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Sind Sanktionen nachhaltig?
(2022)
Are sanctions sustainable?
(2022)
More European, more uniform
(2021)
The crisis management and deposit insurance (CMDI) framework in the euro area requires a reset. Although its policy objectives remain valid, the means of achieving them do not. As the euro area comes the end of the long transition period taken to implement the BRRD/SRMR, it should take the opportunity to reset expectations about resolution.
Above all, resolution should be for the many, not just the few. There should be a single presumptive path for dealing with failed banks: the use of bail-in to facilitate orderly liquidation under a solvent-wind down strategy. This will protect deposits and set the stage – together with the backstop that the European Stability Mechanism provides to the Single Resolution Fund (SRF) -- for the transformation of the SRF into the Single Deposit Guarantee Scheme (SDGS). To avoid forbearance, responsibility for emergency liquidity assistance (ELA) should rest, not with national central banks, but with the ECB as a single lender of last resort. Finally, national deposit guarantee schemes should function as institutional protection schemes and become investors of last resort in their member banks. Together, these measures would complete Banking Union, promote market discipline, avoid imposing additional burdens on taxpayers, help untie the doom loop between weak banks and weak governments, strengthen the euro and enhance financial stability.
Banks are not immune from COVID-19. The economic downturn may drive some banks to the point of non-viability (PONV). If so, is the resolution regime in the Euro-area ready to respond? No, for banks may not have the right amount of the right kind of liabilities to make bail-in work. That could lead to a banking crisis. The Euro area can avoid this risk, by arranging now for a recap later. This would plug the gap between what the failing bank has and what it would need to make bail-in work. To do so, banks would pay – possibly via the contributions they make to the Single Resolution Fund – a commitment fee to a European backstop authority for a mandatory, system-wide note issuance facility. This would compel each bank, as it approached or reached the PONV, to issue to the backstop, and the backstop to purchase from the bank, the obligations the failing bank needs in order to make bail-in work. Such obligations would take the form of “senior-most” non-preferred debt, and bail-in would stop with such debt. That would allow the SRB to use the bail-in tool to resolve the failed bank, reopen it and run it under a solvent wind-down strategy. That protects counterparties and customers and ensures the continuity of critical economic functions. It also keeps investors at risk and promotes market discipline. Above all, it preserves financial stability.