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Sobre la libertad política
(1998)
Este artículo presenta un argumento en favor de un concepción intersubjetivista de la libertad política constituida por cinco diferentes nociones de autonomía: moral, ética, legal, política y social. Más allá de las nociones estrictamente liberales o comunitarias, negativas o positivas, el concepto de libertad política incluye todas aquellas libertades que los ciudadanos, en tanto continentes y usuarios autónomos de la libertad, pueden conceder y garantizar de forma recíproca y general. Así, en la base de este concepto reposa un principio de justiticación moral y política.
Professor Dr. Karl-Otto Apel, Emeritus für Philosophie an der Goethe-Universität, ist am 15. Mai 2017 im Alter von 95 Jahren an seinem Wohnort in Niedernhausen im Taunus gestorben. Er war einer der wichtigsten Philosophen seiner Zeit und hat die Philosophie in Deutschland und weit darüber hinaus nachhaltig geprägt.
Den Menschen als vernunftbegabtes Wesen, als animal rationale, zu begreifen heißt, ihn als rechtfertigendes Wesen anzusehen. Die Vernunft ist die Fähigkeit, sich anhand rechtfertigender Gründe in der Welt zu orientieren. Denn „ratio, raison, reason bedeutet“, wie Tugendhat hervorhebt, „ebenso sehr ‚Grund‘ wie ‚Vernunft‘. Das Vermögen der Vernunft ist die Fähigkeit, für seine Meinungen und für seine Handlungen Rede und Antwort stehen zu können; lat. rationem reddere, griech. logon didonai.“ Dieses Rede-und-Antwort-Stehen ist eine soziale Praxis kulturell und historisch situierter Wesen, die einerseits frei sind, ihre Gründe zu wählen und zu prüfen, andererseits aber daran gebunden, welche Gründe ihnen zur Verfügung stehen und welche als gut oder rechtfertigend gelten. Der Raum der Gründe ist ein Raum der Rechtfertigungen, die nicht nur Einzelhandlungen, sondern auch komplexe Handlungsordnungen, also soziale Verhältnisse und politische Institutionen, legitimieren.
Menschen sind aber auch erzählende Wesen. Der Raum der Gründe, in dem sie sich orientieren, ist kein nackter Raum einzelner Sätze oder gar Normen, sondern bevölkert von Narrativen.
Noumenal Power
(2014)
In political or social philosophy, we speak about power all the time. Yet the meaning of this important concept is rarely made explicit, especially in the context of normative discussions. But as with many other concepts, once one considers it more closely, fundamental problems arise, such as whether a power relation is necessarily a relation of subordination and domination. In the following, I suggest a novel understanding of what power is and what it means to exercise it.
The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the concept of solidarity and distinguish various conceptions of solidarity that differ depending on social and normative contexts. The analysis helps to clarify both the different meanings of the term “solidarity” (and the different normative conceptions) and to avoid some of its pitfalls. The latter stem from making false connections between these conceptions, such as the assumption that solidarity must always be of an ethical or nationalist nature, that it is categorially different from justice or is always supererogatory. Solidarity as a virtue comes in many forms and with many justifications and grounds, and one must not reduce this plurality, but instead describe it properly. As already indicated, this opens up the possibility of conflicts between these contexts and dimensions of solidarity. The (as argued) “normatively dependent” concept of solidarity does not tell us to which form we ought to accord priority.
Very few people doubt that it is a fundamental demand of justice that members of legal-political normative orders ought to have legal rights that define their basic standing as subjects of such an order. But when it comes to the concrete understanding of such rights, debates abound. What is the nature of these rights – are they an expression of the sovereign will of individuals, or are they based on important human interests? How should these rights be justified – do they have a particular moral ground, and if so, only one or many?
Allen Buchanan argues that a particular set of false factual beliefs, especially when part of a comprehensive ideology, can lead persons to develop ‘morally conservative’ convictions that stand in the way of realising justice even though these persons have a ‘firm grasp of correct principles of justice and a robust commitment to their realisation’. In my remarks, I raise some questions concerning the core argument: How ‘firm’ can a grasp of principles of justice be if a person is blind to the realities of injustice? And how ‘sincerely committed’ to justice can such an injustice-insensitive person be? Alternatively: How firm is that grasp or commitment if one has a radically pessimistic view about human nature so that one does not believe that (egalitarian) justice can or could ever be realised? Secondly, I ask: If such ideologies or false beliefs are in play in reproducing injustice, do they not also ‘mask’ existing injustices?
This paper challenges widespread assumptions in trust research according to which trust and conflict are opposing terms or where trust is generally seen as a value. Rather, it argues that trust is only valuable if properly justified, and it places such justifications in contexts of social and political conflict. For these purposes, the paper suggests a distinction between a general concept and various conceptions of trust, and it defines the concept as a four-place one. With regard to the justification of trust, a distinction between internal and full justification is introduced, and the justification of trust is linked to relations of justification between trusters and trusted. Finally, trust in conflict(s) emerges were such relations exist among the parties of a conflict, often by way of institutional mediation.