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Access to loans and other financial services is extremely valuable for micro-, small- and medium-sized enterprises in developing and transition countries as it enables their owners as well as their employees to exploit their economic potential and to increase their income. Although this insight has lead development aid institutions to undertake many attempts to create sustainable microfinance institutions, only a small fraction of these has been successful so far. This article analyses what determines the success of attempts to provide financial services in general, and credit in particular, to low income target groups in these countries. We argue that it is crucial to understand, and to mitigate or even eliminate in practice, the serious and numerous incentive problems at the level of the lending operations as well as those at the levels of the human resource management and the governance of microfinance institutions. We attempt to show moreover, that unsolved incentive problems at only one level will ultimately undermine any potential success at the other levels. In our paper, we first analyse information and incentive problems from a theoretical perspective, using and extending the well-known Stiglitz-Weiss model of credit rationing, and derive theoretical requirements for solutions of these problems. In the light of these considerations, we then discuss how problems are solved in practice. Section 3 deals with the credit relationship. Section 4 extends the argument by showing how incentive problems within the institution can be handled, and section 5 analyses corporate governance-related problems of development finance institutions as incentive problems. In section 6 it is demonstrated why, and how, the incentive problems at the different levels, as well as their solutions, are interrelated. From this we derive the proposition that, as the institutional devices for dealing with these problems constitute a complementary system, any sustainable solution requires consistent arrangements of all elements and at all levels of the system. In the last section we will show the potential of strategic networks to set up institutions which we consider to be consistent systems for successfully solving the problems at all three levels simultaneously.
The financial crisis of 2007-08 has stressed the importance of a sound financial system. Unlike other studies weighing the pros and cons of market versus bank-based systems, this paper investigates whether the main elements of the German financial system can be regarded as complementary and consistent. This assessment refers to the idea that there is a potential for positive interaction between different elements in the system that is actually used to make it more valuable to economy and society and more robust to crises. It is shown that the old German bank-based system, where the risk of long-term lending by large private commercial banks was limited by the membership in supervisory boards and strong personal ties between all stakeholders, was a consistent system of well-adjusted complementary elements. After reunification, a hybrid system has emerged where, on the one hand, public savings banks and cooperative banks maintain their role as lenders, but on the other, large private banks have withdrawn from their former dominant role in financing and corporate governance. It is argued that this transition to stronger capital-market and, accordingly, shareholder value orientations has occurred at the expense of consistency.
Die Macht der Ratingagenturen beruht auch auf den vielen Gesetzen und Verordnungen, die eine Orientierung an den Ratings der drei großen Agenturen vorschreiben, sagt Wirtschaftsprofessor Reinhard Schmidt. Um die Macht der Ratingagenturen zu begrenzen, empfiehlt er viele dieser Regeln ersatzlos zu streichen.
The German savings and cooperative banks of the 19th century were precursors of modern microfinance. They provided access to financial services for the majority of the German population, which was formerly excluded from bank funding. Furthermore, they did this at low costs for themselves and affordable prices for their clients. By creating networks of financially viable and stable financial institutions covering the entire country, they contributed significantly to building a sound and “inclusive” financial infrastructure in Germany. A look back at the history of German savings and cooperative banks and combining these experiences with the lessons learned from modern microfinance can guide current policy and be valuable for present and future models of microfinance business.
This paper aspires to provide an overview of the issue of diversity of banking and financial systems and its development over time from a positive and a normative perspective. In other word: how different are banks within a given country and how much do banking systems and entire financial systems differ between countries and regions, and do in-country diversity and between-country diversity change over time, as one would be inclined to expect as a consequence of globalization and increasingly global standards of regulation?
As the first part of this paper shows, the general answer to these questions is that there is still today a surprisingly high level of diversity in finance. This raises the two questions addressed in the second part of the paper: How can the persistence of diversity be explained, and how can it be assessed? In contrast to prevailing views, the author argues that persistent diversity should be regarded as valuable in a context in which there is no clear answer to the question of which structures of banking and financial systems are optimal from an economic perspective
Passt das deutsche Dreisäulensystem in eine zunehmend harmonisierte Bankenstruktur für Europa?
(2018)
Das deutsche Bankensystem ruht seit Jahrzehnten auf drei Säulen: den privaten Kreditbanken, einschließlich der großen Banken in Aktionärsbesitz, den öffentlichen Banken und den Genossenschaftsbanken. Fast nirgendwo anders in Europa hat ein solches Dreisäulensystem überlebt. Passt es also noch in ein Europa, in dem die Bankpolitik, die Regulierung und die Aufsicht inzwischen weitgehend in die Zuständigkeit der EU fallen? Für eine Bewahrung des Systems sprechen vor allem Gesichtspunkte der Stabilität. Angesichts ihrer Gruppenzugehörigkeit sind die deutschen "stakeholder-value-orientierten" Banken der Säulen 2 und 3 finanziell keineswegs weniger erfolgreich, sogar ein wenig erfolgreicher als die "shareholder-value-orientierten" Großbanken der Säule 1. Insbesondere schwanken ihre Geschäftszahlen deutlich weniger als jene der Großbanken, die in der Regel ein riskanteres Geschäftsmodell verfolgen. In vielen Privatbanken ist die Gewinnorientierung und damit auch die Bereitschaft, hohe Risiken einzugehen, aus ordnungspolitischer Sicht zu hoch, was die Systemstabilität tendenziell gefährdet. Zudem erfüllen die Genossenschaftsbanken und Sparkassen eine regionalpolitische Ausgleichsfunktion und haben eine gesamtwirtschaftlich stabilisierende Wirkung.