN IT AS WELL AS NON-EXPOSED CUSTOMERS.
We use minutes from 17,000 financial advisory sessions and corresponding client portfolio data to study how active client involvement affects advisor recommendations and portfolio outcomes. We find that advisors confronted with acquiescent clients stick to their standards and recommend expensive but well diversified mutual fund portfolios. However, if clients take an active role in the meetings, advisors deviate markedly from their standards, resulting in poorer portfolio diversification and lower Sharpe ratios. Our findings that advisors cater to client requests parallel the phenomenon of doctors prescribing antibiotics to insistent patients even if inappropriate, and imply that pandering diminishes the quality of advice.
The European Commission has published a Green Paper outlining possible measures to create a single market for capital in Europe. Our comments on the Commission’s capital markets union project use the functional finance approach as a starting point. Policy decisions, according to the functional finance perspective, should be essentially neutral (agnostic) in terms of institutions (level playing field). Our main angle, from which we assess proposals for the capital markets union agenda, are information asymmetries and the agency problems (screening, monitoring) which arise as a result. Within this perspective, we make a number of more specific proposals.