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Venture capital (VC) investment has long been conceptualized as a local business , in which the VC’s ability to source, syndicate, fund, monitor, and add value to portfolio firms critically depends on their access to knowledge obtained through their ties to the local (i.e., geographically proximate) network. Consistent with the view that local networks matter, existing research confirms that local and geographically distant portfolio firms are sourced, syndicated, funded, and monitored differently. Curiously, emerging research on VC investment practice within the United States finds that distant investments, as measured by “exits” (either initial public offering or merger & acquisition) out-perform local investments. These findings raise important questions about the assumed benefits of local network membership and proximity. To more deeply probe these questions, we contrast the deal structure of cross-border VC investment with domestic VC investment, and contrast the deal structure of cross-border VC investments that include a local
partner with those that do not. Evidence from 139,892 rounds of venture capital financing in the period 1980-2009 suggests that cross-border investment practice, in terms of deal sourcing, syndication, and performance indeed change with proximity, but that monitoring practices do not. Further, we find that the inclusion of a local partner in the investment syndicate yields surprisingly few benefits. This evidence, we argue, raises important questions about VC investment practice as well as the ability of firms to capture and lever the presumed benefits of network membership.
While record-making prices at art auctions receive headline news coverage, artists typically do not receive any direct proceeds from those sales. Early-stage creative work in any field is perennially difficult to value, but the valuation, reward, and incentivization for artistic labor are particularly fraught. A core challenge in studying the real return on artists’ work is the extreme difficulty accessing data from when an artwork was first sold. Galleries keep private records that are difficult to access and to match to public auction results. This paper, for the first time, uses archivally sourced primary market records, for the artists Jasper Johns and Robert Rauschenberg. Although this approach restricts the size of the data set, this innovative method shows much more accurate returns on art than typical regression and hedonic models. We find that if Johns and Rauschenberg had retained 10% equity in their work when it was first sold, the returns to them when the work was resold at auction would have outperformed the US S&P 500 by between 2 and 986 times. The implication of this work opens up vast policy recommendations with regard to secondary art market sales, entrepreneurial strategies using blockchain technology, and implications about how we compensate creative work.
Employing the art-collection records of Burton and Emily Hall Tremaine, we consider whether early-stage art investors can be understood as venture capitalists. Because the Tremaines bought artists’ work very close to an artwork’s creation, with 69% of works in our study purchased within one year of the year when they were made, their collecting practice can best be framed as venture-capital investment in art. The Tremaines also illustrate art collecting as social-impact investment, owing to their combined strategy of art sales and museum donations for which the collectors received a tax credit under US rules. Because the Tremaines’ museum donations took place at a time that U.S. marginal tax rates from 70% to 91%, the near “donation parity” with markets, creating a parallel to ESG investment in the management of multiple forms of value.
A premise of the capabilities perspective in strategy is that firm-specific capabilities allow some firms to be unusually adept at exploiting growth opportunities. Since few firms have the capacity to internally generate the quantity or variety of strategic resources needed to exploit growth opportunities, the ability to externally acquire complementary resources is critical to the acquisition of competitive advantage. However, the external sourcing of resources exposes the firm’s strategic resources to risks of expropriation. We argue this threat gives capable firms incentive to use internally generated strategic resources to pursue growth opportunities before turning to external sources. A pecking order theory of strategic resource deployment is implied. Data from a 22-year sample of cross-border investment partnership decisions made by U.S.-based venture capital firms lend support to our theory.
This paper investigates the effect of anticipated/experienced regret and pride on individual investors’ decisions to hold or sell a winning or losing investment, in the form of the disposition effect. As expected the results suggest that in the loss domain, low anticipated regret predicts a greater probability of selling a losing investment. While in the gain domain, high anticipated pride indicates a greater probability of selling a winning investment. The effects of high experienced regret/pride on the selling probability are found as well. An unexpected finding is that regret (pride) seems to be not only relevant for the loss (gain) domain, but also for the gain (loss) domain. In addition, this paper presents evidence of interconnectedness between anticipated and experienced emotions. The authors discuss the implications of these findings and possible avenues for further research.
According to disposition effect theory, people hold losing investments too long. However, many investors eventually sell at a loss, and little is known about which psychological factors contribute to these capitulation decisions. This study integrates prospect theory, utility maximization theory, and theory on reference point adaptation to argue that the combination of a negative expectation about an investment’s future performance and a low level of adaptation to previous losses leads to a greater capitulation probability. The test of this hypothesis in a dynamic experimental setting reveals that a larger total loss and longer time spent in a losing position lead to downward adaptations of the reference point. Negative expectations about future investment performance lead to a greater capitulation probability. Consistent with the theoretical framework, empirical evidence supports the relevance of the interaction between adaptation and expectation as a determinant of capitulation decisions. Keywords: Investments , Adaptation , Reference Point , Capitulation , Selling Decisions , Disposition Effect , Financial Markets JEL Classification: D91, D03, D81
This paper provides a review of the development of the non-fungible tokens (NFTs) market, with a particular focus on its pricing determinants, its current applications and future opportunities. We investigate the current state of the NFT markets and highlight the perception and expectations of investors towards these products. We summarize and compare the financial and econometric models that have been used in the literature for the pricing of non-fungible tokens with a special focus on their predictive performance. Our intention is to design a framework that can help understanding the price formation of NFTs. We further aim to shed light on the value creating determinants of NFTs in order to better understand the investors’ behavior on the blockchain.
Venture capital (VC) funds backed by large multi-fund families tend to perform substantially better due to cross-fund cash flows (CFCFs), a liquidity support mechanism provided by matching distributions and capital calls within a VC fund family. The dynamics of this mechanism coincide with the sensitivity of different stage projects owing to market liquidity conditions. We find that the early-stage funds demand relatively more intra-family CFCFs than later-stage funds during liquidity stress periods. We show that the liquidity improvement based on the timing of CFCF allocation reflects how fund families arrange internal liquidity provision and explains a large part of their outperformance.
We study the relevance of signaling and marketing as explanations for the discount control mechanisms that a closed-end fund may choose to adopt in its prospectus. These policies are designed to narrow the potential gap between share price and net asset value, measured by the fund’s discount. The two most common discount control mechanisms are explicit discretion to repurchase shares based on the magnitude of the fund discount and mandatory continuation votes that provide shareholders the opportunity to liquidate the fund. We find very limited evidence that a discount control mechanism serves as costly signal of information. Funds with mandatory voting are not more likely to delist than the rest of the CEFs in general or whenever the fund discount is large. Similarly, funds that explicitly discuss share repurchases as a potential response do not subsequently buy back shares more often when discounts do increase. Instead, the existence of these policies is more consistent with marketing explanations because the policies are associated with an increased probability of issuing more equity in subsequent periods.
The discount control mechanisms that closed-end funds often choose to adopt before IPO are supposedly implemented to narrow the difference between share price and net asset value. We find evidence that non-discretionary discount control mechanisms such as mandatory continuation votes serve as costly signals of information to reveal higher fund quality to investors. Rents of the skill signaled through the announcement of such policies accrue to managers rather than investors as differences in skill are revealed through growing assets under management rather than risk- adjusted performance.