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We determine optimal monetary policy under commitment in a forwardlooking New Keynesian model when nominal interest rates are bounded below by zero. The lower bound represents an occasionally binding constraint that causes the model and optimal policy to be nonlinear. A calibration to the U.S. economy suggests that policy should reduce nominal interest rates more aggressively than suggested by a model without lower bound. Rational agents anticipate the possibility of reaching the lower bound in the future and this amplifies the effects of adverse shocks well before the bound is reached. While the empirical magnitude of U.S. mark-up shocks seems too small to entail zero nominal interest rates, shocks affecting the natural real interest rate plausibly lead to a binding lower bound. Under optimal policy, however, this occurs quite infrequently and does not imply positive average inflation rates in equilibrium. Interestingly, the presence of binding real rate shocks alters the policy response to (non-binding) mark-up shocks.
The effects of public policy programmes which aim at internalising spill-overs due to successful innovation are analysed in a sequential double-sided moral hazard double-sided adverse selection framework. The central focus lies in analysing their impact on contract design. We show that in our framework only ex post grants are a robust instrument for implementing the first-best situation, whereas the success of guarantee programmes, ex ante grants and some public-private partnerships depends strongly on the characteristics of the project: in certain cases they not only give no further incentives but even destroy contract mechanisms and so worsen the outcome.
The effects of public policy programmes which aim at internalising spill-overs due to successful innovation are analysed in a sequential double-sided moral hazard double-sided adverse selection framework. The central focus lies in analysing their impact on contract design. We show that in our framework only ex post grants are a robust instrument for implementing the first-best situation, whereas the success of guarantee programmes, ex ante grants and some public-private partnerships depends strongly on the characteristics of the project: in certain cases they not only give no further incentives but even destroy contract mechanisms and so worsen the outcome.
The focus of the discussion at the conference on September 23, 2004 was on the long-term impact on capital markets and pension systems. The speakers tried to identify the direction and magnitude of potential changes as well as the likelihood of an eventual asset meltdown. The conference's objective was to combine insights from academia with those from the financial community in order to provide a more comprehensive outlook on capital market developments. Conference Reader Nr. 2005/01