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We make three points. First, the decade before the financial crisis in 2007 was characterized by a collapse in the yield on TIPS. Second, estimated VARs for the federal funds rate and the TIPS yield show that while monetary policy shocks had negligible effects on the TIPS yield, shocks to the latter had one-to-one effects on the federal funds rate. Third, these findings can be rationalized in a New Keynesian model.
We study the responses of residential property and equity prices, inflation and economic activity to monetary policy shocks in 17 countries, using data spanning 1986-2006, using single-country VARs and panel VARs in which we distinguish between groups of countries depending on their financial systems. The effect of monetary policy on property prices is about three times as large as its impact on GDP. Using monetary policy to guard against financial instability by offsetting asset-price movements thus has sizable effects on economic activity. While the financial structure influences the impact of policy on asset prices, its importance appears limited.
In this paper we assemble an annual data set on broad and narrow money, prices, real economic activity and interest rates in Ireland from a variety of sources for the period 1933-2012. We discuss in detail how the data set is constructed and what assumptions we have made to do so. Furthermore, we estimate a simple SVAR model to provide some empirical evidence on the behaviour of these time series. Money supply shocks appear to be the most important drivers of both money and prices. Interest rate shocks, which capture monetary policy, play an important role driving output and, of course, interest rates. The GDP shocks, which raise prices, seem of less importance.
Since the 1970s, the overarching view in the literature has been that a Phillips curve relationship did not exist in Ireland prior to the 1979 exchange rate break with Sterling. It was argued that, as a small open economy, prices were determined externally. To test this relationship, we study the determination of inflation between 1926 and 2012, a longer sample period than any previously used. We find that the difference between unemployment and the NAIRU is a significant determinant of inflation both in the full sample and in the subsamples spanning the periods before and after the Sterling parity link.
Expectations of Sterling returning to Gold have been disregarded in empirical work on the US dollar – Sterling exchange rate in the early 1920s. We incorporate such considerations in a PPP model of the exchange rate, letting the probability of a return to gold follow a logistic function. We draw several conclusions: (i) the PPP model works well from spring 1919 to spring 1925; (ii) wholesale prices outperform consumer prices; (iii) allowing for a return to gold leads to a higher speed of adjustment of the exchange rate to PPP; (iv) interest rate differentials and the relative monetary base are crucial determinants of the expected return to gold; (v) the probability of a return to Gold peaked at about 72% in late 1924 and but fell to about 60% in early 1925; and (vi) our preferred model does not support the Keynes’ view that Sterling was overvalued after the return to gold.
This European Policy Analysis discusses the need to strengthen the institutions underpinning the euro and makes several policy recommendations. The Stability and Growth Pact must be reinforced, have greater automaticity and entail graduated sanctions. Fiscal surveillance must be improved through the establishment of a European Fiscal Stability Agency. Finally, the European Financial Stability Facility must be made permanent.
At the upcoming G20 meetings the issue what can be done to avoid a repetition of the current deep financial crisis will again be debated. Much attention and criticism will be directed to central banks. That is unavoidable: central banks must never again permit the development of financial imbalances that are large enough to lead to the collapse of major parts of the financial system when they unwind. In the future, policy makers must “lean against the wind” and tighten financial conditions if they perceive that imbalances are forming, even if there is little hard data to rely on. And they must be mindful that the costs of acting too late can dwarf those of acting too early.