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Private equity fund managers are typically required to invest their own money alongside the fund. We examine how this coinvestment affects the acquisition strategy of leveraged buyout funds. In a simple model, where the investment and capital structure decisions are made simultaneously, we show that a higher coinvestment induces managers to chose less risky firms and use more leverage. We test these predictions in a unique sample of private equity investments in Norway, where the fund manager's taxable wealth is publicly available. Consistent with the model, portfolio company risk decreases and leverage ratios increase with the coinvestment fraction of the manager's wealth. Moreover, funds requiring a relatively high coinvestment tend to spread its capital over a larger number of portfolio firms, consistent with a more conservative investment policy.
The dynamics of entrepreneurial careers in high-tech ventures: experience, education, and exit
(2016)
We investigate the career dynamics of high-tech entrepreneurs by analyzing the exit choice of entrepreneurs: to found another firm, to become dependently employed, or to act as a business angel. Our detailed data resting on the CrunchBase online database indicate that founders stick with entrepreneurship as a serial entrepreneur or as an angel investor only in cases where the founder (1) had experience either in founding other startups or working for a startup, (2) had a ‘jack-of-all-trades’ education, or (3) achieved substantial financial success upon a venture capital exit transaction.
We investigate the differential effect of the COVID-19 shock to the stock market shock on the share prices of firms with different levels of ESG (Environmental, Social and Governance) scores. Thereby, we analyse whether and to what extent better ESG ratings provided insurance for investors in the stocks of those firms during this shock. We focus our analysis on the European market in which ESG investment plays a particularly important role. Using a broad sample of listed firms we provide mixed evidence. On the one hand, we show that immediately after the start of the shock firms with a higher ESG score outperformed their peers. On the other hand, this effect faded less than six weeks later. Given the quick recovery of the market our finding supports the idea that ESG stocks provide limited insurance in severe crises.
We investigate the decisions of listed firms to go private once again. We start by revealing that while a significant number of firms which go public is VC-backed, an overproportional share of these VC-backed firms go private later on (they stay on the exchange for an average of 8.5 years). We interpret this very robust pattern such that IPOs of VC-backed firms are to a large extent a temporary rather than a permanent feature of the corporate governance of these firms. We investigate various potential hypotheses why VCs actually seem to be able to bring marginal firms to the exchange by relating the going-private decisions to various characteristics of the IPO market as well as to VC characteristics. We find strong support for the certification ability of VCs: more experienced and reputable VCs are more able to bring marginal firms to public exchanges via an IPOs. These marginal firms backed-by more reputable and experienced VCs are more likely to go private later on. Hence, our analysis suggests that IPOs backed by experienced VCs are most likely to be a temporary rather than the final stage in the life of the portfolio firm. We find no support that reputable VCs underprice their IPO-exits more implying that they have no need to leave more money on the table to take the marginal firms public.
Broad, long-term financial and economic datasets are a scarce resource, in particular in the European context. In this paper, we present an approach for an extensible, i.e. adaptable to future changes in technologies and sources, data model that may constitute a basis for digitized and structured long- term, historical datasets. The data model covers specific peculiarities of historical financial and economic data and is flexible enough to reach out for data of different types (quantitative as well as qualitative) from different historical sources, hence achieving extensibility. Furthermore, based on historical German company and stock market data, we discuss a relational implementation of this approach.
This paper analyzes the influence Leveraged Buyouts (LBOs) have on the operating performance of the LBO target companies’ direct competitors. A unique and hand-collected data set on LBOs in the United States in the period 1985-2009 allows us to analyze the effects different restructuring activities as part of the LBO have on the competitors’ revenues. These restructuring activities include changes to leverage, governance, or operating business, as well as M&A activities of the LBO target company. We find that although LBOs itself have a negative influence on competitors’ revenue growth, some restructuring mechanisms might actually benefit competing companies.
This paper aims to analyze the effects of financial constraints and the financial crisis on the financing and investment policies of newly founded firms. Thereby, the analysis adds important new insights on a crucial segment of the economy. We make use of a large and comprehensive data set of French firms founded in the years 2004-2006, i.e. well before the financial crisis. Our panel data analysis shows that the global financial crisis imposed a shock (mostly demand-driven) on the financing as well as on the investments of these firms. Moreover, we find that financially constrained firms use less external debt financing and invest smaller amounts. They also rely on less trade credit. With regard to bank financing, newly founded firms which are more financially constrained accumulate less bank debt and repay initial bank debt slower than their non-financially constraint counterparts. Finally, we find that financially constrained firms are affected to a smaller degree by the financial crisis than their less financially constrained counterparts.
Little evidence exists on the financing decisions of newly founded firms or on the financing dynamics of these firms over their life cycle. We aim to help filling this gap by investigating the financing dynamics of 2,456 French manufacturing firms founded between 2004 and 2006 through their legally required and reported financial statements. Because we observe significant heterogeneity in the financing decision in the firms' founding year, we focus on analyzing whether these differences widen, persist, or converge by using different convergence concepts. We identify a persistence-cum-convergence pattern. We find the existence of ß-convergence (implying that e.g. firms with lower initial levels of debt accumulate more debt over time) but not of σ-convergence (i.e. we observe an increase in the cross-sectional dispersion of the financing structure). We also show that the dynamics of financing matter for the growth path of the firms.
We analyze the impact of decreases in available lending resources on quantitative and qualita- tive dimensions of firms’ patenting activities. We thereby make use of the European Banking Authority?s capital exercise to carve out the causal effect of bank lending on firm innovation. In order to do so we combine various datasets to derive information on firms’ financials, their patenting behaviors, as well as their relationships with their lenders. Building on this self- generated dataset, we provide support for the “less finance, less innovation” view. At the same time, we show that lower available financial resources for firms lead to improvement in the qualitative dimensions of their patents. Hence, we carve out a “less finance, less but better innovation” pattern.