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Background: Nitric oxide (NO) is an essential vasodilator. In vascular diseases, oxidative stress attenuates NO signaling by both chemical scavenging of free NO and oxidation and down-regulation of its major intracellular receptor, the alpha/beta heterodimeric heme-containing soluble guanylate cyclase (sGC). Oxidation can also induce loss of sGC's heme and responsiveness to NO.
Results: sGC activators such as BAY 58-2667 bind to oxidized/heme-free sGC and reactivate the enzyme to exert disease-specific vasodilation. Here we show that oxidation-induced down-regulation of sGC protein extends to isolated blood vessels. Mechanistically, degradation was triggered through sGC ubiquitination and proteasomal degradation. The heme-binding site ligand, BAY 58-2667, prevented sGC ubiquitination and stabilized both alpha and beta subunits.
Conclusion: Collectively, our data establish oxidation-ubiquitination of sGC as a modulator of NO/cGMP signaling and point to a new mechanism of action for sGC activating vasodilators by stabilizing their receptor, oxidized/heme-free sGC.
This article shows that investors financing a portfolio of projects may use the depth of their financial pockets to overcome entrepreneurial incentive problems. Competition for scarce informed capital at the refinancing stage strengthens investors’ bargaining positions. And yet, entrepreneurs’ incentives may be improved, because projects funded by investors with ‘‘shallow pockets’’ must have not only a positive net present value at the refinancing stage, but one that is higher than that of competing portfolio projects. Our article may help understand provisions used in venture capital finance that limit a fund’s initial capital and make it difficult to add more capital once the initial venture capital fund is raised. (JEL G24, G31)
This paper shows that active investors, such as venture capitalists, can affect the speed at which new ventures grow. In the absence of product market competition, new ventures financed by active investors grow faster initially, though in the long run those financed by passive investors are able to catch up. By contrast, in a competitive product market, new ventures financed by active investors may prey on rivals that are financed by passive investors by “strategically overinvesting” early on, resulting in long-run differences in investment, profits, and firm growth. The value of active investors is greater in highly competitive industries as well as in industries with learning curves, economies of scope, and network effects, as is typical for many “new economy” industries. For such industries, our model predicts that start-ups with access to venture capital may dominate their industry peers in the long run. JEL Classifications: G24; G32 Keywords: Venture capital; dynamic investment; product market competition
We study a model of “information-based entrenchment” in which the CEO has private information that the board needs to make an efficient replacement decision. Eliciting the CEO’s private information is costly, as it implies that the board must pay the CEO both higher severance pay and higher on-the-job pay. While higher CEO pay is associated with higher turnover in our model, there is too little turnover in equilibrium. Our model makes novel empirical predictions relating CEO turnover, severance pay, and on-the-job pay to firm-level attributes such as size, corporate governance, and the quality of the firm’s accounting system.
This paper argues that banks must be sufficiently levered to have first-best incentives to make new risky loans. This result, which is at odds with the notion that leverage invariably leads to excessive risk taking, derives from two key premises that focus squarely on the role of banks as informed lenders. First, banks finance projects that they do not own, which implies that they cannot extract all the profits. Second, banks conduct a credit risk analysis before making new loans. Our model may help understand why banks take on additional unsecured debt, such as unsecured deposits and subordinated loans, over and above their existing deposit base. It may also help understand why banks and finance companies have similar leverage ratios, even though the latter are not deposit takers and hence not subject to the same regulatory capital requirements as banks.
Background The effect of additional treatment strategies with antineoplastic agents on intraperitoneal tumor stimulating interleukin levels are unclear. Taurolidine and Povidone-iodine have been mainly used for abdominal lavage in Germany and Europe. Methods In the settings of a multicentre (three University Hospitals) prospective randomized controlled trial 120 patients were randomly allocated to receive either 0.5% taurolidine/2,500 IU heparin (TRD) or 0.25% povidone-iodine (control) intraperitoneally for resectable colorectal, gastric or pancreatic cancers. Due to the fact that IL-1beta (produced by macrophages) is preoperatively indifferent in various gastrointestinal cancer types our major outcome criterion was the perioperative (overall) level of IL-1beta in peritoneal fluid. Results Cytokine values were significantly lower after TRD lavage for IL-1beta, IL-6, and IL-10. Perioperative complications did not differ. The median follow-up was 50.0 months. The overall mortality rate (28 vs. 25, p = 0.36), the cancer-related death rate (17 vs. 19, p = .2), the local recurrence rate (7 vs. 12, p = .16), the distant metastasis rate (13 vs. 18, p = 0.2) as well as the time to relapse were not statistically significant different. Conclusion Reduced cytokine levels might explain a short term antitumorigenic intraperitoneal effect of TRD. But, this study analyzed different types of cancer. Therefore, we set up a multicentre randomized trial in patients undergoing curative colorectal cancer resection. Trial registration : ISRCTN66478538