Universitätspublikationen
Refine
Document Type
- Working Paper (6)
- Part of Periodical (2)
Has Fulltext
- yes (8)
Is part of the Bibliography
- no (8)
Keywords
This paper studies the interactions between corporate law and VC exits by acquisitions, an increasingly common source of VC-related litigation. We find that transactions by VC funds under liquidity pressure are characterized by (i) a substantially lower sale price; (ii) a greater probability of industry outsiders as acquirers; (iii) a positive abnormal return for acquirers. These features indicate the existence of fire sales, which satisfy VCs' liquidation preferences but hurt common shareholders, leaving board members with conflicting fiduciary duties and litigation risks. Exploiting an important court ruling that establishes the board’s fiduciary duties to common shareholders as a priority, we find that after the ruling maturing VCs become less likely to exit by fire sales and they distribute cash to their investors less timely. However, VCs experience more difficult fundraising ex-ante, highlighting the potential cost of a common-favoring regime. Overall the evidence has important implications for optimal fiduciary duty design in VC-backed start-ups.
We argue two alternative routes that lead entrepreneurial start-ups to acquisition outcomes instead of liquidation. On one hand, acquisitions can come about through the control route with external financers such as venture capitalists (VCs). VCs take control through their board seats along with other contractual rights that can bring about changes in a start-up necessary to successfully attract a strategic acquirer. Consistent with this view, we show that VCs often replace the founding entrepreneur as CEO long before an acquisition exit. On the other hand, acquisitions can come about through advice and support provided to the start-up, such as that provided by an incubator or technology park. Based on a sample of 251 Crunchbase companies in the U.S. over the years 2007 to 2014, we present evidence that is strongly consistent with these propositions. Further, we show that the data indicate a tension between VC-backing of start-ups resident in technology parks insofar as such start-ups are slower to become, and less likely to be, acquired.
After nearly two decades of US leadership during the 1980s and 1990s, are Europe’s venture capital (VC) markets in the 2000s finally catching up regarding the provision of financing and successful exits, or is the performance gap as wide as ever? Are we amid an overall VC performance slump with no encouraging news? We attempt to answer these questions by tracking over 40,000 VC-backed firms stemming from six industries in 13 European countries and the US between 1985 and 2009; determining the type of exit – if any – each particular firm’s investors choose for the venture.
A premise of the capabilities perspective in strategy is that firm-specific capabilities allow some firms to be unusually adept at exploiting growth opportunities. Since few firms have the capacity to internally generate the quantity or variety of strategic resources needed to exploit growth opportunities, the ability to externally acquire complementary resources is critical to the acquisition of competitive advantage. However, the external sourcing of resources exposes the firm’s strategic resources to risks of expropriation. We argue this threat gives capable firms incentive to use internally generated strategic resources to pursue growth opportunities before turning to external sources. A pecking order theory of strategic resource deployment is implied. Data from a 22-year sample of cross-border investment partnership decisions made by U.S.-based venture capital firms lend support to our theory.
This paper sets out to analyze the influence of different types of venture capitalists on the performance of their portfolio firms around and after IPO. We investigate the hypothesis that different governance structures, objectives, and track records of different types of VCs have a significant impact on their respective IPOs. We explore this hypothesis using a data set embracing all IPOs that have occurred on Germany's Neuer Markt. Our main finding is that significant differences among the different VCs exist. Firms backed by independent VCs perform significantly better two years after IPO as compared to all other IPOs, and their share prices fluctuate less than those of their counterparts in this period of time. On the contrary, firms backed by public VCs show relative underperformance. The fact that this could occur implies that market participants did not correctly assess the role played by different types of VCs.
Venture capital (VC) investment has long been conceptualized as a local business , in which the VC’s ability to source, syndicate, fund, monitor, and add value to portfolio firms critically depends on their access to knowledge obtained through their ties to the local (i.e., geographically proximate) network. Consistent with the view that local networks matter, existing research confirms that local and geographically distant portfolio firms are sourced, syndicated, funded, and monitored differently. Curiously, emerging research on VC investment practice within the United States finds that distant investments, as measured by “exits” (either initial public offering or merger & acquisition) out-perform local investments. These findings raise important questions about the assumed benefits of local network membership and proximity. To more deeply probe these questions, we contrast the deal structure of cross-border VC investment with domestic VC investment, and contrast the deal structure of cross-border VC investments that include a local
partner with those that do not. Evidence from 139,892 rounds of venture capital financing in the period 1980-2009 suggests that cross-border investment practice, in terms of deal sourcing, syndication, and performance indeed change with proximity, but that monitoring practices do not. Further, we find that the inclusion of a local partner in the investment syndicate yields surprisingly few benefits. This evidence, we argue, raises important questions about VC investment practice as well as the ability of firms to capture and lever the presumed benefits of network membership.