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The introduction of a common currency as well as the harmonization of rules and regulations in Europe has significantly reduced distance in all its guises. With reduced costs of overcoming space, this emphasizes centripetal forces and it should foster consolidation of financial activity. In a national context, as a rule, this led to the emergence of one financial center. Hence, Europeanization of financial and monetary affairs could foretell the relegation of some European financial hubs such as Frankfurt and Paris to third-rank status. Frankfurt’s financial history is interesting insofar as it has lost (in the 1870s) and regained (mainly in the 1980s) its preeminent place in the German context. Because Europe is still characterized by local pockets of information-sensitive assets as well as a demand for variety the national analogy probably does not hold. There is room in Europe for a number of financial hubs of an international dimension, including Frankfurt.
Stakeholderorientierung, Systemhaftigkeit und Stabilität der Corporate Governance in Deutschland
(2006)
Since the time of Germany’s belated industrialisation, corporate governance in Germany has been stakeholder oriented in the dual sense of attaching importance to the interests of stakeholders who are not at the same time shareholders, and of providing certain opportunities for these stakeholders to influence corporate decisions. Corporate governance is also systemic. It is a system of elements that are complementary to each other, and also consistent. In other word, it is composed of elements for which it is important that they fit together well, and in the German case these elements did fit together well until quite recently. Corporate governance as a system is itself an element of the German bank-based financial system at large and possibly even of the entire German business and economic system. Stakeholder orientation of governance is consistent with the general structure this system, and even represents one of its central elements. In retrospect, German corporate governance has also proved to be surprisingly stable. Its fundamental traits date back to the turn from the 19th to the 20th century. There are strong reasons to assume that the systemic features, that is, its complementarity and consistency, have greatly contributed to its past stability. Since about ten years now, there are growing tendencies to question the viability and stability of the German corporate governance system and even the financial system as a whole. One of the central topics in the new debate concerns the stakeholder orientation of the system, which some observers and critics consider as the main weakness of the “German model” under the increasing pressures of globalisation and European integration. As far as their development over time is concerned, systems of complementarity elements exhibit certain peculiarities: (1) They do not adjust easily to changing circumstances. (2) Changes concerning important individual elements, such as the stakeholder orientation of governance, tend to jeopardize the viability and the stability of the entire system. (3) While they appear to be stable, systems shaped by complementary may simply be rigid and tend to break under strong external pressure. “Breaking” means that a system undergoes a fundamental transformation. It seems plausible to assume that the German financial system is already in the middle of such a transformation. It is yet another consequence of its systemic character that this transformation is not likely to be a smooth and gradual process and that it will not lead to a “mixed model” but rather to the adoption of a capital market-based financial system as it prevails in the Anglo-Saxon countries. In such a system, corporate governance cannot be geared to catering to the interests of stakeholders, and an active role for them would not even make any economic sense.
Pensions- und Finanzsysteme in Europa : ein Vergleich unter dem Gesichtspunkt der Komplementarität
(2001)
Die Debatte über die optimale Ausgestaltung der Alterssicherung wird in jüngster Zeit äußerst kontrovers und hitzig geführt. Dabei scheint uns ein zentraler Aspekt nicht genügend beachte zu werden: Welcher Zusammenhang besteht zwischen den Merkmalen des Finanzsystems und des Pensionssystems eines Landes? Weil dieser Zusammenhang wichtig sein könnte, wird in diesem Beitrag untersucht, ob es Unterschiede zwischen den Finanz- und Pensionssystemen in drei großen europäischen Ländern, Deutschland, Frankreich und Großbritannien, gibt, ob sich diese Unterschiede in charakteristischer Weise entsprechen und ob sich über diese Entsprechungen hinaus auch Wechselwirkungen zwischen dem Finanzsystem und dem Pensionssystem eines Landes nachweisen lassen.
Zur Beantwortung dieser Fragen wird in einem ersten Schritt kurz die Unterschiedlichkeit der Finanz- und Pensionssysteme zwischen den drei Ländern skizziert, und es werden parallelen zwischen diesen Unterschieden nachgewiesen. Daran anschließend werden die Zusammenhänge zwischen der Ausgestaltung der gesetzlichen Alterssicherung und der volkswirtschaftlichen Risikoallokation sowie der Ausgestaltung der betrieblichen Alterssicherung für die Unternehmensstrategien, -finanzierung und –verfassung betrachtet. Dabei lässt sich zeigen, dass es sowohl in Deutschland als auch in Großbritannien eine – wenn auch vollkommen unterschiedlich ausgeprägte – Komplementarität zwischen Finanz- und Pensionssystem gibt, während sich ein solcher Zusammenhang für Frankreich nicht konstatieren lässt. Abschließend werden wirtschaftspolitische Implikationen dieses Zusammenhangs angesprochen
Bericht der Arbeitsgruppe Technik zur Vorbereitung des Programms "Retrospektive Digitalisierung von Bibliotheksbeständen" im Förderbereich "Verteilte Digitale Forschungsbibliothek" Arbeitssitzungen am 14. Mai 1996 (Frankfurt a. M.), 29.-30. Juli 1996 (München), 12.-13. Dezember 1996 (Göttingen) Mitglieder der Arbeitsgruppe: Prof. Dr. Rudolf Bayer, Technische Universität München, Fakultät für Informatik Dr. Jürgen Bunzel, Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, Bonn Dr. Marianne Dörr, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek München Dr. Reinhard Ecker, Beilstein-Institut bzw. ABC Datenservice GmbH, Frankfurt/Main Dipl.-Math. Heinz-Werner Hoffmann, Hochschulbibliothekszentrum NRW, Köln (als Gast für die AG der Verbundsysteme) Dr. Norbert Lossau, Niedersächsische Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Göttingen (DFG-Projekt ‘Verteilte Digitale Forschungsbibliothek’) Prof. Dr. Elmar Mittler, Niedersächsische Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Göttingen Dipl.-Inf. Christian Mönch, FB Informatik der J.W. Goethe-Universität Frankfurt Dr. Wilhelm R. Schmidt, Stadt- und Universitätsbibliothek Frankfurt Dr. Hartmut Weber, Landesarchivdirektion, Stuttgart
The nucleosynthesis of elements beyond iron is dominated by neutron captures in the s and r processes. However, 32 stable, proton-rich isotopes cannot be formed during those processes, because they are shielded from the s-process flow and r-process β-decay chains. These nuclei are attributed to the p and rp process.
For all those processes, current research in nuclear astrophysics addresses the need for more precise reaction data involving radioactive isotopes. Depending on the particular reaction, direct or inverse kinematics, forward or time-reversed direction are investigated to determine or at least to constrain the desired reaction cross sections.
The Facility for Antiproton and Ion Research (FAIR) will offer unique, unprecedented opportunities to investigate many of the important reactions. The high yield of radioactive isotopes, even far away from the valley of stability, allows the investigation of isotopes involved in processes as exotic as the r or rp processes.