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In memory of Brigitte Haar
(2021)
Nachruf auf Brigitte Haar (1965-2019).
The paper examines the importance of international labour standards for ESG reporting. International labour standards exist today for almost all working conditions. There are many reasons why ESG criteria should be based on these standards. This is already happening to some extent. However, the references to international labor standards should be expanded and the existing references deepened.
Women are overrepresented in informal employment in the Indian labour market. They also devote more time to unpaid care work than men do. The poor working conditions of women are attributable to this double burden of work. Due to the lack of regulatory measures to protect the interest of informal women workers along with rigid gender norms, women’s participation in paid work is drastically reduced. As far as unpaid care work is concerned, feminist economists have been striving to make such work visible for a long time now. There have been some developments in labour statistics, with time use surveys quantifying women’s paid and unpaid contributions to the economy. This article delves into the examination of unpaid care work in India with the help of the Indian government’s recent Time-use Survey. It attempts to study the connection between paid work and unpaid care work and its implications for the working conditions of women in India. Finally, it evaluates the ‘right to work’ as a possible solution by using the example of employment guarantee schemes in India.
We study the design features of disclosure regulations that seek to trigger the green transition of the global economy and ask whether such regulatory interventions are likely to bring about sufficient market discipline to achieve socially optimal climate targets.
We categorize the transparency obligations stipulated in green finance regulation as either compelling the standardized disclosure of raw data, or providing quality labels that signal desirable green characteristics of investment products based on a uniform methodology. Both categories of transparency requirements can be imposed at activity, issuer, and portfolio level.
Finance theory and empirical evidence suggest that investors may prefer “green” over “dirty” assets for both financial and non-financial reasons and may thus demand higher returns from environmentally-harmful investment opportunities. However, the market discipline that this negative cost of capital effect exerts on “dirty” issuers is potentially attenuated by countervailing investor interests and does not automatically lead to socially optimal outcomes.
Mandatory disclosure obligations and their (public) enforcement can play an important role in green finance strategies. They prevent an underproduction of the standardized high-quality information that investors need in order to allocate capital according to their preferences. However, the rationale behind regulatory intervention is not equally strong for all categories and all levels of “green” disclosure obligations. Corporate governance problems and other agency conflicts in intermediated investment chains do not represent a categorical impediment for green finance strategies.
However, the many forces that may prevent markets from achieving socially optimal equilibria render disclosure-centered green finance legislation a second best to more direct forms of regulatory intervention like global carbon taxation and emissions trading schemes. Inherently transnational market-based green finance concepts can play a supporting role in sustainable transition, which is particularly important as long as first-best solutions remain politically unavailable.
This paper argues that the key mechanisms protecting retail investors’ financial stake in their portfolio investments are indirect. They do not rely on actions by the investors or by any private actor directly charged with looking after investors’ interests. Rather, they are provided by the ecosystem that investors (are legally forced to) inhabit, as a byproduct of the mostly self-interested, mutually and legally constrained behavior of third parties without a mandate to help the investors (e.g., speculators, activists). This elucidates key rules, resolves the mandatory vs. enabling tension in corporate/securities law, and exposes passive investing’s fragile reliance on others’ trading.
Combining insights from the history of citizenship with contemporary legal analysis, this article both highlights and problematizes what we may call sorting strategies – restrictive closure and selective openness – which rely on ‘varieties of affluence’ (income, wealth, equity, credit, and the like) in shaping possibilities for entry, settlement, and naturalization. By emphasizing the growing significance of income barriers and thresholds on the one hand, and fast-tracked investment-based entryways on the other, this article investigates the role of wealth as both accelerator and barrier to citizenship, contributing to the varied toolbox used by governments to advance goals that may at times appear contradictory; these tools both tighten and relax the requirements of access to membership at the same time. These new developments represent different facets of the same trend. Without explicitly stating as much, programs that turn wealth into a core criterion for admission conceptually reignite an older, exclusive, and exclusionary vision according to which individuals must hold property (in land, resources, or in relation to one’s ‘dependents,’ including women, slaves, and children) in order to qualify as a citizen. While such a trajectory is no stranT8ger to ancient models, it raises profound challenges to modernist accounts of political membership that place equality at their core.
Private equity has grown remarkably in the last 30 years. Given its rise to prominence, exceptional profitability and a more prolific and publicly visible buyout activity, regulation in the private equity space seemed inevitable. The 2007 global financial crisis furnished an opportunity to doubt the industry’s role and magnify the key concerns, providing momentum for calls to regulate the industry more aggressively. Ultimately, the regulatory change came from the Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive (AIFMD), which has been described as one of the most rigorously debated and controversial pieces of financial regulation to ever emerge from the European Union (EU).
The AIFMD is unique and unprecedented, yet there has been very little written about it in the context of private equity. Therefore, this thesis makes a contribution to this area of research by examining the implications of AIFMD for private equity and arguing that this EU Directive has a re-shaping effect on the industry that inevitably marks the end of the light-touch regulation in this area. Whilst the desire of policymakers to act and intervene decisively during market
downturns is understandable, there is a risk that the response may not be appropriate and result in a crisis-induced over-reaction.
This thesis demonstrates, amongst other things, that the AIFMD has created a particularly
complex regulatory regime which for the hitherto unregulated or lightly regulated fund managers has had a significant effect in the EU and beyond. Examples of the most impactful
provisions relate to authorisation, marketing, depositaries, acquisition of control, remuneration, and transparency and disclosure. The implication are wide-ranging, and there is a clear conflict between the opportunities (e.g. EU passport, AIFMD as a global brand) and threats (e.g. excessive compliance costs, exodus of fund managers from the EU), which depend on a firm’s size, domicile and the gap needed to be aligned between the pre- and post-AIFMD regime.
Although there will be no stark triumph of one position over another in the assessment of the AIFMD until all of its elements are fully implemented, overall the impact of the Directive has been material, requiring substantial work to comply with (or adapt to) the requirements, which in some cases are not only particularly onerous and costly, but also a bit misguided, discouraging, or fairly irrelevant.
This article provides a novel explanation for the global intellectual property (IP) paradox, i.e. the consistent growth of the multilateral IP system in spite of mounting evidence that its effects are at best neutral if not disadvantageous for low-income and most middleincome countries and thus the majority of contracting states. It demonstrates that the multilateral IP system is deliberately structured as a virtual network that exhibits network effects similar to a social media platform, for example. The more members an IP treaty has, the more IP protection acceding states can secure for their nationals. Conversely, every accession enlarges the territory in which nationals of previous members can enjoy protection. Due to these increasing returns to adoption, signing up to and remaining part of the global IP network is attractive, irrespective of the immediate effects of a treaty.
According to the standard account, IPRs allocate objects to owners, just like ownership allocates real property. In this paper, I explain that this simplistic paradigm operates on the basis of three fictions: The first – truly Polanyian – fiction concerns IP subject matter that was originally not produced for sale but created for other purposes, e.g. private pleasure. The second fiction is that IP is treated as a marketable good whereas much IP, in particular works and signs, are embedded in communication. Finally, IP is a fictitious concept in that we speak of works, inventions, and other IP objects as of tangible commodities, where in fact IP objects only exist insofar and because we speak and regulate as if they exist as abstract “goods” of value.