Refine
Document Type
- Working Paper (8) (remove)
Has Fulltext
- yes (8)
Is part of the Bibliography
- no (8)
Keywords
- Justification (4)
- Critique (2)
- Gerechtigkeit (2)
- Normative Orders (2)
- Normative Ordnungen (2)
- Rechtfertigung (2)
- Democracy (1)
- Demokratie (1)
- Equality (1)
- Globalisierung (1)
Institute
Die Herausbildung normativer Ordnungen : zur Idee eines interdisziplinären Forschungsprogramms
(2010)
Ein geistes- und sozialwissenschaftliches Forschungsprogramm betritt mit der These, dass wir in einer Zeit tiefgreifender sozialer Veränderungen leben, kein Neuland. Ein thematischer Fokus auf die Frage der Herausbildung normativer Ordnungen mit Bezug auf die entsprechenden Verschiebungen, Umbrüche und Konflikte in verschiedenen Gesellschaften und auf transnationaler Ebene bringt dagegen etwas Neues und Wichtiges ans Licht. Das ist jedenfalls unsere Überzeugung.
Noumenal Power
(2014)
In political or social philosophy, we speak about power all the time. Yet the meaning of this important concept is rarely made explicit, especially in the context of normative discussions. But as with many other concepts, once one considers it more closely, fundamental problems arise, such as whether a power relation is necessarily a relation of subordination and domination. In the following, I suggest a novel understanding of what power is and what it means to exercise it.
The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the concept of solidarity and distinguish various conceptions of solidarity that differ depending on social and normative contexts. The analysis helps to clarify both the different meanings of the term “solidarity” (and the different normative conceptions) and to avoid some of its pitfalls. The latter stem from making false connections between these conceptions, such as the assumption that solidarity must always be of an ethical or nationalist nature, that it is categorially different from justice or is always supererogatory. Solidarity as a virtue comes in many forms and with many justifications and grounds, and one must not reduce this plurality, but instead describe it properly. As already indicated, this opens up the possibility of conflicts between these contexts and dimensions of solidarity. The (as argued) “normatively dependent” concept of solidarity does not tell us to which form we ought to accord priority.
Ernst Bloch pointed out in a particularly emphatic way that the concept of human dignity featured centrally in historical struggles against different forms of unjustified rule, i.e. domination – to which one must add that it continues to do so to the present day. The “upright gait,” putting an end to humiliation and insult: this is the most powerful demand, in both political and rhetorical terms, that a “human rights-based” claim expresses. It marks the emergence of a radical, context-transcending reference point immanent to social conflicts which raises fundamental questions concerning the customary opposition between immanent and transcendent criticism. For within the idiom of demanding respect for human dignity, a right is invoked “here and now,” in a particular, context-specific form, which at its core is owed to every human being as a person. Thus Bloch is in one respect correct when he asserts that human rights are not a natural “birthright” but must be achieved through struggle; but in another respect this struggle can develop its social power only if it has a firm and in a certain sense “absolute” normative anchor. Properly understood, it becomes apparent that these social conflicts always affect “two worlds”: the social reality, on the one hand, which is criticized in part or radically in the light of an ideal normative dimension, on the other. For those who engage in this criticism there is no doubt that the normative dimension is no less real than the reality to which they refuse to resign themselves. Those who critically transcend reality always also live elsewhere.
Very few people doubt that it is a fundamental demand of justice that members of legal-political normative orders ought to have legal rights that define their basic standing as subjects of such an order. But when it comes to the concrete understanding of such rights, debates abound. What is the nature of these rights – are they an expression of the sovereign will of individuals, or are they based on important human interests? How should these rights be justified – do they have a particular moral ground, and if so, only one or many?
This paper challenges widespread assumptions in trust research according to which trust and conflict are opposing terms or where trust is generally seen as a value. Rather, it argues that trust is only valuable if properly justified, and it places such justifications in contexts of social and political conflict. For these purposes, the paper suggests a distinction between a general concept and various conceptions of trust, and it defines the concept as a four-place one. With regard to the justification of trust, a distinction between internal and full justification is introduced, and the justification of trust is linked to relations of justification between trusters and trusted. Finally, trust in conflict(s) emerges were such relations exist among the parties of a conflict, often by way of institutional mediation.
The title I have chosen seems to signal a tension, even a contradiction, in a number of respects. Democracy appears to be a form of political organisation and government in which, through general and public participatory procedures, a sufficiently legitimate political will is formed which acquires the force of law. Justice, by contrast, appears to be a value external to this context which is not so much linked to procedures of “input” or “throughput” legitimation but is understood instead as an output- or outcome-oriented concept. At times, justice is even understood as an otherworldly idea which, when transported into the Platonic cave, merely causes trouble and ends up as an undemocratic elite project. In methodological terms, too, this difference is sometimes signalled in terms of a contrast between a form of “worldly” political thought and “abstract” and otherworldly philosophical reflection on justice. In my view, we are bound to talk past the issues to be discussed under the heading “transnational justice and democracy” unless we first root out false dichotomies such as the ones mentioned. My thesis will be that justice must be “secularised” or “grounded” both with regard to how we understand it and to its application to relations beyond the state.
Den Menschen als vernunftbegabtes Wesen, als animal rationale, zu begreifen heißt, ihn als rechtfertigendes Wesen anzusehen. Die Vernunft ist die Fähigkeit, sich anhand rechtfertigender Gründe in der Welt zu orientieren. Denn „ratio, raison, reason bedeutet“, wie Tugendhat hervorhebt, „ebenso sehr ‚Grund‘ wie ‚Vernunft‘. Das Vermögen der Vernunft ist die Fähigkeit, für seine Meinungen und für seine Handlungen Rede und Antwort stehen zu können; lat. rationem reddere, griech. logon didonai.“ Dieses Rede-und-Antwort-Stehen ist eine soziale Praxis kulturell und historisch situierter Wesen, die einerseits frei sind, ihre Gründe zu wählen und zu prüfen, andererseits aber daran gebunden, welche Gründe ihnen zur Verfügung stehen und welche als gut oder rechtfertigend gelten. Der Raum der Gründe ist ein Raum der Rechtfertigungen, die nicht nur Einzelhandlungen, sondern auch komplexe Handlungsordnungen, also soziale Verhältnisse und politische Institutionen, legitimieren.
Menschen sind aber auch erzählende Wesen. Der Raum der Gründe, in dem sie sich orientieren, ist kein nackter Raum einzelner Sätze oder gar Normen, sondern bevölkert von Narrativen.