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In nature, society and technology many disordered systems exist, that show emergent behaviour, where the interactions of numerous microscopic agents result in macroscopic, systemic properties, that may not be present on the microscopic scale. Examples include phase transitions in magnetism and percolation, for example in porous unordered media, biological, and social systems. Also technological systems that are explicitly designed to function without central control instances, like their prime example the Internet, or virtual networks, like the World Wide Web, which is defined by the hyperlinks from one web page to another, exhibit emergent properties. The study of the common network characteristics found in previously seemingly unrelated fields of science and the urge to explain their emergence, form a scientific field in its own right, the science of complex networks. In this field, methodologies from physics, leading to simplification and generalization by abstraction, help to shift the focus from the implementation's details on the microscopic level to the macroscopic, coarse grained system level. By describing the macroscopic properties that emerge from microscopic interactions, statistical physics, in particular stochastic and computational methods, has proven to be a valuable tool in the investigation of such systems. The mathematical framework for the description of networks is graph theory, in hindsight founded by Euler in 1736 and an active area of research since then. In recent years, applied graph theory flourished through the advent of large scale data sets, made accessible by the use of computers. A paradigm for microscopic interactions among entities that locally optimize their behaviour to increase their own benefit is game theory, the mathematical framework of decision finding. With first applications in economics e.g. Neumann (1944), game theory is an approved field of mathematics. However, game theoretic behaviour is also found in natural systems, e.g. populations of the bacterium Escherichia coli, as described by Kerr (2002). In the present work, a combination of graph theory and game theory is used to model the interactions of selfish agents that form networks. Following brief introductions to graph theory and game theory, the present work approaches the interplay of local self-organizing rules with network properties and topology from three perspectives. To investigate the dynamics of topology reshaping, coupling of the so called iterated prisoners' dilemma (IPD) to the network structure is proposed and studied in Chapter 4. In dependence of a free parameter in the payoff matrix, the reorganization dynamics result in various emergent network structures. The resulting topologies exhibit an increase in performance, measured by a variance of closeness, of a factor 1.2 to 1.9, depending in the chosen free parameter. Presented in Chapter 5, the second approach puts the focus on a static network structure and studies the cooperativity of the system, measured by the fixation probability. Heterogeneous strategies to distribute incentives for cooperation among the players are proposed. These strategies allow to enhance the cooperative behaviour, while requiring fewer total investments. Putting the emphasis on communication networks in Chapters 6 and 7, the third approach investigates the use of routing metrics to increase the performance of data packet transport networks. Algorithms for the iterative determination of such metrics are demonstrated and investigated. The most successful of these algorithms, the hybrid metric, is able to increase the throughput capacity of a network by a factor of 7. During the investigation of the iterative weight assignments a simple, static weight assignment, the so called logKiKj metric, is found. In contrast to the algorithmic metrics, it results in vanishing computational costs, yet it is able to increase the performance by a factor of 5.
Envy, the inclination to compare rewards, can be expected to unfold when inequalities in terms of pay-off differences are generated in competitive societies. It is shown that increasing levels of envy lead inevitably to a self-induced separation into a lower and an upper class. Class stratification is Nash stable and strict, with members of the same class receiving identical rewards. Upper-class agents play exclusively pure strategies, all lower-class agents the same mixed strategy. The fraction of upper-class agents decreases progressively with larger levels of envy, until a single upper-class agent is left. Numerical simulations and a complete analytic treatment of a basic reference model, the shopping trouble model, are presented. The properties of the class-stratified society are universal and only indirectly controllable through the underlying utility function, which implies that class-stratified societies are intrinsically resistant to political control. Implications for human societies are discussed. It is pointed out that the repercussions of envy are amplified when societies become increasingly competitive.
Human societies are characterized by three constituent features, besides others. (A) Options, as for jobs and societal positions, differ with respect to their associated monetary and non-monetary payoffs. (B) Competition leads to reduced payoffs when individuals compete for the same option as others. (C) People care about how they are doing relatively to others. The latter trait –the propensity to compare one’s own success with that of others– expresses itself as envy. It is shown that the combination of (A)–(C) leads to spontaneous class stratification. Societies of agents split endogenously into two social classes, an upper and a lower class, when envy becomes relevant. A comprehensive analysis of the Nash equilibria characterizing a basic reference game is presented. Class separation is due to the condensation of the strategies of lower-class agents, which play an identical mixed strategy. Upper-class agents do not condense, following individualist pure strategies. The model and results are size-consistent, holding for arbitrary large numbers of agents and options. Analytic results are confirmed by extensive numerical simulations. An analogy to interacting confined classical particles is discussed.